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Abstract This thesis incorporates non-economic concepts like values and norms into
public finance research. Perceived normative features of the tax system alone can affect
economic behaviour. This, in turn, has repercussions for the design of optimal tax
structures. Both theoretical and empirical aspects are analyzed.
Keywords: Taxation, incentive effects, social preferences.
Kurzzusammenfassung Diese Dissertation bezieht nicht-o¨konomische Konzepte wie
Werte und Normen in die finanzwissenschaftliche Forschung mit ein. Steuergerechtig-
keitsvorstellungen ko¨nnen o¨konomisches Verhalten beeinflussen. Dies wiederum hat
Auswirkungen auf das Design von optimalen Steuerstrukturen. Es werden sowohl theo-
retische als auch empirische Aspekte analysiert.
Schlagwo¨rter: Steuern, Anreizeffekte, soziale Pra¨ferenzen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and summary of the results
Standard neoclassical theory assumes that individuals care about taxes only to the
extent that their own material well-being is concerned. However, opinion data seem
to tell a different story. For example, in a 2009 Economist poll on U.S. public opinion
people were asked: ”How angry do you get when thinking about tax breaks for the
wealthy?”. According to the neoclassical view, individuals should be unimpressed by the
idea of what others pay in taxes, and consequently, should not show any emotion when
thinking about tax code changes for other social groups. But this does not seem to be
the case: in the poll, only one out of ten chose the neutral response option ”Don’t think
about it”, while the share of respondents answering with the extreme category ”Very
angry” was almost one-half (47.9%). In the same vein, psychologists report findings
from free association studies that are puzzling from a neoclassical point of view: when
asked about what comes spontaneously to their mind when hearing the word ’taxes’,
people raise concerns about the fairness of the distribution of tax burdens and other
equity-related features of the tax system (see Kirchler, 2007; Taylor, 2003). E.g., in a
2002 Australian survey on tax attitudes, more than sixty percent of the probands use
the word ’fair’ or ’fairness’ at least once when writing down their expectations of what
the tax office should deliver to them (Rawlings, 2003).
This evidence suggests that people think about taxes in social categories, including
notions of fairness, legitimacy and envy. But then, existing public finance frameworks
of taxation need to be amended. This is what is done in this thesis. Two types of
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non-standard preferences are taken into account: concerns for tax fairness and post-
materialist value orientations. It is shown that incorporating these preferences into tax
models considerably affects standard results and policy recommendations. Further, it is
argued that studying values and norms is not just a theoretical exercise for behavioral
public finance, but that psychological constructs economically matter: tax fairness per-
ceptions are empirically related to work morale, and differences in cross-country culture
go along with huge difference in international tax systems.
This thesis comprises six further chapters. The second chapter introduces tax equity
concerns into a standard model for small open economies where capital is perfectly
mobile, but labor supplied inelastically. Preferences for tax equity are modeled by
assuming that differences in capital and labor tax rates negatively impact on well being
via both a direct change in utility and by increasing disutility of labor, thus lowering
work incentives. It is shown that even the slightest concern for tax equity invalidates the
standard result that capital should remain tax-exempt. The reason is that government
now trades off costly capital taxation against the positive welfare effect from satisfying
the preference for equity. A comparative static analysis reveals the intuitive results
that a stronger preference for tax equity raises the capital tax rate and reduces the
distance between both tax rates. Surprisingly, however, a stronger equity concern may
also result in a higher labor tax rate. The reason is that equity concerns may push the
economy on the decreasing part of the partial Laffer curve for the capital tax rate – a
situation that would never occur as optimal within a standard framework of taxation.
Then, the revenue-dampening effect of a higher capital tax rate needs to be offset by
higher labor taxation in order to satisfy the public expenditure requirement. Similar
results hold for endogenous government spending. Moreover, in this case, it is shown
that a stronger concern for tax equity, though it forces the government to make stronger
use of an inefficient instrument to collect tax revenues, does not necessarily erode the
size of the public sector.
The third chapter may be viewed as a test of the preferences assumed in Chapter
2: it analyzes empirically whether perceived inequity in taxation negatively impacts
on work effort, using large-scale German survey data. Work effort is captured by the
number of days an individual is absent from work due to illness, which is more or
less a discretionary choice in the German health insurance system. This measure is
2
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regressed on the belief that the rich pay less than their fair share of taxes. A surprising
strong connection is revealed: On average, employees who harbor the perception that
managers pay too little in taxes accrue 20 percent more sick days, which translates to 1.5
more days absent from work per year, even after conditioning on a rich set of personal
characteristics including health, income and other personal characteristics. This result is
robust to different estimations methods. To address issues of unobserved heterogeneity,
the research design implements Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests. They reveal that
any remaining omitted variable would need to have implausibly strong associations
with absenteeism and perceived fairness in order to spuriously generate our results,
suggesting that the presented association is not a statistical artifact.
Besides supporting chapter 2, chapter 3 also raises interesting aspects concerning
the welfare costs of taxation. Standard economic theory explains that taxation imposes
deadweight losses by distorting incentives. But if perceptions over tax rates can induce
behavioral changes either, then the excess burden of taxation might be quite different
from what is usually assumed. Second, and at a more general level, the regression
results contribute to a growing literature on the role of fairness in economics. While
experiments on conditional cooperation or reciprocity assume that individuals react
only in the same area or against the same person, our results provide evidence that
the behavioral adjustments to unfairness can be quite far-reaching, pointing to the
possibility of ’fairness spillovers’.
Chapter 4 further elaborates on the real-world consequences of tax fairness percep-
tions. It tests whether the strong connection revealed in chapter 3 is also found for
another concern often put forward in the public, namely that the ’working poor’ are
overtaxed. Interestingly, the belief that unskilled workers pay too much in taxes hardly
triggers any changes in absenteeism rates, except with people in the lowest income quin-
tile. In contrast, the view that there is tax unfairness at the top of the income scale
is shown to be negatively associated with work morale throughout the social spectrum,
and even among the rich themselves. This behavioral asymmetry is difficult to recon-
cile with existing fairness theories, but suggests that a distinction between upward and
downward unfairness is informative when addressing the behavioral potential of tax
equity concerns.
Chapter 5 extends chapter 3 in a different direction: it examines whether cognitive
3
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dissonance may economically matter when individuals suspect pay differentials. It ad-
dresses one of the most hotly discussed and debated topics during financial crisis (and
still today), namely that CEO compensation is going out of hand. It is shown that
the belief that CEOs earn too much is associated with a similar increase in sickness
leave as the belief that the rich are undertaxed, suggesting that verbal protests against
bonus payments are only the tip of an iceberg and may come at a huge, though hidden
economic cost.
Chapters 6 to 7 set aside people’s fairness considerations, though the focus is still on
how value orientations shape economic incentives, and how this is reflected in the tax
setting behavior of governments. The chapters study postmaterialism. The reason why
we propose this value concept (which is widely used in the political science literature to
understand democratic processes) in an economic tax analysis is as follows. The degree
of postmaterialism measures the importance which individuals give to immaterial goods
over material possessions. Individuals who are less impressed by material goods (have
a high tendency towards postmaterialist life goals) are arguably less sensitive to their
income being taxed away. But then, optimal tax theory would suggest that these people
should be taxed at higher levels (compared to materialists).
Chapter 6 formalizes this intuition within a standard model for open economies with
mobile capital and elastically supplied labor. Postmateralism is introduced via a pref-
erence parameter controlling the priority individuals give to material over nonmaterial
consumption (which we take to be complementary to leisure). It is shown that as the
degree of postmaterialism increases, governments have incentives to shift tax burden
from capital to labor as the wage elasticity decreases (firms and their decision where
to allocate capital is assumed of not being affected by postmaterialist tendencies; they
just maximize after tax profits).
In a second step, this theoretical result is tested empirically, using a panel data
set comprising 17 OECD countries over the period from 1981 to 2001. The analysis
employs a modified version of the so-called Inglehart Four Items Index but (to check
robustness) also uses two other proxies for postmaterialist attitudes developed from the
World Values Surveys. Controlling for country and time fixed effects, these proxies,
a measure of capital mobility, and a set of control variables are used as regressors for
explaining the ratio of the effective marginal tax rate on capital (EMTR) to the tax
4
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wedge on labor. The estimates for the postmaterialism parameter exhibit the predicted
(negative) signs and are highly significant in all regressions, indicating a substantial
impact of non-material values on tax design.
As many works on culture and policy outcomes, the statistical setup in chapter 6
faces the problem that causality is likely to go both ways – from culture to politics
and from politics to culture. This issue cannot be tackled by a fixed effects model.
Therefore, chapter 7 proceeds with an instrumental variable approach to test whether
postmaterialist attitudes are causally related to tax structures. To isolate postmate-
rialist culture from policy outcomes, we use information on the value inclinations of
second-generation immigrants, as provided by the American General Social Surveys.
The attitudes of American-born citizens whose ancestors emigrated to the US two gen-
erations ago are not shaped by the current economic and institutional environment of
their ancestry country. Nevertheless, they systematically vary with cross-country dif-
ferences in today’s culture. This source of variation is used to instrument for today’s
postmaterialism in the home country. Doing so, we are able to identify that postmateri-
alist values shape tax structures: countries with a stronger emphasis on postmateralist
life goals tend to tax personal incomes relatively more heavily than corporate incomes.
Interestingly, classical economic predictors, such as GDP or openness, are unrelated to
these tax measures, further supporting the plea of this thesis that people’s system of
values and beliefs matter economically in the area of taxation.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of seven chapters. It includes theoretical and empirical perspectives
on the role of values and norms in public finance research. A motivation and summary
of the results is given in Section 1.1.
Chapter 2 is co-authored with Andreas Wagener, Institute of Social Policy, Uni-
versity of Hannover. The chapter was published as: ’Tax Structure and Government
Expenditures under Tax Equity Norms’, CESifo Working Paper, No. 3205. It is cur-
rently under review at the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (present
status: revise-and-resubmit). Earlier versions of the chapter were presented at the
24th Congress of the European Economic Association (Barcelona, Spain), the 66th
5
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Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Uppsala, Sweden), the 2nd
CESifo Venice Summer Institute on Ethics and Economics (Venice, Italy), the 14th
Spring Meeting of Young Economists (Istanbul, Turkey), the 2009 Annual Meeting of
the European Public Choice Society (Athens, Greece), the 2009 Annual Meeting of the
American Public Choice Society (Las Vegas, USA), the 2009 Annual Congress of the
Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik (Magdeburg, Germany), the 2008 Go¨ttinger Workshop on Pub-
lic Economics (Go¨ttingen, Germany) and at the 2009 Mentoring Seminar of the Chair
of Public Finance, University of Magdeburg (Potsdam, Germany).
Chapter 3 is joint work with Thomas Cornelissen, Centre for Research and Analysis
of Migration (CReAM), University College London and Oliver Himmler, Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn. A reprint was published as: ’Fair-
ness Spillovers: The Case of Taxation’, CESifo Working Paper, No. 3217. Part of
this chapter was also published at O¨konomenstimme, March 2011 (in German). The
chapter received a revise-and-resubmit decision from the Journal of Economic Behav-
ior and Organization. Earlier versions of the chapter were presented at the 10th World
Congress of the Econometric Society (Shanghai, China), the 5th Nordic Behavioral
and Experimental Economics Conference (Helsinki, Finland), the 2nd CESifo Venice
Summer Institute on Ethics and Economics (Venice, Italy), the 2010 Annual Meeting
of the Public Choice Society (Monterey, USA), the 2010 International Conference on
Tax Policy Decision Making (Mannheim, ZEW, Germany), the 15th Spring Meeting of
Young Economists (Luxembourg), the 2010 Economic Workshop, University of Tu¨bin-
gen (Tu¨bingen, Germany), the 2010 Public Economics Seminar, LMU Munich (Munich,
Germany) and at a 2009 seminar at CReAM, University College London (London, UK).
Chapter 4 is titled ’Testing for the Behavioral Asymmetry of Tax Fairness Percep-
tions: Evidence From Absenteeism’ and was written in 2011. The subsequent chapter is
a joint project with Thomas Cornelissen and Oliver Himmler. An earlier version of the
chapter is available as Discussion Paper No. 435 of the discussion paper series of the
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at Leibniz University of Hannover.
The chapter was published as: ’Perceived Unfairness in CEO Compensation and Work
Morale’, Economics Letters, 110, 2011, 45-48. Publication within this thesis is with
kind permission of the editor, Eric Maskin.
Chapter 6 is joint work with Andreas Wagener. The chapter was published as:
6
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
’(Post-)Materialist Attitudes and the Mix of Capital and Labor Taxation’, CESifo
Working Paper, No. 2366. It was presented at the 64th Congress of the Interna-
tional Institute of Public Finance (Maastricht, Netherlands), the 13th Spring Meeting
of Young Economists (Lille, France), the 2008 Annual Meeting of the European Pub-
lic Choice Society (Jena, Germany) and at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American
Public Choice Society (San Antonio, USA). An earlier version of this chapter won the
Best Paper Award at the 13th Spring Meeting of Young Economists.
The final chapter ’Cultures and Tax Structures’ is co-authored with Andreas Wa-
gener and was presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society (San
Antonio, USA).
7
Chapter 2
Tax Structure and Government Expenditures
under Tax Equity Norms1
2.1 Introduction
A fundamental theorem on taxation states that small open economies should not rely
on capital taxation. This result, originally derived in Gordon (1986), emerges from the
assumption of an infinitely elastic capital supply which small countries face. Under this
assumption, the burden of a tax on capital will be entirely shifted onto workers or other
immobile domestic factors. But if those factors bear the tax burden anyway, it is less
costly to tax them directly and, by this, to avoid the excess burden associated with
capital flight.
Zero capital taxation, thus, is optimal in this class of models – it maximizes the
representative household’s utility and is also the policy outcome that people actually
want and would vote for. However, in reality the prospect of zero taxes on capital
hardly looks popular. It flies in the face of all sorts of concerns with equity, fairness,
and equal treatment in taxation – which remain unmodelled in the standard framework
of optimal (international) taxation. Over the past decades a large body of evidence has
been compiled suggesting that people not only care for, or are solely driven by, material
self-interest but also by values, norms and equity concerns. Such ethical preferences
1This chapter is co-authored with Andreas Wagener. The chapter was published as: ’Tax Structure
and Government Expenditures under Tax Equity Norms’, CESifo Working Paper, No. 3205. It is
currently under review at the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (present status: revise-
and-resubmit). The chapter was presented at conferences and seminars in Barcelona, Uppsala, Istanbul,
Las Vegas, Venice, Magdeburg, Go¨ttingen and Potsdam.
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have been embedded into various economic contexts, but only little is known about the
optimal tax structure when ethical norms are related to taxation.
In this paper, we analyze optimal taxation in the presence of tax equity norms, i.e.,
when citizens hold the view that tax rates on capital and labor incomes ought not to
differ too widely. Such an approach can be motivated along several lines:
• First, tax systems that exclusively or disproportionately rely on taxes on labor
incomes appear unacceptable on grounds of common norms for equity and justice.2
The most general and fundamental of such norms is reflected in the principle of
horizontal tax equity, to which most tax systems pay at least lip service. Stating
that equal incomes should be taxed at equal rates (Musgrave, 1959; Kaplow,
1995), the principle forms part of the rationale underlying the comprehensive
income tax (of the Schanz-Haig-Simons type), a normative ideal to which many
countries (used to) adhere.3 Discrimination between similarly situated tax payers
– such as zero or low taxes on capital in the presence of positive and high tax
rates on labor – clearly violates this principle. Such discrimination also violates
its relative, the ability-to-pay principle, stating that all members of society have
a duty to pay taxes in accordance with their economic capabilities; tax legislation
warps this principle when tax privileges are not based on ability to pay.4
• Second, equity does not only matter from the abstract perspective of a philoso-
pher. Rather, the experimental literature provides ample evidence that percep-
tions of “fairness” and its violation indeed and significantly impact on individuals’
subjective well-being as well as on individuals’ behaviour (for a survey see Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006). From a citizen’s perspective equity constitutes an important
criterion for the legitimacy of a tax system; it shapes tax compliance (Bordignon,
2For a survey on tax equity norms and their implications for actual tax policy see, e.g., Barker
(2006).
3These aspects also matter in the debate on dual income taxes: by applying different tax treatments
to incomes from different sources, dual income tax generate problems of horizontal inequity. See, e.g.,
Sørensen (1994).
4Moreover, burdening only one subgroup of the population (i.e., workers) could also be in conflict
with the benefit principle of taxation, stating that the taxes an agent pays should somehow reflect the
benefits that (s)he receives from the goods and services supplied by the state (for a discussion of the
benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation see, e.g., Neill, 2000). Since everybody benefits from the
provision of public goods, the benefit principle calls (as a minimum) for a positive share in taxes for
everyone.
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1993), political support (Taylor, 2003, p. 84) and work incentives. Boadway
et al. (2007) argue that individuals hold personal views on what constitutes an
ethical tax rate; discrepancies between actual and ethically acceptable tax rates
may induce individuals to (legally) avoid taxation by adjusting their labor supply.
Hence, hurt ethical feelings may give rise to tax distortions.
• Third, zero or low tax rates on capital income in the presence of high tax rates
on labor income cause discontent and envy. The rich, capital income earners or
profitable businesses getting away without being taxed adequately makes wage
earners with (perceived) high tax burdens angry (The Economist, 2009). The
“common man”, paying a substantial share of his moderate income in taxes, is up-
set when – as it happens in many countries – capital incomes are subject to rather
symbolic income or capital gains taxes, exempt from contributing to social insur-
ance, and given various preferences and privileges. Likewise, the (perception of a)
growing imbalance in the taxation of labor and capital incomes (allegedly induced
by globalisation) nourishes political discomfort. Generally, policies that discrimi-
nate across comparable circumstances or individuals appear to create resentment,
possibly also endangering social stability. This view finds strong support in the
socio-psychological literature which shows that relative deprivation – via unequal
treatment, exclusion, or discrimination – negatively impacts both on individual
well-being and on social cohesion and welfare (Runciman, 1966; Podder, 1996).5
As argued by Elster (1991, p. 66) in general and by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978,
p. 590) for taxation, a society that tries to assuage its envy may well adopt
policies that damage its material interests.
• Fourth, large discrepancies between taxes on capital and labor may indicate a
high degree of inequality which might be detrimental for utility (Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005). Reducing inequality is a major rationale for taxation in modern
societies, and the exemption from taxation or low tax rates for capital incomes
and fortunes let the social compact for redistribution appear shaky – which many
people find undesirable (Brooks and Manza 2006). Concerns over inequality have
5While economists tend to reduce relative deprivation to shortfalls of income or consumption, Runci-
man’s original concept is far wider and applicable to abstract or intangible social objects, including
policy measures such as tax rates.
10
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mainly been studied in the context of the progressivity of income taxes (see, e.g.,
Snyder and Kramer, 1988). Recently, however, Kim (2007) embedded fairness
considerations in form of inequality aversion into a Ramsey-Mirrlees framework
of optimal taxation, making the case for a substantial taxation of capital.6
To summarize, people seem to care about the tax structure in itself (and beyond the
extent by which it affects their own net incomes). They find it important that tax rates
on different factors or types of income do not differ too much. Tax rate differentials
affect individual well-being via concerns for equity, equality, and sentiments of relative
deprivation or envy. In this paper we analyze the implications of such concerns for the
tax structures in small open economies. To keep terminology simple, we shall henceforth
and invariably refer to tax-related sentiments as “tax equity concerns”. This term is
an imperfect container for a wide range of different concepts that partially overlap and
are difficult to disentangle (norms for horizontal tax equity, envy, fairness perceptions,
feelings of relative deprivation or discrimination, status concerns etc.). Their common
denominator is, however, that large discrepancies between tax rates on different types of
income are undesirable. From a modelling perspective, holding a tax equity norms mean
that tax rates (or the tax structure) directly into one’s utility function, independently
of whether material well-being is affected or not.
Concerns for tax equity may matter in at least two different ways: Perceiving a
situation as more inequitable may cause discomfort and reduce the level of well-being
(level effect), but it may also trigger adjustments in labor supply (incentive effects).
The motivation for the inclusion of incentive effects comes from empirical and experi-
mental evidence suggesting that unfairness felt in the context of taxation indeed affects
work incentives. Dissatisfied individuals spend less effort on work, show higher rates
of absenteeism etc. (see, e.g., Le´vy-Garboua et al., 2009; Cornelissen et al., 2010, or
in a theoretical framework, Boadway et al., 2007). In social psychology, adverse be-
havioural reactions of this type have since long been discussed under the label “equity
6Another potential argument why unequal tax rates are disliked may indirectly enter via relative-
income concerns (Luttmer, 2005; Layard 2006). If individual well-being depends, in addition to the
absolute level of own income, also on one’s income position relative to others and taxation changes
these relative positions, then tax privileges (for earners of capital income, say) may be detrimental to
utility (of wage earners, say). We do not follow this route here. With status concerns, the reference
point for the assessment of taxes is not a general standard but an interpersonal comparison whose
normative relevance is unclear.
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theory” (Adams, 1963). In our model, level effects of tax equity concerns formally show
up in preferences as (separable) reductions in total utility while incentive effects affect
marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure.
We embed these tax equity concerns into a model of a small open economy whose
remaining components are fairly standard: A single output is produced with labor
and capital. Capital is perfectly mobile internationally. Workers are immobile but their
supply of labor is endogenous (and may be affected by equity concerns). Higher levels of
capital imply higher equilibrium wages. The government provides a consumption good
and finances its expenditures with linear source taxes on capital and labor income. The
level of government expenditure can be exogenously given or might be chosen optimally.
In the absence of concerns for tax equity, government finance should exclusively rely
on labor income taxes. Capital taxation causes a higher excess burden, irrespectively of
whether government expenditures are exogenous or endogenous. An optimum without
concerns for tax equity, thus, involves a large differential tax treatment of capital and
labor.
In the presence of equity concerns, however, the tax designer faces a trade-off. On
the one hand, there is the standard excess burden: taxes on capital drive capital out of
the country and, by this, also depress gross wages. On the other hand, at given (and
relatively high) labor tax rates, they reduce the tax gap and thereby placate equity
concerns. This trade-off has a number of implications for optimal tax policies, some
expected, some perhaps less so.
First, exempting capital income from taxation is never optimal. Already with the
slightest concern for tax equity a zero tax rate on capital income ceases to be optimal,
irrespectively of whether equity concerns impact on work incentives or “only” on well-
being. Second, and more surprising, stronger concerns for tax equity may indeed call for
a higher level of labor taxation. One reason is that equity concerns may drive the econ-
omy onto the decreasing part of the partial Laffer curve for the capital tax – a situation
that would never occur within a standard framework of taxation. Another reason is that
government finance via capital taxes may eventually carry so large an excess burden
that a further increase of capital taxes, induced by stronger equity concerns, needs to
be accommodated by an (smaller) increase in labor taxes. Third, also the comparative
statics for government expenditures reveal some interesting non-monotonicities. One
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might expect that a stronger concern for tax equity calls for higher capital tax rates
and, by this, for a smaller public sector (capital taxation being plagued by a larger
excess burden). However, even when the former is true, the size of the public sector
need not necessarily decline. Tax equity concerns erode the size of the public sector
only when they are relatively weak. If strong equity concerns grow even more intense,
higher government expenditure can be desirable.
Our paper contributes to the theory of taxation in two areas. First, it complements
a small literature that incorporates values and equity norms into optimal tax frame-
works.7 Most of this literature is concerned with the impact of equity perceptions on
tax compliance, but some recent theoretical and experimental research also deals with
the interaction between inequity aversion (in the Fehr-Schmidt sense) and tax struc-
tures (see, e.g., Kim 2007, or Le´vy-Garboua et al., 2009). Second, we add to recent
research on the optimal mix of capital and labor taxation in open economies which is
puzzled by the failure of empirical studies to confirm the theoretical prediction that
increased capital mobility leads to a lower relative tax burden on capital (see Haufler,
1997, or Haufler et al., 2008). Our paper suggests that concerns with tax equity may
have prevented such a race to the bottom for capital taxes; the social value of balanced
taxation may outweigh the economic benefits from low capital taxes.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 sets out a basic model with tax equity
concerns. In Section 2.3, we analyze tax policies and their comparative statics for the
case that government spending is exogenous. In Section 2.4, we extend the model to
endogenous government spending. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider a small open one-good economy which is inhabited by a large number of
identical individuals. For simplicity, we normalize the number of individuals to unity.
Production in the economy takes place in one single-output firm that is owned by absent
foreigners. It uses labor and capital as its inputs. Capital is an internationally mobile
7The literature on social preferences often assumes that individuals compare their own income
position to that of others. If such comparisons entail negative externalities (via envy, say), Pigouvian
taxes may be helpful remedies (see, e.g., Alvarez-Cuadrado 2007; Alonso-Carrera et al. 2006). By
contrast, in our framework unequal taxation is a source of disutility – and not a remedy against it.
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factor of production that can be purchased on world capital markets at an exogenous
rental rate of r > 0 per unit. Capital and labor can be taxed with constant average tax
rates t` for labor and tk for capital. Taxation is only source-based.
The individual has convex and increasing preferences over consumption c, leisure
– which will be negatively represented by working hours ` –, and a publicly provided
good g. We assume that these preferences can be represented by an additively separable
utility function
u(c, `) = c− E(`, ψ) + h(g)− Ω, (2.1)
where E(·) with E` > 0 and E`` > 0 represents the disutility from labor ` and h(g)
with h′(g) > 0 > h′′(g) measures the utility from the publicly provided good.
The special features of preferences in our model are functions Ω and ψ, both of
which are assumed to depend on the tax rates on labor and capital:
Ω = Ω(t`, tk) and ψ = ψ(t`, tk).
Preferences, thus, directly depend on the policy choices made in the society. Specifically,
Ω captures that the level of individual well-being may be affected by the tax structure.
We assume that
Ω` := ∂Ω/∂t` ≥ 0 and Ωk := ∂Ω/∂tk ≤ 0.
Hence, individuals welcome lower taxes on labor and higher taxes on capital. In spite
of this asymmetric treatment of tk and t` in Ω (and also below in ψ), we can interpret Ω
(and ψ) as concerns for tax equity. In our framework, we will only encounter situations
where capital is taxed less severely than labor. On this domain, preference functions
such as Ω can reflect that any widening of the statutory tax gap (t` − tk) is welfare
reducing. Viz., as a special case (sometimes used below), Ω could be written as
Ω = Ω˜ (β · (t` − tk))
with Ω˜′ > 0; the parameter β > 0 would then measure the intensity of the equity
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concern.
The function ψ in (2.1) captures that tax equity concerns may generate incentive
effects: the disutility from work not only varies with working hours ` but also with the
individual’s perception ψ of tax policies. We assume that both the absolute and the
marginal disutility from labor increases whenever the tax policy is perceived to be less
fair (Eψ > 0, E`ψ > 0). Moreover, we assume that ψ = ψ(t`, tk) with
ψ` := ∂ψ/∂t` ≥ 0 and ψk := ∂ψ/∂tk ≤ 0, (2.2)
reflecting that higher taxes on labor (weakly) depress work morale while higher taxes
on capital boost it. As with Ω, this asymmetric treatment does not preclude the in-
terpretation of ψ as an ethical norm; we operate on a policy domain where tk < t`.
Experimental evidence for the validity of (2.2) can be found in Le´vy-Garboua et al.
(2009) where it is shown that workers who consider equity norms to be violated by
taxation refuse to work.
As discussed in the introduction, the labelling of both ψ and Ω as equity concerns
covers a wide array of affects, ranging from abstract horizontal equity norms to envy to
feelings of relative deprivation. The distinction between Ω and ψ reflects two channels
of tax equity: a work morale effect (ψ alters the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption) and a “feel-good” effect (Ω affects well-being but leaves incen-
tives untouched).
In (2.1) we take the perspective of a worker without capital income. Moreover, (2.1)
does not entail any status concerns, comparisons with reference groups or comparisons
of actual tax payments; the direct preference over tax structures is purely an (individual)
ethic norm.
The legal incidence of labor taxes is assumed to lie with workers. Thus, the dispos-
able income of a worker just equals the hourly net wage (w − t`) times hours worked:
c = (w − t`) · `. The (gross) wage rate w will be endogenously determined (see below).
Individuals take the wage and tax rate as parametrically given when deciding on
their labor supply. Substituting for c in (2.1) and maximizing over ` requires that:
E`(`, ψ(t`, tk)) = w − t`. (2.3)
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Equation (2.3) implicitly defines a labor supply function `S(w, t`, tk) with properties
∂`S
∂w
=
1
E``
> 0, (2.4)
∂`S
∂t`
= − 1
E``
· (1 + E`ψ · ψ`) < 0, (2.5)
∂`S
∂tk
= −E`ψ
E``
· ψk > 0. (2.6)
Firms maximize their profits. Denoting by K and L, respectively, the amounts of
capital and labor employed in the firm, output of the firm equals F (K,L), where F
is a strictly increasing, constant-returns-to-scale and strictly quasi-concave production
function. Firms pay a tax tk on each unit of capital they hire. Since the cost of hiring
an additional hour of labor are w while an additional unit of capital costs r + tk, the
firm’s net profits amount to
pi = F (K,L)− w · L− (r + tk) ·K = L · (f(k)− w − (r + tk) · k) . (2.7)
Here, k := K/L denotes capital per labor unit and f(k) is the per-unit-of-labor produc-
tion function; f is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The firm takes input prices
and taxes as given. Profit maximization requires
f ′(k) = r + tk, (2.8)
which implicitly defines the capital intensity k = k(r + tk) as a function of the cost of
capital, with
k′(r + tk) =
1
f ′′(k)
< 0. (2.9)
Since we assume constant returns to scale, the gross wage rate is determined via the
factor price frontier and is given by
w(r + tk) = f(k)− (r + t) · k (2.10)
with
w′(r + tk) = −k. (2.11)
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In equilibrium, labor supply must equal labor demand. The equilibrium level L∗ of
employment is, thus, given by
L∗(t`, tk) = `S(w(r + tk), t`, tk); (2.12)
it decreases in the tax rate on labor but has an ambiguous response to higher capital
taxation:
∂L∗
∂t`
=
∂`S
∂t`
< 0,
∂L∗
∂tk
= w′(r + tk) · ∂`
S
∂w
+
∂`S
∂tk
= −k · ∂`
S
∂w
+
∂`S
∂tk
Q 0.
Note that when equity concerns are sufficiently high, they may offset the usual disincen-
tive from higher capital taxation on labor supply. In this case, equilibrium employment
would increase in the tax rate on capital.
The government provides a (public) good g (measured in units of output) which
has to be financed out of the revenues from labor and capital taxes. Hence, its budget
constraint reads:
g = t` · L∗ + tk ·K = L∗(t`, tk) · (t` + tk · k(r + tk)) =: G(t`, tk). (2.13)
In what follows, we shall refer to G(t`, tk) as the Laffer curve of the economy. For later
use, we note that from (2.13) the partial derivatives of the Laffer curve with respect to
the two tax rates are given by
∂G
∂tk
=
∂L∗
∂tk
· (t` + tkk) + L∗ · (k + tkk′) =: Gk, (2.14)
∂G
∂t`
=
∂L∗
∂t`
· (t` + tkk) + L∗ =: G`. (2.15)
2.3 Optimal tax policy with exogenous government
spending
In this section, we assume that a given and fixed level of government revenues g¯ has
to be raised; the case of endogenous government expenditures will be dealt with in
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Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Some taxation of capital is optimal
The government chooses t` and tk such as to maximize individual welfare (recall that
firm owners are absentee capitalists). Plugging the equilibrium level of employment L∗
and (2.13) into (2.1) and taking into account that w = w(r + tk) via (2.10), we obtain
indirect utility (= social welfare) in equilibrium as follows:
V (t`, tk) := (w(r + tk)− t`) · L∗(t`, tk)− E(L∗(t`, tk), ψ(t`, tk))− Ω(t`, tk). (2.16)
As government expenditures g are exogenously fixed, the utility h(g) derived from them
does not matter here; it is omitted from (2.16). The government chooses tax rates t`
and tk such as to maximize V subject to the revenue constraint. The Lagrangian W
for this problem reads:
max
t`,tk
W (t`, tk) = V (t`, tk) + λ · [G(t`, tk)− g¯], (2.17)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier and g¯ the exogenous level of the public good
to be financed. Differentiating (2.17), with respect to tax rates (tk, t`) and using the
Envelope Theorem gives:
∂W
∂t`
= −L∗ + λ ·G` − Eψ · ψ` − Ω`
= L∗ · [λ− 1] + λ · (t` + tkk) · ∂L
∗
∂t`
− Eψ · ψ` − Ω` (2.18)
∂W
∂tk
= w′(r + tk)L∗ + λ ·Gk − Eψ · ψk − Ωk
= kL∗ · [λ− 1] + λ ·
(
(t` + tkk) · ∂L
∗
∂tk
+ tkk
′L∗
)
− Eψ · ψk − Ωk. (2.19)
No concerns for tax equity. As a benchmark, we consider the case without tax
equity concerns (i.e., ψk = ψ` = Ωk = Ω` ≡ 0). Here,
∂L∗
∂t`
= −∂`
S
∂w
and
∂L∗
∂tk
= −k · ∂`
S
∂w
. (2.20)
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From (2.18) and (2.19) we, thus, get
∂W
∂t`
=
1
k
· ∂W
∂tk
− λL∗ tkk
′
k
>
1
k
· ∂W
∂tk
(2.21)
for all (t`, tk) with tk > 0. Hence, without equity concerns it can never be optimal to
tax capital at source: tk = 0.
8 The intuition for this standard result is that a small
country faces a fixed rate of return on capital and, thereby, an infinitely elastic capital
supply. Capital taxes would then be entirely shifted over to the immobile factor, which
makes it less costly to tax this factor directly (Razin and Sadka, 1991; Bucovetsky and
Wilson, 1991).
Disutility from unequal tax rates. First, consider the case where concerns for tax
equity only affect utility levels (Ωk ≤ 0,Ω` ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality) but
do not have any incentives effects (i.e., ψk = ψ` ≡ 0). Then (2.20) continues to hold
and we get from (2.18) and (2.19) that
∂W
∂t`
=
1
k
· ∂W
∂tk
− λtkk
′L∗
k
− Ω` + 1
k
Ωk. (2.22)
This equation differs from (2.21) only by the term −Ω` + Ωk/k < 0, implying that
zero taxation of capital is no longer desirable: at tk = 0 and
∂W
∂t`
= 0, we get ∂W
∂tk
> 0
instead of ∂W
∂tk
= 0 such that a positive tk is warranted. Intuitively, with preferences for
equal taxation, capital taxation not only has economics costs (distortion of the capital
intensity), but also reduces the psychological costs from tax differences. For later use,
note that
L∗tkk′/k =
1
λ
(
1
k
Ωk − Ω`) (2.23)
must hold in a welfare maximum.
Incentive effects. Suppose now that deviations from the tax equity norm do not
cause a deterioration in utility per se, but distort the incentives to provide labor. I.e.,
we shall assume that ψk(t`, tk) ≤ 0 ≤ ψ`(t`, tk) with at least one strict inequality, while
we reset Ωk = Ω` ≡ 0. Then the partial derivatives of equilibrium employment with
8Formally, if ∂W∂t` = 0, one gets
∂W
∂tk
< 0 for all tk > 0 such that a reduction of tk is worthwhile.
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respect to the tax rates are given by
∂L∗
∂t`
= − 1
E``
· (1 + E`ψ · ψ`) and ∂L
∗
∂tk
= − 1
E``
· (k + E`ψ · ψk). (2.24)
Using (2.24), it follows from (2.18) and (2.19) that
∂W
∂t`
=
1
k
· ∂W
∂tk
− λL∗ tkk
′
k
+ (
1
k
ψk − ψ`)[Eψ + λ(t` + tkk)E`ψ
E``
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
. (2.25)
This again implies that no taxation of capital can never be optimal: For any (t`, tk) =
(t`, 0), we get
∂W
∂tk
> k · ∂W
∂t`
such that an increase in tk is warranted. In an interior
solution ∂W
∂tk
= ∂W
∂t`
= 0 and, from (2.25),
L∗
tkk
′
k
=
1
λ
(
1
k
ψk − ψ`)[Eψ + λ(t` + tkk)E`ψ
E``
]. (2.26)
To sum up:
Result 1 In the absence of tax equity concerns, capital should remain untaxed. In the
presence of equity concerns, whether they shape incentives or just affect utility levels, a
zero tax rate on capital is never optimal.
Result 1 shows that the standard recommendation that small open economies should
leave capital untaxed balances on a knife’s edge. Any effect providing capital taxation
with some extra marginal benefit induces the government to rely on at least some capital
taxation. Here, concerns for tax equity do the job.
2.3.2 Comparative statics with level effects
The inclusion of tax equity considerations provides governments with incentives to levy
positive capital tax rates. But precisely how does the strength of equity concerns affect
optimal tax policy? To answer this, we first consider the case where tax equity concerns
do not impact on work incentives (i.e., ψ is a constant). To be able to measure the
intensity of equity concerns, we suppose that equity concerns are assuaged as soon as
the difference between capital and labor tax rates narrows. Then Ω only depends on
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the gap between labor and capital tax rates:
Ω = Ω˜(β · (t` − tk)) (2.27)
with Ω˜′ > 0 and Ω˜′′ ≥ 0. Parameter β > 0 then serves as a parametric measure for the
strength of equity concerns. The comparative statics of (t`, tk) with respect to β are
given through:
W`` W`k G`
W`k Wkk Gk
G` Gk 0
 ·

dt`
dtk
dλ
 =

−W`β
−Wkβ
0
 dβ,
with Wxy = ∂
2W/(∂tx∂ty) and Wxβ = ∂
2W/(∂tx∂β). From (2.18), (2.19), and (2.27)
we get that
Wkβ = −W`β = Ω`β := Ω˜′ + β(t` − tk) · Ω˜′′ > 0 (2.28)
for all t` > tk. Hence, applying Cramer’s Rule to (2.28) we obtain:
dt`
dβ
= − 1
D
· Ω`β · (G2k +G`Gk) (2.29)
dtk
dβ
=
1
D
· Ω`β · (G2` +G`Gk) (2.30)
d(t` − tk)
dβ
= − 1
D
· Ω`β · (Gk +G`)2. (2.31)
Here,
D = 2GkG`W`k − (G2kW`` +G2`Wkk)
is the determinant of the bordered Hessian on the LHS of (2.28). In a welfare maximum,
D > 0 as well as Wkk,W`` < 0.
Observe from (2.28) that the weak assumption Ω˜′ > 0 (the individual feels worse
the larger the tax rate differential) suffices to have equity concerns affect tax policies –
we do not strictly need to assume that Ω˜′′ ≥ 0 (the psychological costs of tax inequity
increase more than proportionately with the tax gap).
As can be seen immediately from (2.31), a stronger concern for tax equity has an
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unambiguous effect on the tax rate differential: (t` − tk) is strictly decreasing in β,
irrespective of the signs of the partial derivatives of the Laffer curve (G`, Gk). Starting
from t` > tk = 0 at β = 0, the stronger the tax equity norm, the closer the tax structure
moves towards equal tax rates:
d(t` − tk)
dβ
< 0.
To determine the signs of (2.29) and (2.30), we manipulate these expressions in the
following way. From (2.20), (2.14), (2.15), (2.23) and Ω` = −Ωk, it follows that we have
G` =
1
k
Gk − 1
λ
Ωk(1 +
1
k
) (2.32)
in an interior equilibrium. Observe from (2.18) thatG` > 0 in an optimum. Substituting
for G` from (2.32) into (2.29), we obtain
dt`
dβ
= − 1
D
· Ω`β︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
·Gk(1 + 1
k
)
[
Gk − Ωk
λ
]
R 0, (2.33)
where Ωk/λ < 0. Thus, the effects from stronger tax equity concerns on the labor
tax rate are unclear in sign. If Gk > 0, the labor tax decreases with the strength
of the equity concern. This accords with intuition: the more upset workers are with
privileged capital taxation, the lower the tax burden they are willing to accept on their
own incomes. However, the counter-intuitive case, that a stronger desire to correct for
tax inequity is associated with higher labor taxation may also occur. This can happen
if Gk < 0, i.e. if the economy is on the downward-sloped part of the Laffer curve of the
capital tax rate (given that G` and, from (2.32), Gk − Ωkλ are positive). In Example 1
below we will show that under certain conditions government in fact has an incentive
to push the economy beyond the maximum of the (partial) Laffer-curve for the capital
tax.
Similar as for (2.33) one can show that
dtk
dβ
= −1
k
dt`
dβ
1
Gk
[
(Gk − Ωk
λ
)− kΩk
λ
]
. (2.34)
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This expression is positive, irrespective of the sign of Gk. Thus, we get a monotonic
increase of the capital tax rate with the strength of equity concerns:
dtk
dβ
> 0.
The observation that the tax on labor may increase when tax equity concerns grow
stronger deserves an explanation. An increase in β calls for a higher tk. If tk is high
enough, this will ceteris paribus cause tax revenues to drop (Gk < 0), due to a reduction
both in the capital stock and wages. As revenue shortfalls are not allowed with an
exogenous budget requirement, the tax on labor consequently has to rise (but at a
lower pace than the capital tax rate as (t` − tk) is bound to decrease).
To see that dt`
dβ
> 0 might indeed be an optimal policy response, have a look at
Example 1. In this and the following examples, we consider a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology where per-capita output is produced according to y = kα. We parameterize the
disutility from labor by E = 0.5 · ψ · `2. The disutility from tax rate differentials is
assumed to follow Ω = 0.5 · β · (t` − tk)2. The parameter α, capital’s share of output,
is set equal to 0.25. The “dislove for work” parameter, ψ, is set to 0.1, and the world
market’s rental rate, r, to 0.25. Figure 2.1 depicts optima for different values of β.
Each graph plots tax indifference curves for V (t`, tk) (dashed curves) and a govern-
ment iso-budget contour (solid lines) in (t`, tk)-space. The aspired revenue level and
(since there are no incentive effects) the iso-budget contours for the government are
the same in all panels. The (lower leg of the) iso-budget contour is negatively sloped
for moderate capital tax rates: a higher capital tax entails higher tax revenues and,
thus, allows for a lower tax rate on labor to meet the budget requirement. However,
eventually the negative effect of a higher capital tax rate on tax revenues (a lower tax
base induced by capital flight) dominates, such that the same level of g can only be
met at higher taxes on labor. The shape of the V -indifference curves varies across the
four panels of Figure 2.1 with the strength β of the tax equity concern. For zero or
low values of β indifference curves are negatively sloped since individuals place high
emphasis on the adverse effects of capital taxation on consumption (w′ < 0). For β = 0
both the labor and the capital tax rate are considered as “bads” – while t` adversely
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affects consumption via lower net wages, a higher tk depresses gross wages. Indifference
curves closer to the origin represent higher utility levels. With increasing concerns for
tax equity, indifference curves bend upwards. Closing the tax gap is increasingly con-
sidered as good, and losses in material consumption can be less easily compensated for
by a lower tax burden on labor income.9
Fig. 2.1: Tax equity without incentive effects. Government iso-budget
contour (solid) and indifference curves (dashed) for varying values of
β.
t`t`
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tktk
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Figure 1: Tax equity without incentive effects. Government iso-budget contour (solid) and
indifference curves (dashed) for varying values of β.
narrow gap between capital and labour tax rate.
2. Starting from weak levels, a strengthening of tax equity concerns calls for a lower tax on
labour. However, if equity concerns become sufficiently strong, the optimal tax rate on
labour may eventually increase. This occurs if and only if, at the optimal tax mix, the
economy operates on the decreasing part of the Laffer curve for the capital tax.10
The significant (economic) inefficiency identified in the last effect in item b) is interesting in
itself. Already Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) conjectured that the inclusion of social preferences
(in their case: concerns about relative consumption) potentially removes the economic barriers
for increasing tax rates to the point where disincentive effects actually reduce tax revenues.
10The economy will never operate on the downward-sloped part of its total Laffer curve (G`, Gk both negative);
G` must be positive from the FOC (18).
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Geometrically the i difference curve at an optimal tax mix must be tangent to the
(lower leg of the) iso-budget contour representing the exogenous revenue requirement
g¯. In the benchmark case (β = 0), this point of tangency is on the vertical axis where
9In the extreme, when tax equity concern becomes overwhelmingly strong, indifference curves would
be linear with slope +1 and the highest utility level is represented by the 45◦-line. All tax combinations
along the 45◦-line are then considered as equally good.
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capital is tax exempt. Starting from such a position, the point of tangency moves along
the budget contour towards the 45◦-line. This initially entails a reduction of t` and an
increase in tk. However, with equity concerns strong enough, eventually the upward-
sloped part of the iso-budget contour might be entered. The optimal tax mix then leads
the economy on the downward-sloped part of the (partial) Laffer for the capital tax rate
(where Gk < 0). Thus, it is shown that (
dt`
dβ
> 0) is possible.10
Equity concerns call for narrowing the spread between labor and capital taxation.
Indeed, if it is possible to finance the exogenous revenue requirement at equal tax
rates (the iso-budget contour intersects with the diagonal), t` = tk will eventually be
implemented when equity concerns β grow strong enough. Such tax rate equalization
need not be feasible, in particular not when budget requirements are sufficiently high.
An economy with strong tax equity motives will then (geometrically) remain at that
situation on the iso-budget contour that lies at minimal distance to the diagonal. From
here onwards, dt`
dβ
= dt`
dβ
= 0.
We sum up the general findings of this section in
Result 2 Suppose that individual well-being decreases when the gap between the tax
rates on capital and labor widens.
1. A more intense concern for tax equity calls for a higher tax on capital and for a
more narrow gap between capital and labor tax rate.
2. Starting from weak levels, a strengthening of tax equity concerns calls for a lower
tax on labor. However, if equity concerns become sufficiently strong, the optimal
tax rate on labor may eventually increase. This occurs if and only if, at the optimal
tax mix, the economy operates on the decreasing part of the Laffer curve for the
capital tax.11
The significant (economic) inefficiency identified in the last effect in item b) is in-
teresting in itself. Already Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) conjectured that the inclusion
of social preferences (in their case: concerns about relative consumption) potentially
10Formally, the tax mix (tk, t`) that is at minimum distance to the 45
◦-line satisfies, on the iso-budget
contour for g, the condition −Gk/G` = 1. From (2.29) to (2.31), this implies that tax rates do no
further vary with β.
11The economy will never operate on the downward-sloped part of its total Laffer curve (G`, Gk both
negative); G` must be positive from the FOC (2.18).
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removes the economic barriers for increasing tax rates to the point where disincentive
effects actually reduce tax revenues. Tax equity concerns provide a case in point here.
In an alternative interpretation the equity norm may represent tax envy. Then the
choice of economically questionable tax policies (i.e., operating in the decreasing part
of the Laffer curve) is reminiscent of Elster’s (1991, p. 66) warning that assuaging its
envy may come at the expense of a society’s substantial economic interests.12
It is informative to study how the level of equilibrium labor supply L∗(t`, tk) varies
with the strength of tax equity concerns. From (2.12) in conjunction with (2.4) to (2.6),
(2.34), and (2.33) we obtain:13
dL∗
dβ
=
∂L∗
∂t`
dt`
dβ
+
∂L∗
∂tk
dtk
dβ
= −∂`
S
∂w
·
(
dt`
dβ
+ k
dtk
dβ
)
= −∂`
S
∂w
· dt`
dβ
· (1 + k)Ωk
λGk
=
∂`S
∂w︸︷︷︸
>0
· 1
D
· Ω`β · (1 + k)
2
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·
(
Gk − Ωk
λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· Ωk
λ︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0
Hence,
Corollary 1 People in an economy with more intense concerns for tax equity work less.
This observation should be interpreted against the backdrop that the equity norm
itself does not exert any incentive effects (in the present scenario). The impact of
tax equity concerns on labor supply is entirely indirect, via the attending optimal tax
structure.
2.3.3 Comparative statics with incentive effects
Now we turn to the effects of stronger fairness concerns when tax equity concerns impact
on work incentives (i.e., ψ` > 0 > ψk but Ω` = Ωk ≡ 0). This change affects indifference
maps for V (t`, tk) as well as the iso-budget contour G(t`, tk) = g¯ – which now changes
its shape when equity concerns vary.
12Le´vy-Garboua et al. (2009) experimentally show that workers who respond sensitively to violations
of a tax equity norm refuse to work. This implies that higher tax rates (viz., more severe violations
of the equity norm) lead to decreasing tax revenues. This undesirable Laffer curve effect has to be
clearly distinguished from our observation where it may be optimal to bring the economy on the
downward-sloped side of the (partial) Laffer curve.
13The positive sign of the bracketed expression is implied by G` > 0 in (2.32).
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For low levels of equity concerns, the effects are similar as in the “level effect”-
scenario of the previous section: starting from tk = 0, stronger equity concerns call for
raising tk and lowering t`. Eventually, higher equity concerns may call for an increase
in the labor tax rate t`. However, unlike in the previous scenario, this does neither
imply nor necessitate that the economy is on the decreasing leg of its Laffer curve. We
demonstrate this in
Example 2. As above, preferences are parameterized by u = c− 0.5 ·ψ · `2. But now
ψ is not a constant but a function given by
ψ = ψ0 + 0.5 · β · (t` − tk)2. (2.35)
The level of spending is again exogenously fixed. Throughout the numerical examples,
we set ψ0 equal to 0.1 and g¯ = 0.12; all other parameters take on the same values as in
Example 1.14
The four panels in Figure 2.2 depict the government iso-budget contour (solid line)
and indifference curves (dashed lines) for different values of β. Unlike in Figure 2.1,
the iso-budget contours vary with the strength of the equity norm. They move into the
direction of the 45◦-line in (t`, tk)-space and tend to bend upwards when β increases.
The reason is that (starting from a situation with t` > tk) a higher capital tax motivates
people to work more. The same level of tax revenues can be generated at a lower labor
tax than in the absence of incentive effects. Moreover, when work disincentives from
tax differentials are very large, tax revenues can only be earned when the tax rates are
sufficiently close to each other.15 The effect of β on the shape of indifference curves
looks qualitatively similar as in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.2 shows that the optimal capital tax rate decreases monotonically with β.
Initially, the tax rate on labor falls. However, as the transition from the third to the
fourth panel shows, the labor tax rate eventually may increase again. Observe that all
optimal tax mixes lie on the lower and decreasing arc of the iso-budget contours. I.e.,
tax revenues are increasing in either tax rate.
14For β = 0, scenarios here and in Example 1 coincide. Cf. also the upper left panels in Figures 1
and 2.
15In the extreme case when people only care for tax equity, t` = tk must hold (for any given tk);
otherwise people would not supply any labor at all.
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Fig. 2.2: Tax equity with incentive effects. Government iso-budget con-
tours (solid) and indifference curves (dashed) for varying values of β.
Example 2. As above, preferences are parameterized by u = c− 0.5 ·ψ · `2. But now ψ is not
a constant but a function given by
ψ = ψ0 + 0.5 · β · (t` − tk)2. (35)
The level of spending is again exogenously fixed. Throughout the numerical examples, we set
ψ0 equal to 0.1 and g¯ = 0.12; all other parameters take on the same values as in Example 1.
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Figure 2: Tax equity with incentive effects. Government iso-budget contours (solid) and indif-
ference curves (dashed) for varying values of β.
The four panels in Figure 2 depict the government iso-budget contour (solid line) and indifference
curves (dashed lines) for different values of β. Unlike in Figure 1, the iso-budget contours vary
with the strength of the equity norm. They move into the direction of the 45◦-line in (t`, tk)-
space and tend to bend upwards when β increases. The reason is that (starting from a situation
with t` > tk) a higher capital tax motivates people to work more. The same level of tax revenues
13For β = 0, scenarios here and in Example 1 coincide. Cf. also the upper left panels in Figures 1 and 2.
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Result 3 Suppose that a widening of the gap between labor and capital tax rates depress
work incentives. Starting from weak levels, a stronger tax equity concern calls for a
higher tax on capital and a lower tax on labor. However, if equity concerns become
sufficiently intense, increasing the labor tax rate may eventually become optimal.
2.4 Endogenous government expenditure
W now analyze the effects of tax equity concerns wh n governme t spending is endoge-
nous. Such an analysis appears worthwhile since tax equity norms make government
activities less desirable per se: they call for tax mixes that are excessively costly from a
pure efficiency perspective; obedience to tax equity norms increases the marginal costs
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of public funds. This might impact on the optimal level of government expenditures –
and a first intuition would suggest that greater concerns for tax equity call for smaller
governments. But we better have a closer look.
2.4.1 Capital taxation and the size of government
We recycle the set-up of Section 2.2. Again, the government chooses t` and tk in order
to maximize social welfare (= indirect utility). Allowing g to vary rather than being
preset, the government objective function reads as
V (t`, tk) : = (w(r + tk)− t`) · L∗(t`, tk)− E(L∗(t`, tk), ψ(t`, tk)) (2.36)
+h(G(t`, tk))− Ω(t`, tk)
where L∗(·) and G(·) are defined as in (2.12) and (2.13). Differentiating V , as defined
in (2.36), with respect to tax rates (tk, t`) and using the Envelope Theorem gives:
∂V
∂t`
= L∗ · [h′(G)− 1] + h′(G) · (t` + tkk) · ∂L
∗
∂t`
− Eψ · ψ` − Ω` (2.37)
∂V
∂tk
= kL∗ · [h′(G)− 1] + h′(G) ·
(
(t` + tkk) · ∂L
∗
∂tk
+ tkk
′L∗
)
− Eψ · ψk − Ωk
= k · ∂V
∂t`
+ h′(G)tkk′L∗ + kΩ` − Ωk. (2.38)
These conditions give rise to
Result 4 1. In the absence of tax equity concerns, capital should optimally never be
taxed.
2. In the presence of tax equity concerns, whether they shape incentives or just affect
utility levels, a zero tax rate on capital is never optimal.
3. The level of the government-provided good is always16 inefficiently low.
The analytical results on the tax structure and their interpretation coincide with
those in Section 2.3.1. Also the proof of items 1 and 2 is similar as for Result 1.
16There is one (immaterial) exception: With exogenous labor supply and in the absence of tax equity
concerns, government expenditures are optimally at their efficient level. This can be seen in (2.37)
when ∂L∗/∂t` = ψ` = Ω` ≡ 0.
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Consequently, we omit it (the optimality of a zero tax rate on capital was also proven
by Fuest and Huber, 2001).
The under-provision of the government good in the absence of tax equity concerns
(i.e., when ψ` = Ω` = 0) can be seen from equating (2.37) to zero with tk = 0; we then
get the Atkinson-Stern Rule:
h′(G) =
1
1 + ∂`
S
∂w
· t`
`S
> 1. (2.39)
Hence, the marginal willingness-to-pay for the government good exceeds the marginal
rate of transformation (which is equal to one). The reason for the under-provision is the
financing through a distortionary (labor) tax. When tax equity concerns only affect the
level of well-being (i.e., Ω` > 0 = ψ`), the costs of public funds further increase since
government expenditures will now partly be financed through the even less efficient
capital tax.
2.4.2 Comparative statics with level effects
As in the previous section, let us consider the case that the feeling of inequitable taxation
has no incentives effects, i.e., ψk = ψ` ≡ 0. Only the level effect of tax equity concerns is
operative. For simplicity (and as in Section 2.3) let us assume that Ω is given by (2.27):
Ω = Ω˜(β · (t` − tk)). Though comparative statics get quite messy, some reasonably
general results are available. Our first finding is in the spirit of Result 2; it holds
irrespective of whether labor supply is endogenous or exogenous:
Result 5 Suppose that tax equity concerns are not too strong initially (i.e., β is positive,
but small).
1. A more intense concern for tax equity, represented by an increase β, calls for
a decrease in the tax rate on labor, an increase in the tax rate on capital and,
consequently, a decrease in the tax rate differential.
2. The optimal level of government expenditures decreases when concerns for tax
equity get stronger.
The proof of this result is in Appendix 1. From the second item in Result 5,
stronger concerns for tax equity call for cutting back the size of the public sector. The
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intuition appears straightforward: Capital taxation is economically more costly than
labor taxation. When equity concerns induce the economy to rely more heavily on the
less efficient tax instrument, the (economic) opportunity costs of the government good
rise. Consequently, its optimal provision level decreases.
While Result 5 sounds plausible, a strong caveat has to be added: the qualification
of only weak equity concerns made in the proposition is indeed essential. If concerns
with tax equity are strong already, a further intensification may call for an increase in
labor taxes and/or a rise in government expenditures. This is illustrated by means of
Example 3: As in Example 1, we choose y = f(k) = kα. To arrive at explicit
solutions, we further suppose that labor supply is inelastic at some level L¯ > 0. Utility
is then measured by u = c− Ω, where Ω = 0.5β(t` − tk)2.
Fig. 2.3: Optimal policies when government spending is endogenous.
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Figure 3: Optimal policies when government spending is endogenous.
tax, which is lump-sum here. Naturally, the increase in the labour tax must not offset the rise
of the capital tax rate; the tax differential is bound to decrease.
The fourth graph in Figure 3 shows that also government expenditures are non-monotonic in β,
first falling, then rising. The simultaneous increase in both tax rates just explained yields higher
revenues for the government. Thus, the first-order intuition that an increase in the marginal
costs of public funds (due to greater reliance on capital taxes, induced by larger equity concerns)
always calls for smaller government is not correct. An equity-induced reduction in the tax spread
may well go along with a larger government budget.
Result 6 In spite of a greater reliance of government finance on capital taxes, stronger tax
equity concerns may call for an expansion of government expenditures.
Of course, Result 5 remains valid in that government expenditure is always inefficiently low in
the presence of equity concerns, even though it may increase once equity concerns get stronger.17
The upper left panel in Figure 3 depicts a positive relationship between the strength of equity
concerns and the optimal capital tax rate. Other than the effects shown in the remaining three
panels, this relationship is indeed general in the case of exogenous labour supply, but not in the
case of endogenous labour supply:
17In the example, an inelastic labour supply is assumed. Hence, the third item in Result 3 does not strictly apply
(see previous footnote). Rather, in the example G is at its efficient level for β = 0: we have G = 0.25, which
solves 1 = h′(G) = 0.5G−0.5.
20
Figure 2.3 illustrates optimal policies when parameter values are set to L¯ = 0.2,
α = 1/3, and r = 0.2. The first graph shows that β and tk are strictly positively
related, as expected. The other three graphs plot, respectively, (t`− tk), t`, and optimal
government expenditure G(t`(β), tk(β)) against tk – which translates, by the positive
association between β and tk from the first graph, into similarly shaped plots against
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β. As can be seen, tk and the tax rate differential (t`− tk) move monotonically with β,
but the labor tax rate initially falls and later rises when tax equity concerns intensify
beyond some level. This eventual non-monotonicity of the labor tax rate in the strength
of equity considerations may be explained as follows: With strong equity concerns, the
tax rate on capital is quite high and government finance is economically quite costly.17
To reduce the economic costs of a further narrowing (demanded by even stronger equity
concerns) in the tax gap may then call for a stronger reliance on the labor tax, which is
lump-sum here. Naturally, the increase in the labor tax must not offset the rise of the
capital tax rate; the tax differential is bound to decrease.
The fourth graph in Figure 2.3 shows that also government expenditures are non-
monotonic in β, first falling, then rising. The simultaneous increase in both tax rates
just explained yields higher revenues for the government. Thus, the first-order intuition
that an increase in the marginal costs of public funds (due to greater reliance on capital
taxes, induced by larger equity concerns) always calls for smaller government is not
correct. An equity-induced reduction in the tax spread may well go along with a larger
government budget.
Result 6 In spite of a greater reliance of government finance on capital taxes, stronger
tax equity concerns may call for an expansion of government expenditures.
Of course, Result 5 remains valid in that government expenditure is always ineffi-
ciently low in the presence of equity concerns, even though it may increase once equity
concerns get stronger.18
The upper left panel in Figure 2.3 depicts a positive relationship between the
strength of equity concerns and the optimal capital tax rate. Other than the effects
shown in the remaining three panels, this relationship is indeed general in the case of
exogenous labor supply, but not in the case of endogenous labor supply:
Result 7 1. For endogenous government spending and exogenous labor supply, a
stronger concern with tax equity always calls for an increase in the capital tax
rate.
17This effect is more severe the more elastically capital responds to higher taxation.
18In the example, an inelastic labor supply is assumed. Hence, the third item in Result 3 does not
strictly apply (see previous footnote). Rather, in the example G is at its efficient level for β = 0: we
have G = 0.25, which solves 1 = h′(G) = 0.5G−0.5.
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2. For endogenous government spending but endogenous labor supply, a stronger con-
cern with tax equity may call for a lower tax rate on capital. A necessary (but
insufficient) condition for this to occur is that the labor supply function is strictly
convex in the net wage (i.e., ∂2`S/∂w2 > 0).19
The proof is in Appendix 2. Result 7 shows that the a priori intuition that a
higher degree of tax equity calls for higher taxes on capital is only true for exogenous
labor supply. For variable labor supply, a stronger concern for tax equity may also be
associated with lower taxes on capital income, given that the labor supply function is
sufficiently convex in the net wage. The reason is the following: With relatively strong
concerns for tax equity the capital tax rate will optimally be positive (see Result 4).
Even stronger equity concerns call for further narrowing the spread between labor and
capital taxes. One way to achieve this is to cut back both tax rates, but with a larger
reduction in the labor tax rate. Such tax cuts will increase the gross wage (lowering
tk boosts k), the net wage (w − t` rises), indirect utility V , and finally labor supply
(both via the standard wage effect and the reduced disincentive by the smaller tax
gap). If these effects are strong enough (here the convexity requirement jumps in), such
a move need not reduce, and may even increase, government expenditure, rendering the
joint tax cut indeed feasible and optimal. Recall, however, the necessary requirements:
strong equity concerns and a highly elastic labor supply.
With invariant labor supply, only the comparative statics for the capital tax rates
are unambiguously characterized in Result 7. All other comparative statics depend on
the sign and magnitude of k′′, i.e., on the curvature of the capital demand function
or, which is the same, on the third derivative of the production function f(k). In
addition, the case of an endogenous labor supply entails a complex interaction between
equity and efficiency effects: Closing the spread between labor and capital tax rates
increases labor supply via reduced disincentives for work. On the other hand, it also
raises the excess burden of taxation, due to the mobility of capital. These opposing
effects make it virtually impossible to arrive at any predictions of at least moderate
generality when fairness concerns are strong and labor supply is exogenous. However,
Example 3 shows that counter-intuitive effects may arise already when labor supply is
19In our model, this convexity condition is equivalent to the marginal disutility from labor being
concave: further implicit differentiation of (2.3) gives ∂2`/∂w2 = E```/(−E``)3.
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fixed; by a continuity argument they cannot be excluded in case of an endogenous labor
supply either.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we augmented a standard model for factor taxation in small open economies
by concerns about tax equity. Violating standard neoclassical assumptions, we endowed
individuals with direct preferences over tax rates, allowing for a distinction between eq-
uity considerations that shape work incentives and such that just scale up or down
utility levels. Optimal tax policies have to balance three policy goals: (i) maintaining a
solid capital base in spite of international mobility, (ii) generating sufficiently high tax
revenue, and (iii) avoiding large imbalances between capital and labor taxation.
The third requirement upsets the standard recommendation of exempting capi-
tal from taxation. Moreover, our comparative statics reveal some unexpected non-
monotonicities: With weak concerns about tax equity the tax on capital should be
higher and the tax on labor and (endogenous) government expenditures should be lower,
relative to an economy that is unconcerned with tax equity. However, with intense con-
cerns for tax equity these intuitive patterns turn out to be unstable: capital taxes might
decrease, labor taxes increase, and government expenditure go up.
The potential implications of concerns for tax equity on the optimal structure of
factor income taxation can be substantial. Moreover, they vary considerably with the
strength of equity motives. Yet, while from the arguments provided in the introduction
(justice principles, fairness considerations, relative deprivation, envy, etc.) the preva-
lence of such equity concerns appears highly plausible, we can at present not provide
any measurable evidence for their intensity. We hope that by demonstrating the po-
tential policy relevance of equity concerns, we shall encourage empirical work on the
subject.
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2.6 Appendix 1: proof of result 5
Tax rates (item 1)
From (2.27), Ω`β = −Ωkβ = Ω˜′ + β(t` − tk)Ω˜′′ > 0. Using (2.37) and (2.38), the
comparative statics of (t`, tk) with respect to β are given by: V`` V`k
V`k Vkk
 ·
 dt`
dtk
 = −
 V`β
Vkβ
 dβ
=
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
·
 +1
−1
 dβ
(with Vxy = ∂
2V/(∂tx∂ty) and Vxβ = ∂
2V/(∂tx∂β)). Consequently, by Cramer’s Rule:
dt`
dβ
=
1
D
·
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
· (Vkk + V`k) (2.40)
dtk
dβ
= − 1
D
·
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
· (V`` + V`k) (2.41)
d(t` − tk)
dβ
=
1
D
·
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
· (V`` + Vkk + 2V`k) . (2.42)
Here,
D := V``Vkk − V 2`k (2.43)
is the determinant of the matrix on the LHS of (2.28). In a welfare maximum, D > 0
as well as Vkk, V`` < 0. From (2.27), Ω`` = Ωkk = −Ω`k = β2Ω˜′′ > 0. The claims in
item 1 of Result 5 are, thus, proven if (but not only if) V`k < 0.
20
As an intermediate result (which will also be helpful in the proof of item 2) we
report:
V`k = kV`` + A1 (2.44)
Vkk = kV`k + A2 (2.45)
20In fact, this condition is overly strict. It would suffice that V`k < max{−V``,−Vkk}.
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where we set
A1 := h
′′(G)
∂G
∂t`
Ltkk
′ − h′(G)tkk′ ∂`
∂w
+ (k + 1)β2Ω˜′′ ≥ 0; (2.46)
A2 := h
′′(G)Ltkk′
∂G
∂tk
− h′(G)ktkk′ ∂`
∂w
+ h′(G)L(2k′ + tkk′′)
−(k + 1)β2Ω˜′′ − h′k′ ∂`
∂w
(t` + tkk)− k′L. (2.47)
Equations (2.44) and (2.45) are proven below.
From Result 3 we get that tk = 0 for β = 0. Hence, A1 = 0 in this case. However,
then V`k < 0 follows from (2.44). Hence, at β = 0, we get from (2.40 to (2.42) that
dt`
dβ
< 0, dtk
dβ
> 0, and d(t`−tk)
dβ
< 0. By continuity, the same holds for small positive
values of β (and, thus, tk). 
Government expenditures (item 2)
Observe that
dG
dβ
= Gk · dtk
dβ
+G` · dt`
dβ
.
Suppose now that β = 0 and, thus, tk = 0 (from Result 3). Then, using (2.15) and
(2.14), we obtain
dG
dβ
=
(
∂L
∂tk
t` + L
∗k
)
· dtk
dβ
+
(
∂L
∂t`
t` + L
∗
)
· dt`
dβ
=
[
∂L
∂t`
t` + L
∗
]
·
(
k
dtk
dβ
+
dt`
dβ
)
= G` ·
(
k
dtk
dβ
+
dt`
dβ
)
.
Recall that G` > 0 in an optimum.
21 Hence, dG
dβ
< 0 if and only if k dtk
dβ
+ dt`
dβ
< 0. Verify
that, using (2.44) and (2.45) and the fact that A1 = 0 for β = 0,
k
dtk
dβ
+
dt`
dβ
=
1
D
·
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
· (−kV`` − kV`k + Vkk + V`k)
=
1
D
·
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
· (−k2V`` + k(kV`` + A1) + A2)
=
A2
D
·
[
Ω˜′ + β · (t` − tk) · Ω˜′′
]
. (2.48)
21 See (2.37) and (2.38): Conditions V` = Vk = 0 require that G` > 0 and Gk− 1h′Ωk > 0, respectively.
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In (2.48) both the square-bracketed expression and D are positive. Moreover, using
the definition of D in (2.43) and, again, (2.44) and (2.45) and the fact that A1 = 0 at
β = 0,
D = V``(A2 − kA1)− A21 = V``A2.
As V`` < 0 in an optimum, D being positive necessitates A2 < 0. In turn, we get that
(2.48) is negative and, thus, dG
dβ
< 0 at β = 0. Again, by continuity, this also holds for
β > 0, but small. 
Proof of (2.44) and (2.45)
Calculate:
V`` = −∂L
∂t`
+ h′′(G)
(
∂G
∂t`
)2
+ h′(G)
∂2G
∂t2`
− Ω``
=
∂`
∂w
+ h′′(G)
(
L− (t` + tkk) ∂`
∂w
)2
+ h′(G)
(
2
∂L
∂t`
+ (t` + tkk)
∂2L
∂t2`
)
− Ω``
=
∂`
∂w
+ h′′(G)
(
L− (t` + tkk) ∂`
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With A1 as defined in (2.46), this is (2.44). Finally,
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With A2 as defined in (2.47), this coincides with (2.45). 
2.7 Appendix 2: proof of result 7
Exogenous labor supply (item 1)
From (2.41), dtk/dβ is opposite in sign to V``+V`k. Using (2.44), we get that V``+V`k =
(1 + k)V`` + A1. With exogenous labor supply, (2.46) gives A1 = h
′′(G)L2tkk′ + (k +
1)β2Ω˜′′. Moreover, from (2.49), V`` = h′′(G)L2− β2Ω˜′′ when labor supply is exogenous.
Hence,
V`` + V`k = h
′′(G)L2(1 + k + tkk′) = h′′(G)L(G` +Gk) < 0,
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where we used (2.15) and (2.14) and exploited that from (2.32), it follows that
G` +Gk = (1 +
1
k
)(Gk − 1
h′
Ωk) (2.50)
must be positive in an inner solution.22 Thus, dtk/dβ > 0. 
Endogenous labor supply (item 2)
From (2.41) and 2.44, sign[dtk/dβ] = −sign[(1 + k)V`` + A1]. With endogenous labor
supply, (2.49) and (2.46) give
(1 + k)V`` + A1 (2.51)
=
∂`
∂w
(1 + k)(1h′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+h′′G`(G` +Gk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+h′(− ∂`
∂w
)(1 + k + tkk
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+h′(t` + tkk)
∂2`
∂w2
(1 + k).
Here we used that Ωkk = −Ω``. The first and second term on the RHS of (2.51) are
negative since h′ > 1, G` > 0 and G` + Gk > 0 must hold in an inner optimum. The
sign of the third term in (2.51) can be determined from (2.15), (2.14) and (2.50) which
yield that L(1 + k + tkk
′) = G` + Gk + ∂`∂w (t` + tkk)(1 + k) > 0. Thus, ∂
2`/∂w2 < 0 is
sufficient for (2.51) to be negative and, thus, for dtk/dβ > 0. 
22See also footnote 21. Note that in (2.32) we have to substitute for λ with h′ to obtain the analogue
for endogenous government spending.
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Chapter 3
Fairness Spillovers: The Case of Taxation1
3.1 Introduction
It is widely documented that fairness perceptions matter for economic behavior. Various
experiments have suggested that people who find themselves in situations which they
perceive to be inconsistent with their moral standards or expectations show behavioral
responses that entail economic costs. Agents receiving “unkind” wage offers have been
shown to react by cutting back work effort (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), the belief that
others do not contribute to charitable funds induces a lower willingness to donate to
charity (Frey and Meier, 2004), and people who think that there is injustice in taxation
respond by increasing their own level of tax evasion (Alm et al. 1993; Andreoni et al.,
1998). This literature shares the premise that individuals adjust to perceived unfairness
or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original event
has occurred.
Social psychologists on the other hand have proposed that the behavioral conse-
quences of perceived norm violations may be less direct. In a series of field experiments,
Keizer et al. (2008) find that “when people observe that others violated a certain social
norm or legitimate rule, they are more likely to violate other norms [...].”: Pedestrians
are more likely to steal an envelope from a mailbox when the area around the mail-
1This chapter is co-authored with Thomas Cornelissen and Oliver Himmler. A reprint was pub-
lished as: ’Fairness Spillovers: The Case of Taxation’, CESifo Working Paper, No. 3217. Part of
this chapter was also published online at O¨konomenstimme, March 2011 (in German). It received a
revise-and-resubmit decision from the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. The chap-
ter was presented at conferences and seminars in Shanghai, Helsinki, Venice, Monterey, Mannheim,
Luxembourg, Tu¨bingen, Munich and London.
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box is arranged to be littered with trash, and customers outside a shopping mall are
more likely to disobey a “no throughway” sign when bicycles were illegitimately parked
nearby. Similarly, Mullen and Nadler (2008) find that when they have experiment par-
ticipants read a newspaper article which reports on a court decision that is inconsistent
with their core values, they show higher rates of stealing the pen they were given to fill
out the experiment questionnaire.
The latter examples show that a perception of norm-deviant behavior can have
consequences for other contexts and make individuals feel less obliged to show compliant
behavior there, even if this comes at cost of third parties. While the evidence gathered
by social psychologists is intriguing, the economic relevance of such cross-norm or cross-
relationship adjustments – a phenomenon we label ’fairness spillovers’ – has not been
assessed so far. To do so, we look at two genuinely economic norms of conduct which
are at the heart of modern industrialized societies: the obligations to work hard and to
pay taxes.2 We evaluate whether individuals who believe that there is a norm violation
in taxation exhibit a lower willingness to comply with the norm to exert effort at work.
As a specific setup, we analyze whether the belief that the rich do not pay their fair
share in taxes comes with higher levels of shirking.
Our suggested fairness spillover meets the conditions which social psychologists say
make the occurrence of cross-norm adjustments likely (Austin and Walster, 1975; Mullen
and Nadler, 2008): (i) people’s fundamental or core values must be at stake; (ii) a
direct response is difficult; (iii) some degree of anonymity should be involved such that
own deviant behavior cannot be easily detected or punished. Consider condition (i):
The opinion that the top income brackets should contribute a substantial share to
the funding of public affairs is widely held in societies that adhere to the principle of
progressive taxation. Mankiw (2010) even goes so far as to state that “[t]he question,
’Do the rich pay their fair share in taxes?’ is one of [the] defining issues of our time”.
Consequently, the idea that the rich may pay too little in taxes can let emotions run
high. A recent Economist poll on US public opinion inquired how angry people get when
they think about “Tax Breaks for the Rich”. Almost half of the respondents answered
2Hard work is seen as a virtue almost universally across cultures, religions and political regimes
(Lipset 1992). Likewise, once a state is brought into existence, paying taxes is considered as a citizens’
duty and hence constitutes a widely accepted norm (Locke, 1690).
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“Very Angry”, about one fifth get“Somewhat Angry”while only one out of ten said they
“Don’t think about it”.3 When it comes to criterion (ii), it could be argued that tax
evasion is a natural reaction to perceived injustice in taxation. This direct adjustment
measure has been analyzed in tax evasion experiments (Spicer and Becker 1981, Kinsey
et al. 1991). However, it has also been argued in the tax evasion literature that evasion
often is not a viable option, as the opportunities for manipulating tax returns are slim for
the employed population: Taxable income is often directly reported to the authorities
by employers or other third-party institutions such as banks, investment and pensions
funds (Kleven et al. 2011). While Kleven et al. (2011) find lower rates of tax evasion
in the presence of such reduced evasion opportunities, it is reasonable to assume that
this lack of a direct adjustment measure makes the occurrence of spillovers to other
spheres of life more likely. Instead of evading taxes, agents may turn to non-compliant
behavior in surrogate areas, where adjustment is less difficult – in our case by reducing
work morale. We consider condition (iii) to be met because exertion of effort at work is
hardly ever fully contractible and therefore entails various elements of “quasi-voluntary”
contributions.
That fairness spillovers may indeed exist can be inferred from situations where agents
utter that they refuse to make any effort above and beyond the call of duty at work
as long as those in charge do not contribute their fair share. This is obviously only
anecdotal evidence for the existence of the hypothesized spillovers and a rigorous way
of testing for their existence is more difficult to come up with, because such individual
’work-to-rule’ strategies are notoriously hard to observe and measure. We therefore
propose the following setup. As a measure of work morale which is easy to observe, and
that at the same time allows us to put at a price tag on the suggested fairness spillover
from taxation, we use the number of days that German employees spend on sickness
leave. In Germany, there is no reduction of earnings associated with sickness spells of
up to six weeks’ duration and, for the first three days of each period of leave, employees
are usually not even obliged to provide a doctor’s note. In addition, there are high
levels of job protection, and we assume that ultimately this legal generosity provides
incentives to utilize it as a means of shirking one’s duty when the wealthy are suspected
3Economist/YouGov Poll, conducted March 22-24, 2009.
42
CHAPTER 3. FAIRNESS SPILLOVERS
of not fulfilling the norm of paying ample taxes.4 The German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) provides data on absenteeism and also inquires about the belief that the rich
do not pay their fair share in taxes. A perceived violation of this tax fairness norm
is surprisingly strongly connected to work morale: On average, employees who harbor
the perception that managers pay too little in taxes accrue 20 percent more sick days,
which translates to 1.5 more days absent from work per year. This result holds, even
when carefully conditioning on health status and a rich set of income, personal and
job related variables. The extremely diverse set of control variables that the GSOEP
provides also allows us to test and reject a variety of alternative explanations. While we
believe the control variable strategy to go a long way in correcting potential biases, our
research design additionally implements Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests. They reveal
that any remaining omitted variable would need to have implausibly strong associations
with absenteeism and fairness beliefs in order to spuriously generate our results – given
the large set of covariates, the existence of such an important unobserved variable is
rather unlikely.
While the possible existence of what we label ’fairness spillovers’ has gone largely
unnoticed by economists, the general phenomenon that individuals may use apparently
unrelated outlets in response to external emotional cues is enjoying increasing interest
in the recent economics literature: Upset losses by the home football team have been
shown to induce higher levels of domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011); similarly
the incidence of offenses against police officers (Rees and Schnepel, 2009) as well as
vandalism (Priks, 2010) have been found to be especially high whenever home teams
suffer an upset loss. Our result parallels these findings in that they can all be interpreted
to be consistent with the frustration-aggression hypothesis – deviation from a reference
point of expectation leads to anger which in turn results in adverse behavior. There are,
however, several important differences. First, the reference point we have in mind is
genuinely moralistic or ethical in nature, thus distinguishing the ’fairness spillover’ from
the above mechanisms, which following our terminology could be labeled ’emotional
spillovers’. Second, in our case the suspected triggering event is not a real event but
4This is not to say that everyone on sick leave is a shirker. However, that absence due to illness
is not purely a response to medical conditions is widely accepted in the labor economics literature
(Barmby et al. 2002; Johannsen and Palme 2005; Puhani and Sonderhof 2010).
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rather a belief. Third, because beliefs about justice in the world can be considered to
form slowly over time, the decision to reduce work morale because of suspected injustice
in taxation is not very likely to be an immediate and spontaneous reaction to a single
event. Finally, our dependent variable, a proxy for work effort, is a core variable of
economic analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the choice of
variables, describes the data and gives some descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 presents
the empirical results. Section 3.4 discusses alternative explanations for the findings,
and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
How do individuals react when their sense of tax fairness is violated? In early 2010 a
man deliberately crashed his airplane into an Austin tax office, killing himself and an
employee. The suicide note was described by the New York Times as a ’rant against
the government, big business and particularly the tax system [...]’.5 Such drastic violent
acts are rare, but each year the US tax authorities are faced with a substantial number
of threats against employees.6 The problem is so serious that there even is an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) database of ’Potentially Dangerous Taxpayers’, and every year
a number of individuals receive jail sentences as a consequence of making such threats.7
These are without a doubt very direct responses to perceived unfairness in taxation and
fortunately most people will not go to such extremes. However the violent outbursts may
be only be the tip of the iceberg, indicative of a more widespread disgruntlement with
the tax system. Indeed, opinion polls show that taxation is an emotionally charged
issue for most, especially when it comes to the taxation of wealthy individuals. In
April 2009, between 51% and 74% of respondents were in favor of increasing tax rates
5See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html.
6The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) has investigated more
than 1,000 threats against IRS employees in 2009. See the article in the Wall Street Journal
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704757904575077381781219798.html, and
the TIGTA website at http://www.treas.gov/tigta.
7Guidelines for identifying Potentially Dangerous taxpayers are laid out in Part 25.4.1 of the Internal
Revenue Service’s (IRS) Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), accessible at http://www.irs.gov/irm.
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for those earning more than $250,000.8 When explicitly asked about the fairness of
the tax system, in a 2007 Gallup poll 66% of respondents said they felt that ’upper-
income people’ paid less than their fair share in taxes. An even higher share of people
(71%) believed that corporations didn’t contribute adequately.9 Given the large share
of individuals that is discontent with the current state of taxation, we suspect that
these people do not just bottle up their frustrations, but rather employ more subtle and
indirect measures of adjustment than the ones described above.
Specifically, we test whether the belief that there is injustice in taxation of the rich is
associated with lower work morale. Testing this idea is challenging, as real-world data on
beliefs towards justice in taxation and on work morale are usually not readily available.
An exception is the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a large
nationally representative household panel data set.10 This survey includes questions
on tax fairness perceptions and on absenteeism from the workplace, which we use as a
proxy for work morale.
The 2005 questionnaire of the GSOEP asked respondents how they perceive the
tax burden of individuals at the upper end of the income distribution, exemplified by
”managers”. The introduction to the question reads: ”In Germany, everyone has to
pay taxes in relation to his or her income. Those who earn more have to pay higher
taxes (also known as ’progressive taxes’)”. Respondents are then asked: ”[...] what
do you think about the taxes paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large
company? Does he/she pay too much, too little, or an exactly appropriate amount in
taxes compared to other groups?”. There are four categories among which respondents
could choose: ’too much’, ’too little’, ’appropriate’, ’don’t know’.
The framing of the question alludes to the principle of progressive taxation, which
postulates that the individuals’ average tax rate should increase as income increases.
Yet the question does not explicitly ask ’is there enough progression in the German tax
system?’, and so there is scope for individuals to apply fairness principles other than
that of sufficient progression. The feeling that the rich pay too little in taxes compared
8See the Rasmussen report http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/taxes
/february_2009/51_say_tax_hike_on_those_earning_over_250_000_is_a_good_move, and a Fox
News poll at http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/030509_Poll.pdf.
9See http://www.gallup.com/poll/27199/americans-say-federal-income-taxes-too-high-
unfair.aspx. As an interesting aside, 60% of individuals felt that their own tax burden was fair.
10See Wagner et al. (2007) for a description of the panel survey.
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to other groups may stem from the belief that the rich do not contribute adequately to
the tax pool by taking advantage of loopholes or by flat out evading taxes in an illegal
manner. Yet the blame need not be on the rich themselves: agents may just as well
feel that politicians fail to implement tax policies that sufficiently strain the rich and
thus deem the tax system unfair. In the end, while we cannot say which tax fairness
principle respondents actually have in mind, we assume that individuals apply some
tax fairness principle when answering the question.
In Table 3.1 we present the distribution of the belief that managers are taxed too
little. We exclude those who answered ’don’t know’ and coded the variable to zero
when managers’ taxation was deemed ’too high’ or ’appropriate’. Hence, the reference
group is composed of people who do not think that managers are taxed too little.11 The
first column of the table shows that an overwhelming 72% of respondents think that
managers are taxed too little. One might suspect that this view is more strongly held by
individuals at the lower end of the income distribution. In the remaining columns of the
table we therefore break this figure up by income quartiles, by worker class (blue/white
collar) and by three different skill-related hierarchy levels within an individual’s broad
occupation. It is striking how strongly the belief that managers are taxed too little is
also held by individuals from the higher income and occupation groups. It is held by
61% of the respondents in the 4th income quartile (compared to 78.5% of individuals
in the first income quartile) and by 68% of white-collar workers (compared to 81.4% of
blue-collar workers). We conclude from these numbers that the belief that managers do
not pay their fair share in taxes is indeed not confined to individuals from low-income
groups.12 Quite the contrary, this view is held by a wide range of individuals from
different social backgrounds.
If individuals react to perceived unfairness by reducing work morale, they are most
likely to choose an easily manipulable margin of adjustment with low cost and low
11Perhaps not surprisingly, the view that managers pay too much in taxes is only held by 6% of the
respondents.
12Interestingly, even the billionaire Warren Buffett publicly points out that his own av-
erage tax rate is much lower than that of his receptionist, a first indicator that believ-
ing the tax system to be unfair at the top is not confined to working class individu-
als. See www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/business/yourmoney/15view.html. Similarly, in the
YouGov/Economist Poll cited in the introduction, around forty percent of college graduates declare to
get ’Very Angry’ when thinking about tax breaks for the wealthy. The same is true for those with a
household income above $100,000.
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Tab. 3.1: Are managers being taxed too little?
full income quartiles hierarchy in occupation worker class
sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 low med high blue white
Yes (%) 72.1 78.5 76.8 75.3 61.1 80.3 75.5 60.1 81.4 68.0
N 3647 680 968 1091 908 602 2228 817 1191 2057
No (%) 27.9 21.5 23.2 24.7 38.9 19.7 24.5 39.9 18.6 32.0
N 1413 186 292 357 578 148 723 542 273 970
Total 5060 866 1260 1448 1486 750 2951 1359 1464 3027
Note: Data is taken from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Sample restricted to those observations
used in the full specifications in Table 3.3. The question reads: “In Germany, everyone has to pay taxes in relation
to his or her income. Those who earn more have to pay higher taxes (also known as ’progressive taxes’).[...]And what
do you think about the taxes paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Does he/she pay too
much, too little, or an exactly appropriate amount in taxes compared to other groups?” There are four categories among
which respondents could choose: ’too much’, ’too little’, ’appropriate’, ’don’t know’. The indicator variable used in this
paper drops all individuals that answered ’don’t know’. In addition, all individuals that answered either ’too much’ or
’appropriate’ are coded as zero, i.e. they do not think that managers are being taxed too little. The total number of
observations is lower in the final two columns, as some individuals cannot be classified as blue or white collar individuals.
Tab. 3.2: Days absent by answer to ’Are managers taxed too little?’.
managers taxed too little difference in
yes no days absent
managers taxed too little (%) 72.1 27.9
Days absent by answer category 8.34 5.58 2.76∗∗∗
(.31) (.32) (.54)
N 3647 1413
Note: Percentage of respondents who think that managers are being taxed too little. Mean days
absent by opinion on manager taxation and t-test of difference in means of absenteeism (standard
errors in parentheses). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
probability of detection. In Germany, the number of days absent from work due to
illness meets these requirements, because employees are usually not obliged to produce
a doctor’s note for the first three days of each sickness spell and there is no reduction of
payments for spells of up to six weeks. The analysis will thus use employee absenteeism
due to sickness as the dependent variable. The GSOEP provides the self-reported annual
number of days absent from work due to illness. This question reads ”How many days
were you not able to work [last year] because of illness?” Because of the retrospective
nature of the question we draw the information on work absence from the 2006 GSOEP
wave so that we can relate it to the fairness perceptions collected in the 2005 wave. We
exclude self-employed individuals since our argument for using absenteeism as a work
morale proxy does not apply to them. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the distribution
of days absent from work. It shows that about 45% of the individuals had no absent
days in 2005 (the mean is 7.57, the standard deviation 17.3 and the median 2 days).
The second row of Table 3.2 shows that those who think that managers are taxed
too little are absent from work 8.34 days, while those who think that managers are
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appropriately or excessively taxed are absent for only 5.58 days. This “fairness gap”
of 2.76 days is highly statistically significant, and in relative terms amounts to 36%
of the average number of days absent. While highly suggestive, these observations are
consistent with the idea that individuals not only ’get angry’ when thinking about tax
breaks for the rich – as implied by the Economist poll mentioned above – but that
behavioral consequences to perceived unjust taxation of the rich may manifest at the
workplace.
3.3 Estimation results
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 3.2 show a positive correlation between
the belief that managers pay too little in taxes and days absent from work – a first
indicator that there may indeed be spillovers from tax fairness perceptions to work
morale. The GSOEP provides a vast array of control variables, far beyond what is
usually available in survey data, and this section provides estimates of the association
between fairness perceptions and absenteeism after netting out these possibly confound-
ing factors. Table 3.8 in the Appendix gives descriptions of all variables used in the
analysis, with the corresponding summary statistics displayed in Table 3.9 in the Ap-
pendix. Our benchmark estimation is the linear OLS case, but due to the nature of the
dependent variable, we also use count-data and Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood methods.
These estimates give an idea of the magnitude of the ’fairness gap’, the difference in
sick days between two individuals who only differ in their assessment of whether or not
the rich pay their fair share in taxes.
3.3.1 Baseline results
The main explanatory variable in all regressions of this subsection is the indicator
variable for whether an individual believes that ’managers are being taxed too little’,
which we take as a measure of whether taxation at the top of the income distribution is
in line with a respondent’s concept of tax fairness. We expect people holding this belief
to respond by increasing their days absent from work and thus the dependent variable
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is the number of sick days in the year of the survey.13
Table 3.3 provides the results from linear OLS estimations. Column (1) reproduces
the raw differential presented in Table 3.2 by using a bivariate regression model: People
who think that managers are taxed too little report on average 2.9 more days of staying
away from work due to illness.14 A first natural candidate to control for is a person’s
individual health.15 It might be argued that the correlation in column (1) is driven
by reverse causality: Those who stay at home due to illness may become aware that
they are net beneficiaries of the social security system and therefore always think that
taxation levels are too low. Column (2) therefore adds two indicators of respondents’
health status. Health score is a self-reported assessment of an individual’s objective
health status. Respondents can rate their health on a scale ranging from ’poor’ [1]
to ’very good’ [5]. However, there may be vast differences in the health threshold that
needs to be reached before a person decides to call in sick. Hence, we also control for the
subjective satisfaction with health status. This variable is coded on an 11-point scale
ranging from ’totally unhappy’ [0] to ’totally happy’ [10]. Both variables are significant
and the coefficients bear the expected negative sign. They imply that better objective
health leads to lower levels of absenteeism, and that at fixed objective health, higher
levels of satisfaction with this particular level of well-being are associated with lower
absenteeism.16 Most interestingly, the difference in absenteeism after controlling for
health is still two full days, compared to the 2.9 days difference in absenteeism without
any controls.
Individual income is also an important control variable. One can argue that low-
income earners may systematically want higher tax levels for the rich, and that they also
have a higher probability of shirking, as they have less at stake when getting caught.
Since this would bias our coefficient of interest upwards, income is included in column
(3) along with other personal characteristics, some of which would be included in a
13We exclude individuals who report more than 250 sick days, the maximum number of workdays
per year.
14The only reason that these numbers diverge slightly is that the descriptives in Table 3.2 are based
on the smaller sample which is used in the full specification (6).
15In fact, if everyone used sick days the way one is supposed to, there should not be any systematic
predictors of absenteeism other than actual health.
16Obviously, both these variables are of a subjective nature, even if the health score variable asks
for an objective level of well-being. We would of course prefer to have a really objective measure, such
as the results from getting a physical at a doctor’s office. Unfortunately, such data are not available
in the GSOEP.
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standard Mincer equation. It turns out that a higher level of education is associated
with fewer sick days, as is advanced age and having children. However, the belief that
the tax system at the upper end of the income distribution is unfair is still associated
with significantly higher levels of absenteeism, despite the gap being cut down to one
sick day. Adding job and firm related variables in columns (4) and (5) does not further
diminish the tax fairness coefficient, the difference in absenteeism now actually increases
somewhat. Longer job tenure and larger firm size are both associated with higher levels
of absenteeism. A possible explanation would be that longer tenure makes it harder
for employers to punish shirking due to lay-off protection laws, while a larger firm
size reduces the probability of getting caught while shirking. From column (4) on,
the specifications also include 16 indicators for the German regions and 9 indicators
representing an individual’s rank in occupational hierarchy – the former for netting out
regional differences in work attitudes among others, the latter as further controls for
socio-economic status.
The GSOEP allows us to account for some personal attitudes and mental states
directly, rather than using proxies for them. After adding these variables in column (6)
the absenteeism difference increases somewhat to 1.5 days and remains highly signifi-
cant. We control for whether someone is satisfied with their job, since the job related
and firm related variables we included above may not fully capture workplace charac-
teristics driving both work morale and attitudes towards taxing the rich. Lower job
satisfaction can reduce an individual’s work morale and may be the result of antipathy
against own superiors, whom individuals may equate with the “rich” or the ”managers”.
We also include fear of job loss, although perceived job security should already be at
least partly covered by the dummies for part-time and marginally employed. Finally,
we take into account self-reported laziness as well as a person’s degree of risk aversion,
as shirking is still a risky behavior even under the high job protection levels in Germany.
Remarkably, none of these additional “soft”, or subjective, variables show a significant
association with absenteeism, and the fairness gap remains the same.
In sum, the gap associated with differing perceptions of tax fairness appears very
robust to the specification chosen and hardly changes at all after the inclusion of health
and personal characteristics. The main message of these estimates is that the connection
between tax fairness beliefs and absenteeism, described in Section 3.2, does not seem
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to be an artefact of failing to control for these observable characteristics.
The fact that the dependent variable can only take on non-negative integer values
means that OLS is not the preferred method of estimation and count-data methods
are a better fit. This is why Table 3.4 presents results from a Poisson model, a Neg-
ative Binomial (Negbin II) model, and a two-step Negative Binomial Quasi Maximum
Likelihood Estimator (QMLE). While the first two of these models are fairly standard
count-data models, the third was proposed by Wooldridge (2002) and has desirable ro-
bustness properties. The QMLE estimator is a fully robust estimator in the sense that
it does not rely on the distributional assumption and the variance assumption of the
Negbin II model. Only the conditional mean assumption is needed for consistency.17
In the Poisson model shown in column (1) all control variables have significant coeffi-
cients. However, due to overdispersion in the dependent variable – which can be seen
from the estimate of η2 in the two other models – the standard errors produced by the
Poisson model systematically underestimate the true standard errors. Inference should
therefore be based on the Negative Binomial and QMLE models.18 Coefficients must
be interpreted as in a log-linear regression, and the preferred QMLE model estimates
the difference in absenteeism at 26 log points (corresponding to an effect of 30%), which
translates to roughly 2 days of absenteeism – somewhat more than the OLS estimates
in column (6) of the previous table suggested. This again emphasizes the very robust
nature of the fairness spillover and establishes that individuals who perceive manager
taxation to be unfair have a much higher level of absenteeism, even after conditioning
on a vast array of possible confounders.
3.4 Discussion
So far, we have observed a quite robust and stable association between perceived unfair-
ness in taxing the rich and absenteeism. We have interpreted this finding as evidence
that fairness spillovers are relevant in economic contexts, and non-negligibly so. In this
section we discuss to what extent the presented connection may be explained by mecha-
17See Wooldridge (2002) for details.
18That a Negative Binomial model gives a better fit to our data than a Poisson model is also
illustrated in Figure 1 in the Appendix, which plots the predicted distributions from both models
alongside with the observed distribution of absenteeism.
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Tab. 3.4: Count data methods.
(Poisson) (Negative Binomial) (2-step NegBin QMLE)
managers taxed too little .2262∗∗∗ (0.013) .2575∗∗∗ (0.064) .2558∗∗∗ (0.061)
health score −.4058∗∗∗ (0.009) −.3562∗∗∗ (0.049) −.3566∗∗∗ (0.047)
health satisfaction −.1116∗∗∗ (0.004) −.1067∗∗∗ (0.022) −.1067∗∗∗ (0.022)
Personal characteristics
gross income −.0502∗∗∗ (0.006) −.0527∗∗ (0.025) −.0524∗∗ (0.023)
age −.0316∗∗∗ (0.005) −.0433 (0.031) −.043 (0.028)
agesq 4.2e−04∗∗∗ (0.000) 4.4e−04 (0.000) 4.4e−04 (0.000)
male −.0772∗∗∗ (0.014) −.0882 (0.076) −.089 (0.070)
children −.0834∗∗∗ (0.012) −.0766 (0.065) −.0769 (0.061)
foreign .0927∗∗∗ (0.022) .0244 (0.125) .0257 (0.107)
schooling −.0524∗∗∗ (0.003) −.0357∗∗ (0.015) −.0361∗∗ (0.015)
Job related variables
tenure .0257∗∗∗ (0.002) .0191∗ (0.010) .0192∗ (0.010)
tenure sq −7.8e−04∗∗∗ (0.000) −5.9e−04∗∗ (0.000) −6.0e−04∗∗ (0.000)
full time experience −.02∗∗∗ (0.003) −.013 (0.015) −.0132 (0.015)
full time experience sq 4.7e−04∗∗∗ (0.000) 4.4e−04 (0.000) 4.4e−04 (0.000)
part time experience .007∗∗ (0.003) −.008 (0.018) −.0077 (0.017)
part time experience sq −4.7e−04∗∗∗ (0.000) 2.6e−04 (0.001) 2.3e−04 (0.001)
part time(a) −.1634∗∗∗ (0.020) −.178∗ (0.103) −.1785∗ (0.099)
marginally employed −1.195∗∗∗ (0.050) −.9221∗∗∗ (0.182) −.9255∗∗∗ (0.231)
Firm level variables
20<employees<200(b) .2614∗∗∗ (0.017) .3001∗∗∗ (0.082) .2994∗∗∗ (0.084)
200<=employees<2000 .4618∗∗∗ (0.018) .4746∗∗∗ (0.090) .4742∗∗∗ (0.087)
employees>2000 .4096∗∗∗ (0.018) .411∗∗∗ (0.091) .4114∗∗∗ (0.087)
agriculture(c) −.5878∗∗∗ (0.063) −.3999 (0.278) −.3995 (0.288)
mining/energy .6023∗∗∗ (0.037) .6524∗∗∗ (0.242) .6521∗∗∗ (0.245)
processing .0055 (0.026) .1097 (0.137) .1074 (0.125)
traffic/media .0724∗∗∗ (0.024) .2004 (0.131) .1983 (0.128)
construction .2495∗∗∗ (0.026) .1472 (0.143) .1479 (0.156)
wholesale .2196∗∗∗ (0.020) .2161∗∗ (0.109) .2152∗ (0.112)
services −.1115∗∗∗ (0.022) −.0843 (0.105) −.084 (0.099)
banking/insurance .0606∗∗ (0.027) .0298 (0.140) .031 (0.118)
public sector .0815∗∗∗ (0.018) .2036∗∗ (0.096) .2018∗∗ (0.092)
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job .0041 (0.012) −.0196 (0.063) −.0187 (0.059)
satisfied w/ job .0064∗∗ (0.003) −.0171 (0.016) −.0165 (0.016)
lazy −.0038 (0.004) −.0024 (0.019) −.0023 (0.019)
risk taker .0155∗∗∗ (0.002) .0118 (0.013) .0121 (0.014)
constant 4.933∗∗∗ (0.119) 5.166∗∗∗ (0.657) 5.157∗∗∗ (0.588)
16 region dummies Yes Yes Yes
9 occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
η2 3.48 (0.09) 2.52 (0.13)
log likelihood -4.3e+04 -1.3e+04 -1.3e+04
N 5060 5060 5060
Note: The dependent variable is the number of days absent due to illness. Reference categories are: (a) full-time for
’job status’, (b) less than 20 employees for ’firm size’, (c) Manufacturing for ’sectoral dummies’. Column (1): standard
Poisson regression. Column (2): Negative Binomial regression. Column (3) is a negative binomial two-step quasi-
maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) implying fully robust standard errors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
nisms other than the hypothesized fairness spillovers. Several objections can be rejected
on plausibility grounds, and we also provide Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests, showing
that in order to annihilate our main result, any remaining omitted factors would have
to exhibit implausibly strong associations with absenteeism and fairness beliefs.
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3.4.1 ’Selfish’ explanations
A reasonable objection to the spillover mechanism we have proposed would be that the
link between beliefs on manager taxation and work morale can be a result of individuals
pursuing standard selfish preferences. This would render the label ’fairness spillovers’
inappropriate, since the underlying mechanism would be independent of agents’ fairness
perceptions. The plausibility checks presented in Table 3.5 help us shed some light on
this issue. Only the coefficient of manager taxation and regressors in excess of the full
QMLE specification from Table 3.4 are shown in this table – column (1) reproduces the
coefficient from this full specification as a reference point.
Assume that a belief that managers pay too little in taxes is positively related to
one’s own tax burden. Then, the coefficient on manager taxation may be confounded
with the following standard neoclassical mechanism: a higher tax rate reduces an indi-
vidual’s net income or, equivalently, the expected loss from being detected, which calls
for higher levels of shirking. We calculate an individual’s average tax rate by taking
the difference between reported gross income and net income and divide it by gross in-
come. When including this variable in column (2), the coefficient of the tax unfairness
indicator remains virtually unaltered. In a similar vein, the belief that those in charge
pay too little in taxes could be just another way of expressing frustration about one’s
own career opportunities. In that case the hypothesized fairness spillover boils down
to the notion that expecting low returns to effort is detrimental to work incentives – a
rather selfish argument, too. Column (3) adds a variable measuring the self-evaluated
opportunities of rising up within the firm hierarchy. As expected, a perceived lower
chance of advancing in the ranks of the company is associated with a higher number
of days absent. However, the coefficient on manager taxation remains very similar to
the reference specification in column (1). Expectations of low returns from effort may
also arise when one thinks that hard work generally does not pay in life, e.g. when
one beliefs that success is matter of luck. In the GSOEP, respondents were asked the
question ’What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck’. We use
an indicator taking on the value 1 if the respondent chose at least value (5) on a (7)-
point scale (’disagree’ (0) – ’agree’ (7)). This regressor is added in column (4) and its
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coefficient is statistically significant with the expected positive sign.19 Again, the fact
that the coefficient of the tax unfairness indicator does not change allows us to counter
the objection that we are just measuring a response to the belief that spending effort
at work is fruitless. Finally, we reconsider the redistribution argument from Section
3.3.1: Perhaps those who are sick often become aware that they are net beneficiaries of
the social security system, creating a very self-interested motive to favor higher levels
of redistribution. To the extent that income and risk aversion do not already pick up
this redistributive motive, in column (5) we add a control for the respondent’s position
within the political spectrum. Lower values indicate a leftist stance, which can be as-
sumed to go with a high preference for redistribution, yet such political inclinations do
not seem to be correlated with absenteeism.
3.4.2 ’Complainers’ and general pessimism
Another objection is the idea that believing in an unjust world – and the belief the
rich do not pay their fair share may just be a special instance of this wider view – can
go with a general pessimism or complainer attitude which in turn may be correlated
with lower intrinsic work motivation. In this case, the presented results would not be
a manifestation of ’fairness spillovers’ but should rather be interpreted as evidence for
’emotional spillovers’, if any (which would be interesting on its own since evidence for
the relevance of the frustration-aggression hypothesis in economic contexts are scarce).
Column (6) in Table 3.5 adds a variable which indicates whether the respondent is
’pessimistic about the future’. From the coefficient, it seems that such a disposition
is unrelated to absenteeism and tax fairness. Other individuals may loosely be termed
’complainers’ – these are people who lament about everything. To the extent that such
attitudes are not fully captured in the ’pessimist’ control variable, they can still bias
our estimates. As a further robustness check we therefore use a GSOEP question on
general life satisfaction. The question reads: “How satisfied are you with your life, all
things considered? [scale 0-10]”. The results after including this additional regressor
are shown in column (7), where the coefficient on manager taxation remains stable and
19This is interesting in its own right. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) introduce the disutility stemming
from the perception that luck determines income in an additive-separable manner, and hence, as having
no behavioral affects. However, our results can also be seen as evidence for justifying incentive shaping
variants.
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precise.
3.4.3 Direct reciprocity
There is also some concern that the statement ’managers of large companies do not pay
enough taxes’ may be an expression of a negative attitude individuals may have towards
managers at their own workplace and that makes them want to ’get even’. Recall that
the survey question asked about the fairness of taxes for managers ’on the board of
directors of a large company’, i.e. CEOs. Only a minor fraction of people work for
large companies that actually have CEOs. Consequently, if the fairness beliefs about
manager taxes were merely driven by dissatisfaction with CEOs, we would expect only
a small fraction of workers to believe that managers ’on the board of directors of a large
company’ pay too little in taxes. However, more than two thirds of the employees in our
sample believe that managers contribute too little. In the same vein, if our effect were
largely driven by direct reciprocity, we would expect it to be bigger in large companies,
which are more likely to have CEOs. However, splitting up the sample by firm size, we
find the exact opposite. The coefficient is quite strong for the smaller companies, while
it is much smaller and insignificant for the largest companies (see Table 3.6).
An objection to our argument could be that respondents might equate ’CEO’ with
their own employer, regardless of the size of their company. If this were the case, then
showing that the effect is strong for employees in small companies is not enough to rule
out direct reciprocity. However, there are more reasons why directly reciprocal behavior
is unlikely to be the driving force behind our results: Above all, we do already control
for job satisfaction which should net out many negative job aspects that could trigger
reciprocal actions against the own employer. We also rule out that feelings of being
underpaid may trigger reciprocal actions against the employer by including a variable
which inquired ”Is the income that you earn at your current job just, from your point of
view? [Yes/No]” in column (8) of Table 3.5. While it is surprising that the coefficient is
insignificant, the main message is that the mechanism we label a spillover is not merely
directly reciprocal in the sense of being a reaction to employers offering unfair wages.
In the end, we find little evidence that direct reciprocal behavior is the main driving
force behind our results and therefore stick with the fairness spillover interpretation.
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Tab. 3.6: Direct reciprocity. Sample split by firm size.
(< 20) (20− 199) (200− 1999) (≥ 2000)
managers taxed too little .3211∗∗ .3116∗∗∗ .3019∗∗∗ .0663
(0.139) (0.109) (0.109) (0.095)
N 1043 1537 1156 1324
Note: The full sample is split by firm size as measured by the number of employees. All estimations are two-step
quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) implying fully robust standard errors. The dependent variable is ’number
of days absent’. All regressions include the same control variables as model (6) of Table 3.3. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.4.4 Tax versus income fairness
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence that a perception of norm-deviant behavior
can have consequences for other contexts and make individuals feel less obliged to show
compliant behavior there. While we focus on the perceived fairness of manager taxation,
the GSOEP also asked its participants ”How high on average is the monthly net income
of a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Would you say that this
income has a just relation to the job demands? [Yes/No]”. If this belief can be shown to
matter for shirking, then this can be seen as a fairness spillover, too, in the sense that
abstract beliefs about how incomes are distributed within a society matter for mirco-
economic behavior. As can be seen in column (9), the perception of manager incomes
as unfair is also associated with a higher number of days absent, yet the coefficient
on manager taxation still suggests a roughly 20% higher level of absenteeism for those
who believe the tax system to be unfair. The coefficient is not as precisely estimated
as before, yet still significant at the 5% level. The imprecision stems in part from a
drop in the number of observations by roughly one third. This is due to the fact that
the manager income questions were only asked if respondents could exactly specify how
much they think managers earn. Due to the differing samples, the coefficient on manager
taxation should not be compared to the benchmark in column (1). Rather, in column
(12) we show a benchmark coefficient from a QMLE estimation of the specification
shown in column (1), estimated on the restricted sample that results from the non-
responses to the ’manager income fairness’ question. This coefficient in column (12) is
0.22, and so the drop to 0.18 in column (9) suggests that 78% of the original spillover
remain, even when including another potential spillover.
The fact that tax and income fairness perceptions simultaneously bear a significant
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coefficient is interesting beyond the idea of fairness spillovers in economics. It allows
us to contribute to the debate whether the tax fairness has any significance apart from
other normative concepts such as income justice or the principle of efficiency.20 Our
results suggest that, while tax fairness and income fairness may well have some overlap,
they seem to be distinct concepts, each of which is associated with behavior at work.
What is more, our results suggest that irrespective of the philosophical question of how
these fairness concepts relate to the concept of overall economic efficiency, both concepts
may be related to specific individual productivity losses: beliefs that these concepts are
violated are associated with higher levels of worker absenteeism.
3.4.5 Sensitivity test: simulated confounder
Columns (10) and (11) of Table 3.5 show results when in addition to 59 base specification
controls, we add all the variables from the robustness checks at the same time. This
leaves the coefficient on manager taxation unaltered, yet one might worry that there still
remain endogeneity issues due to omitted variables. We therefore conduct a robustness
check based on a simulated confounder in the spirit of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
The idea is to simulate a confounder that is correlated with absenteeism and with
fairness beliefs about manager taxes, and to check the sensitivity of the results to various
strengths of that simulated confounder. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed this
method for the case of a binary outcome, a categorical regressor, and a binary simulated
confounder. In order to use this method for a multi-valued outcome, we follow the
suggestion of Nannicini (2007) of transforming the outcome variable into a dummy
variable for the purpose of the simulation of the confounder. Let Y denote a binary
variable indicating whether absenteeism is above the mean (Y = 1) or below the mean
(Y = 0), and let T denote our binary regressor of beliefs about manager taxes. The
simulated confounder is a binary variable U that has a joint distribution with T and
20A discussion of the principles of just taxation is found in many textbooks of public finance. For
example, in what could be called the epitome of public economics textbooks, Musgrave (1959) devotes
two entire chapters to tax equity issues. An example that illustrates how dedicated these discussions
can be is the so called Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange. Starting in one, then continued in another journal,
Musgrave and Kaplow debated over four years on whether the concept of horizontal tax equity has any
normative significance aside from vertical tax equity and on how these equity concepts relate to the
goal of efficiency. (The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange refers to Kaplow, 1989, Musgrave, 1990, Kaplow,
1992 and Musgrave 1993.)
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Y which can be described by the four parameters: p00 = P (U = 1|T = 0, Y = 0),
p10 = P (U = 1|T = 1, Y = 0), p01 = P (U = 1|T = 0, Y = 1) and p11 = P (U = 1|T =
1, Y = 1). Nannicini (2007) and Ichino et al. (2008) show that the strength of the
correlation of the confounder with Y and T depends on the parameters d = p01 − p00
and s = p1. − p0., with p1. = P (U = 1|T = 1) and p0. = P (U = 1|T = 0). As suggested
by Nannicini (2007) we simulate the confounder for different combinations of d and s,
holding the unconditional probability P (U) and the difference d′ = p11 − p10 constant
at predefined values. We then include it into the full specification shown in column (6)
in Table 3.3.21
Table 3.7 shows that even after including very strong confounders we still find a
significant fairness spillover. The borderline case is the entry for s = 0.3 and d = 0.5 in
the table. Here, we still find a positive effect of unfairness beliefs on absenteeism of 0.84
days. In this case the confounder has a partial effect on the probability of having above-
average absenteeism of 34 percentage points, and on unfairness beliefs about manager
taxes of 24 percentage points. To put this extremely strong confounder into perspective:
the ’health score’ variable has to increase from 1 (its lowest value) to 5 (its highest
value) in order to generate the same effect on the probability of having above-average
absenteeism, and the health satisfaction variable does not even generate this effect when
it moves from 0 (its lowest value) to 10 (its highest value). When it comes to the effect
of the confounder on beliefs about manager taxation (24 percentage points), consider
again the descriptive results from Table 3.1: There, the largest observed difference
between the proportion of people saying that managers pay too little in taxes was that
between individuals with a ’low’ and a ’high’ hierarchy in their occupation, and that
difference was roughly 20 percentage points, hence less than the effect of our confounder
on fairness beliefs about manager taxes. We conclude from this exercise that if our result
was purely due to an omitted variable this omitted variable would need to have an effect
on absenteeism as strong as a move from poor health to excellent health, and it would
21Our procedure is based on the Stata module sensatt by Nannicini (2007). The difference is
that we do not introduce the simulated confounder into a matching estimator, but into a linear OLS
regression. We also present our results in a slightly different way than Nannicini (2007) or Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). We express the strength of the correlation of the simulated confounder with the
outcome and the regressor not in terms of log odds ratios but in terms of partial effects. As values
for the parameters P (U) and d′ we chose 0.6 and 0.05. These values maximised the range of d and s
yielding parameters p00, p01, p10 and p11 that were meaningful (i.e., bounded between 0 and 1).
60
CHAPTER 3. FAIRNESS SPILLOVERS
Tab. 3.7: Sensitivity checks.
d = 0.1 d = 0.2 d = 0.3 d = 0.4 d = 0.5 d = 0.6
s = 0.1 β 1.45∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
s.e. 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
δA 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.36
δM 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
s = 0.2 β 1.35∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗ 1.09∗∗ 1.03∗∗
s.e. 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47
δA 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.38
δM 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
s = 0.3 β 1.23∗∗ 1.16∗∗ 1.05∗∗ 0.93∗ 0.84∗ 0.75
s.e. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
δA 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.41
δM 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
s = 0.4 β 1.07∗∗ 0.97∗ 0.82 0.68 0.56 0.38
s.e. 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55
δA 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.38 0.45
δM 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32
Note: The table shows the results of sensitivity checks in which a simulated con-
founder has been added to the baseline regression model (6) of Table 3.3. The
strength of the confounder rises with the parameters d and s (see text for details).
In the table, the rows labeled β show the estimated effects of beliefs about manager
taxes on absenteeism after the confounder has been introduced into the regression.
The rows labeled ’s.e.’ show the associated standard errors. δA denotes the partial
effect of the confounder on the probability of having above-average absenteeism,
δM denotes its partial effect on fairness beliefs about manager taxes. With rising
δA and δM the confounder becomes stronger and it is to be expected that the es-
timated effect becomes weaker. For each combination of d and s we implemented
100 repetitions of the simulation. The standard errors are computed as an aver-
age of the within-imputation variance and the between-imputation variance, see
Nannicini (2007, eq. 11). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
at the same time need to generate variation in beliefs about manager taxation larger
than the differences between low-hierarchy and high-hierarchy workers. Given our broad
range of included control variables, we find it hard to think of any omitted variable that
could drive our results to such an important extent.
3.5 Conclusion
What are the behavioral correlates of perceived unfairness in taxation? It has been
proposed that people who believe the tax system to be unfair tend to withhold their
contributions to the tax system, i.e. to cheat on taxes. Building on the argument that
opportunities for evading taxes are rather slim for most individuals, we go one step
further and ask whether people may then try and find alternative ways of adjustment
– specifically, we analyze whether people start to cheat at work when they feel that
there is injustice in taxation. Using a large-scale German dataset, we find that this
link between tax fairness beliefs and work morale is surprisingly strong. The belief
that the top income earners do not pay their fair share in taxes is associated with
at least an 17 percent increase in absenteeism. The results prove robust to adding
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standard labor market controls as well as a wide variety of individual attitudes that may
affect absenteeism but that are not generally available in other data sets. In addition,
Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests provide evidence that any remaining omitted variable
would have to exhibit implausibly strong associations with absenteeism and fairness
beliefs in order to spuriously generate our results.
The main contribution of this paper is that it adds a new angle to the literature on
fairness in economics. It is standardly assumed that people adjust to perceived unfair-
ness in precisely the same area or relationship where the fairness violation is considered
to have occurred, yet our results suggest that behavioral adjustments to perceived vi-
olations of what is considered to be a ’just’ outcome may be rather indirect, i.e. the
cue may elicit responses across spheres and across certain relationships. Our results
indicate that these ’fairness spillovers’ are relevant in a genuinely economic context,
and may come with large economic costs. If we tentatively interpret the association as
causal, the smallest coefficient we find (0.17) corresponds to a monetary cost of 5 billion
euros per year in continued wage payments associated with the spillover.22
More narrowly, our results also raise new aspects concerning the welfare costs of
taxation. Traditionally, welfare effects of taxation are assessed in terms of distorting
monetary incentives. However, our analysis revealed that there are other channels
through which tax policy may have an impact on economic behavior. People have
beliefs about fairness in taxation, and it is these beliefs that may provide an incentive
on their own. While neglecting these fairness-induced costs of taxation bears the risk
of arriving at misleading policy recommendations, it is also important to realize that
the implication of this research cannot simply be higher tax rates for managers or
the wealthy in order to avoid this “extra” excess burden. First, it is unclear whether
beliefs about fairness in taxation correspond to real tax burdens of the wealthy at all.
Even if the fairness beliefs emerge from correct beliefs about the tax system, positive
welfare effects at the bottom of the income distribution must be weighed against possibly
negative welfare effects induced by behavioral responses to increased taxation at the
upper end of the income distribution. In the end, this study can be considered as a
22Assuming an 8-hour workday at the average gross hourly wage in 2005 of around 20 euros, and
26 million gainfully employed. Wage rate and number of employed obtained from the German Federal
Statistical office.
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pointer that quite likely there are hidden effects of taxation in areas that have not been
considered thus far, and that these effects can be non-negligible in size.
Several questions are left for future research. It should be interesting to see whether
our finding can be confirmed in other countries or whether this result is a German pe-
culiarity. At least with respect to the willingness to comply with work norms, Germany
does not seem to be a negative outlier in international comparisons (Hofstede, 1980),
and so we do not expect our results to be upper bound estimates. Still, it would be
interesting to see, whether in a country like the United States, where people believe
in social mobility and in being in charge of their own destiny (Alesina and Angeletos,
2005), a link between perceived unfairness of taxation and work effort can be found,
too. It should also be noted that we proposed just one type of fairness spillover that
bears the potential of being relevant from an economic point of view. A general question
is whether there are other such examples. Our robustness checks revealed that other
beliefs about injustice in the world – such as the belief that income is determined by
luck or that managers earn too much – may deter economic effort as well and hence
should encourage research in that direction. Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether
the recent financial crisis has aggravated the issue. Believing that the rich illegitimately
generate high incomes and enjoy uncalled for tax privileges may have become even more
prevalent during the financial crisis, and our suspicion is that the potential economic
costs associated with fairness spillovers from taxation may then also have increased.
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3.6 Appendix
Fig. 3.1: Observed days absent vs poisson/negative binomial distribution.
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Note: The figure compares the observed distribution of the days of absenteeism with the distributions pre-
dicted from unconditional Poisson and Negative Binomial (Negbin II) count-data models. Due to overdis-
persion (mean 7.57, overdispersion parameter 4.09), the Negative Binomial model gives a better fit to the
data than the Poisson model. To ensure an easier readability of the graph, it is truncated at 30 days of ab-
senteeism (95th percentile). The 99th percentile of absenteeism is at 85 days of absenteeism, the maximum
is 245 days. Number of observations N=5060.
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Tab. 3.8: Description of Variables.
Variable Description
Main variables
absenteeism number of days absent in the year of survey. Asked retrospectively in 2006.
managers taxed too little indicator variable, takes on value 1 if respondent thinks managers are being taxed too little.
health score ’How would you describe your current health?’. Scale: ’Poor’ (1) to ’Very good’ (5).
health satisfaction ’How satisfied are you with your health?’. Scale: ’totally unhappy’ (0) to ’totally happy’ (10).
Personal characteristics
gross income gross monthly income in 1000 Euros.
age age in years.
agesq age in years squared.
male indicator variable, 1 if male.
children the number of children <16 years in the household.
foreign indicator variable, 1 if non-German citizen.
schooling years of schooling (includes tertiary education and vocational training).
Job related variables
tenure tenure with current employer.
tenure sq tenure with current employer squared.
full time experience years of full time experience.
full time experience sq years of full time experience squared.
part time experience years of part time experience.
part time experience sq years of part time experience squared.
part time indicator variable, 1 if currently part time employed.
marginally employed indicator variable, 1 if currently marginally employed.
Firm level variables
20≤employees< 200 indicator variable, 1 if number of employees at current employer 20<employees<200.
200≤employees<2000 indicator variable, 1 if number of employees at current employer 200<=employees<2000.
employees≥2000 indicator variable, 1 if number of employees at current employer >2000.
agriculture indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
mining/energy indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
processing indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
traffic/media indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
construction indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
wholesale indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
services indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
banking/insurance indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
public sector indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job Indicator variable, 1 if individual is ’very concerned’ or ’somewhat concerned’ about job security.
satisfied w/ job ’How satisfied are you with your job?’. Scale: ’totally unhappy’ (0) to ’totally happy’ (10).
lazy ’I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy.’ Scale: ’not at all’ (1) to ’applies perfectly’ (7).
risk taker ’Are you prepared to take risks?’. Scale: ’avoid risks’ (0) to ’fully prepared’ (10).
Robustness checks
effective avg tax rate 1-(net monthly income in Euros/gross monthly income in Euros).
achievements determined by luck indicator, 1 if respondent gave at least (5) on a (7)-point scale (’disagree’ (0) – ’agree’ (7))
to the question ’What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck’.
unfavorable job prospects How likely is respondent to receive a promotion at current place of employment
within next two years? Scale: ’certainly’ (1) to ’certainly not’ (4).
pessimist indicator variable, 1 if individual states to be either ’pessimistic’
or ’more pessimistic than optimistic’ about the future.
life satisfaction ’How satisfied are you with your life’ Scale: ’not at all’ (0) to ’fully’ (10).
leftist/right ’How would you rate your political views?’ Scale: ’Far left’ (0) to ’Far right’ (10).
own income unfair indicator variable, 1 if respondent thinks her/his own pay is unfair.
manager income unfair indicator variable, 1 if respondent thinks manager pay is unfair.
Other
region dummies 16 indicator variables for the German states.
occupation dummies 3 blue collar indicator variables: low, medium, high skilled,
3 white collar indicator variables: low, medium, high skilled,
3 public servant indicator variables: low, medium, high skilled.
65
3.6. APPENDIX
Tab. 3.9: Summary statistics.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Main variables
absenteeism 5060 7.57 17.30 0 245
managers taxed too little 5060 0.72 0.45 0 1
health score 5060 3.55 0.82 1 5
health satisfaction 5060 7.01 1.90 0 10
Personal characteristics
gross income 5060 2.78 1.83 0.25 35
age 5060 43.02 10.08 18 74
male 5060 0.56 0.50 0 1
children 5060 0.38 0.48 0 1
foreign 5060 0.05 0.23 0 1
schooling 5060 12.87 2.79 7 18
Job related variables
tenure 5060 12.14 10.12 0 48.8
full time experience 5060 16.80 10.91 0 47
part time experience 5060 2.62 5.29 0 45
part time 5060 0.19 0.39 0 1
marginally employed 5060 0.03 0.17 0 1
Firm level variables
employees<= 20 5060 0.21 0.40 0 1
20<employees< 200 5060 0.30 0.46 0 1
200<=employees<2000 5060 0.23 0.42 0 1
employees>2000 5060 0.26 0.44 0 1
agriculture 5060 0.01 0.10 0 1
mining/energy 5060 0.01 0.12 0 1
manufacturing 5060 0.21 0.41 0 1
processing 5060 0.05 0.22 0 1
traffic/media 5060 0.06 0.24 0 1
construction 5060 0.05 0.21 0 1
wholesale 5060 0.11 0.32 0 1
services 5060 0.13 0.34 0 1
banking/insurance 5060 0.05 0.23 0 1
public sector 5060 0.30 0.46 0 1
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job 5060 0.60 0.49 0 1
satisfied w/ job 5060 7.04 1.92 0 10
lazy 5060 2.20 1.45 1 7
risk taker 5060 4.85 2.14 0 10
Robustness checks
effective avg tax rate 4983 0.33 0.12 −0.14 0.7
achievements determined by luck 5043 0.24 0.43 0 1
unfavorable job prospects 5049 3.41 0.67 1 4
pessimist 5048 0.26 0.44 0 1
life satisfaction 5056 7.19 1.61 0 10
leftist/right 4978 4.71 1.74 0 10
own income unfair 5045 0.33 0.47 0 1
manager income unfair 3391 0.75 0.43 0 1
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Chapter 4
Testing for the Behavioral Asymmetry of Tax Fairness
Perceptions: Evidence From Absenteeism
4.1 Introduction
People often complain about unfairness in taxation. Typically, these complaints do
not only refer to the own personal situation, but involve a number a quite abstract
dimensions which refer to the tax structure or the tax system as a whole (Wenzel, 2003).
Tax unfairness can be felt between occupations or industries, between different kinds
of properties, between the married and the unmarried, or between men and women.
However, one of most prominent dimensions of tax fairness is along income lines and
involves a vertical perspective, i.e., whether or not the burden of taxes is distributed
evenly across different levels of income (Kinsey and Grasmick, 1993). And there, a
remarkable agreement in beliefs across space and time occurs: usually, a large majority
feels that higher-income earners are not paying their fair share while the working poor
are thought to be overtaxed (Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Wallschutzky, 1984; Kirchler,
2007). According to the International Social Survey Program from 1992, the percentage
of respondents saying that top earners pay too little in taxes ranged from 41.4% in
Australia to roughly 65% in Germany and the U.S., with Italy ranking the highest at
70.9%.1 The share of respondents considering the tax system as unfair to the poor was
even larger. Across industrialized countries, far beyond 50% said that taxes for low-
incomes are ’too high’ or ’much too high’, ranging from 68.8% in Australia to 98.1% in
1For the exact question wording and an illustration of the ISSP data, see the Appendix, Figure 4.2.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Italy.2
At first, complaints about the fairness of tax systems are expressions of opinions.
Psychological research (as well as everyday experience) suggests that concerns over
tax inequity can be associated with moral indignation and sometimes rather strong
emotional repercussions (Rawlings, 2003; Braithwaite, 2003). More interesting from an
economic perspective is whether these opinions translate into behavior, and thus, are
materially relevant.
Tax complaints can be more than just ’cheap talk’, as suggested in the literature on
tax evasion. Individuals perceiving stronger inequities in the tax system are more likely
to engage in tax evasion behavior or tax avoidance schemes (for a survey, see, e.g., Feld
and Frey, 2002). Little is known whether it makes a difference ’where’ the unfairness
is perceived, i.e. whether the complaints refer to the top or the bottom of the income
distribution. E.g., Porcano (1988) uses a single measure for a respondent’s view on tax
justice which aggregates information from whether he/she thinks that the tax system
treats everyone fairly or whether certain types of taxpayers (based on income) received
favorable treatment. Similarly, in Kinsey and Grasmick (1993) respondents choose on
a 6-point scale whether they agreed or disagreed that ’the present tax system benefits
the rich and is unfair to ordinary working people’ – again a measure that does not treat
perceptions about upper and lower brackets separately.
In this paper, we disaggregate concerns over vertical tax equity into the two beliefs
that, first, the rich pay too little (upward unfairness) and, second, that the poor pay
too much in taxes (downward unfairness). We study whether there are behavioral dif-
ferences between perceived ’upward’ and ’downward’ perceptions of tax fairness. To
do so, we use a slightly different setup than in the tax evasion literature.3 Instead of
relating tax fairness beliefs to tax morale, we associate them with work morale, which
we measure by worker absenteeism due to illness. The reasons for using a different
dependent variable are as follows. First, by taking a classical labor market variable,
we can employ a survey data set with a huge range of background information includ-
ing an individual’s fundamental value orientation and attitudes. This strategy helps
to empirically disentangle tax fairness perceptions from socio-economic characteristics
2See the Appendix, Figure 4.3.
3This general framework has been suggested by Cornelissen et al. (2010).
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(education, social status etc.) and ’other’ fairness-related beliefs and attitudes (e.g.,
perceived income fairness, general pessimism) which mitigates issues of unobserved het-
erogeneity. Second, we want to have an outcome variable over which individuals possess
a high degree of control. For a large part of the population, tax evasion is not a viable
option since their income is predominantly taxed at source which makes the manipu-
lation of tax returns difficult (see, e.g., Kleven et al., 2011). Work absenteeism, as we
will argue, can be considered as a direct choice in the framework we use, thus reducing
the risk of underestimating the behavioral potential of tax fairness perceptions.
Our findings are as follows. Perceptions of downward fairness hardly trigger behav-
ioral responses. The only subsample where we find a significant connection between the
belief that the poor are overtaxed and absenteeism behavior is the poor themselves. In
contrast, upward unfairness really matters: people who perceive it do have significantly
higher levels of sickness leave. This holds before and after controlling for health, income,
education and several other observable characteristics. The difference in absenteeism
rates is substantial: Our estimates imply that employees who believe that top earners
are undertaxed show more than 20 percent higher levels of absenteeism compared to
workers who do not hold this belief. This connection decreases when moving up the
social ladder, but is still found for people with higher social status, and interestingly,
even for the rich themselves.
In positing a positive link between perceived unfairness of taxing high-income earners
and absenteeism rates, we confirm the standard result of the literature on tax evasion:
beliefs about abstract features of the tax system can be highly significant drivers of
economic behavior. Our findings suggest that these beliefs matter even outside the
narrow realm of taxation and may shape economic incentives above and beyond the
willingness to pay taxes. The novelty of this paper is that the behavioral implications
of tax fairness perceptions are not symmetric in the sense that perceptions of upward
unfairness in the tax system seem to impact on economic behavior, while beliefs about
downward fairness do not trigger the same kind of adjustments. This asymmetry is not
reflected in standard theories of justice. It seems to imply that the pity for a high tax
burden of the poor is just expressive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data and
explains the estimation method. Section 4.3 sets out the results. In Section 4.4, we
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discuss to what extent the behavioral asymmetry of tax fairness perceptions can be
explained in light of traditional fairness theories. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data and estimation procedure
4.2.1 Data
While opinion polls regularly indicate that people have strong attitudes towards equity
features of the tax system, tax fairness questions are discarded in most large-scale
surveys. The 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an exception:
it asks respondents how to evaluate the burden of taxes of ’managers’ and ’unskilled
workers’. Given the framing of the tax fairness questions, we take these two occupational
groups to represent the upper and the lower end of the income scale, i.e. the ’rich’ and
the ’poor’. The question reads:
In Germany, everyone has to pay taxes in relation to his or her income.
Those who earn more have to pay higher taxes (also known as ’progressive
taxes’). What do you think: Is the amount of taxes paid by an unskilled
worker in Germany too much compared to other groups, too little, or exactly
appropriate? [...] And what do you think about the taxes paid by a manager
on the board of directors of a large company? Does he/she pay too much,
too little, or an exactly appropriate amount in taxes compared to other
groups?
Though respondents could principally choose that workers pay too little and managers
pay too much in taxes, this virtually never happen. Only 0.8% of the GSOEP respon-
dents say that unskilled workers pay less than their fair share of taxes whereas the share
of people saying that managers (top earners) are taxed too heavily relative to others is
about 4%. These views would be examples of perceived injustice in taxation, but the
number of observations is too low to treat them separately in regressions. We therefore
focus on the two pervasive perceptions of ’upward ’and ’downward’ unfairness in the
tax system, i.e. on the beliefs that the rich are under- and the poor are overtaxed. To
represent the former perception, we create a dummy variable that takes on the value 1
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when respondents say that managers are taxed too little and 0 when they choose that
managers pay an ’appropriate amount’ or ’too much’ in taxes (after deleting the “don’t
know” responses). We will refer to this variable as the mtax toolittle indicator. Per-
ceived downward unfairness is captured by the dummy wtax toomuch which is coded
as 1 when individuals answer that unskilled workers are taxed too much (the reference
category is that workers pay an ’appropriate amount’ or ’too little’ in taxes).
Table 4.1 reports the distribution of the variables mtax toolittle and wtax toomuch
over our sample that we restrict to include employees only.4 Two things deserve to be
noticed. First, perceptions of upward unfairness are somewhat more common than that
of downward unfairness. This can be seen from the total sample (first row of Table
4.1), but also when we divide the sample according to different dimensions of socio-
economic class. In all subsamples, the share of employees saying that managers pay too
little is roughly 15 to 20 percentage points higher than the share of respondents feeling
that workers are taxed too much. Second, the subsample descriptives suggest that the
response pattern is not orthogonal to social class: Both the shares of respondents stating
that unskilled workers pay too much and that managers pay too little tend to decrease
when moving up the social ladder. However, even in the highest categories, these beliefs
are held by a considerable percentage of people, indicating that perceptions of upward
and downward unfairness are deeply grounded in the German population.
The response variable to perceived tax unfairness we will use in this study is the
number of days being absent from work due to illness. In Germany, there is no reduction
of payments for sickness spells of up to six weeks and, for sickness spells up to three
days, employees are usually not even obliged to provide a doctor’s note. In addition,
Germany has high levels of job protection. We follow the labor economics literature
(see, e.g., Barmby et al., 1994; Johansson and Palme, 1996; Henrekson and Persson,
2004) and assume that such a legal generosity provides individuals with incentives to use
a sick day for other reasons than sickness itself and take absenteeism behavior as partly
4From the whole sample consisting of 20971 observations, we exclude self- and non-employed in-
dividuals. By definition, unemployed individuals cannot have sick leave. Likewise, it would be odd
to interpret absenteeism from work due to illness as a measure of intrinsic work motivation for self-
employed individuals since these individuals have no incentives to use sickness leave for other reasons
than illness (self-employed usually do not receive ’replacement’ payments). For further explanation of
the German sickness insurance system, see below. The descriptives are shown for individuals having
non-missings for the variables used in the main regression Table 4.2. This leaves us with a total of
5122 observations at maximum.
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Tab. 4.1: Tax fairness perceptions in Germany.
wtax toolittle mtax toomuch
0 1 N 0 1 N
full sample 46.29 53.71 5196 27.74 72.26 5201
income quintile
1. quintile 42.29 57.71 759 22.13 77.87 759
2. quintile 38.57 61.43 980 21.53 78.47 980
3. quintile 39.14 60.68 1068 23.27 76.73 1070
4. quintile 47.33 52.67 1215 27.14 72.86 1216
5. quintile 60.73 39.27 1174 41.24 58.76 1176
worker class
blue 31.80 69.20 1448 18.15 81.85 1449
white 51.76 48.24 3012 32.04 67.96 3015
position in job hierarchy
low tier 25.51 74.49 729 19.08 80.93 729
middle tier 44.92 55.08 2943 24.37 75.63 2946
management level/top tier 60.60 39.40 1358 39.93 60.07 1360
Note: Data is taken from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
Sample consists of the observations used in the full specifications in Table 4.2.
reflecting an individual’s intrinsic work motivation or willingness to shirk at work.
Clearly, there are other measures of individual work strain, e.g. weekly work hours,
overtime work, full versus half-time employment etc. However, one problem with such
variables is that they are partly determined on the market, and hence, shaped by
factors beyond personal control (supply shocks, labor market regulation etc).5 More-
over, changes in these variables are typically accompanied by monetary repercussions.
Though this would not be a problem per se, since individuals have been shown to react
to perceived injustice even when this is associated with losses for themselves, there is a
consensus among economists that behavioral reactions to perceived unfairness are more
likely with low-cost choices taking place outside competitive markets (see, e.g., Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006).
Information on individual sick leave is obtained from the following GSOEP question:
”How many days were you not able to work [last year] because of illness?” Because of
the retrospective nature of the question we draw information on work absence from
the 2006 GSOEP wave such that we get consistency with tax fairness perceptions data
(stemming from 2005).6 It would be preferable to have register data. On the other hand,
5Incidentally, this also makes estimating wage elasticities of labor supply extremely challenging, see
Farber (2005) and Oettinger (1999).
6We exclude individuals who declared that they had been absent on more than 250 days (the max-
imum number of workdays per year) since apparently these individuals (9 observations) misinterpret
the sickness question. However, this does not affect our results. We just want to make sure that our
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we think that incentives to misreport the number of sick days are comparatively low
since ’sickness absence’ is not an illegal behavior per se (in contrast to tax evasion). Note
also that there is evidence by medical scientists that there is a high agreement between
the annual number of self-reported and recorded sickness absence days as provided by
employers’ registers (Ferrie et al., 2005).
Figure 4.1 visualizes the mean days absent from work due to illness for both unfair-
ness concepts. There is a remarkable difference in absenteeism rates between workers
saying that managers pay too little in taxes and those who do not say so. The mean
for the former group of workers is 8.3 days per year, while the mean of the latter is 5.4,
i.e. almost three days less. There is also a substantial difference in mean days when the
sample is divided according to the categories of the variable wtax toomuch (see right
panel of Figure 4.1). On average, employees who say that unskilled-workers pay more
than their fair share spend 8.1 days absent from work, whereas those who do not hold
this belief are absent 6.7 days, indicating a ’fairness gap’ of 1.4 days.
Fig. 4.1: Days absent from work due to illness and tax fairness perceptions.
Figure 1: Days absent from work due to illness and tax fairness perceptions.
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Note: Data is taken from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
Figure 1 visualizes the mean days absent from work due to illness for both unfairness
concepts. There is a remarkable difference in absenteeism rates between workers saying
that managers pay too little in taxes and those who do not say so. The mean for the
former group of workers is 8.3 days per year, while the mean of the latter is 5.4, i.e. almost
three days less. There is also a substantial difference in mean days when the sample is
divided according to the categories of the variable wtax toomuch (see right panel of Figure
1). On average, employees who say that unskilled-workers pay more than their fair share
spend 8.1 days absent from work, whereas those who do not hold this belief are absent
6.7 days, indicating a ’fairness gap’ of 1.4 days.
2.2 Method
Our dependent variable, the number of days absent from work due to illness, takes on
positive integer values. Therefore count data methods might be given the edge over least
squares since OLS would allow for negative values. The standard distribution for count
data is the Poisson distribution. However, the Poisson model implies equidispersion, i.e.
that the variance is equal to the mean. This property is often violated in a wide range of
applications as in our case: The sample mean of sickness days is 7.6, while the variance is
about 2-2.5 times larger (17.3). In such cases of ’overdispersion’, a model that is often used
is the NegBin II model by Cameron and Trivedi (1986). It imposes a variance greater than
the mean, and thus, takes account for overdispersion in the dependent variable. NegBin
II estimates are consistent given that its distributional assumptions hold. However, this
might be considered as too restrictive. We therefore employ a quasi-maximum likelihood
variant of the NegBin II estimator which yields consistent estimates under a correct mean
assumption only.
The idea of this estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2002) is as follows. The NegBin
6
Note: Data is taken from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
4.2.2 Meth d
Our dependent variable, the number of days absent from work due to illness, takes on
positive inte er values. Therefore count data methods ight be given the edge over least
squares since OLS would allow for negative values. The standard distribution for count
parameter estimates are not driven by outliers.
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data is the Poisson distribution. However, the Poisson model implies equidispersion,
i.e. that the variance is equal to the mean. This property is often violated in a wide
range of applications as in our case: The sample mean of sickness days is 7.6, while the
variance is about 2-2.5 times larger (17.3). In such cases of ’overdispersion’, a model
that is often used is the NegBin II model by Cameron and Trivedi (1986). It imposes
a variance greater than the mean, and thus, takes account for overdispersion in the
dependent variable. NegBin II estimates are consistent given that its distributional
assumptions hold. However, this might be considered as too restrictive. We therefore
employ a quasi-maximum likelihood variant of the NegBin II estimator which yields
consistent estimates under a correct mean assumption only.
The idea of this estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2002) is as follows. The NegBin
II model can be derived from a Poisson model with random unobserved heterogeneity.
Carried over to our framework, the conditional density assumption can be written as
y|T,x, θ ∼ Poisson[θ ·m(α0 + α1T + xβ)], (4.1)
where y denotes the number of days absent, T and x, respectively, represent an indicator
of perceived tax unfairness and a control vector and m(·) is the conditional mean (we
use an exponential link function to ensure positivity). The error θ ∼ Gamma[1, η2]
captures unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to be independent of T and x. The
conditional variance is given by
V ar(y|T,x) = m(T,x;α0, α1,β)[1 + η2m(T,x;α0, α1,β)], (4.2)
implying overdispersion for η2 > 0. While the parameters α0, α1,β and η
2 are jointly es-
timated in the NegBin II model by maximum likelihood, we estimate the overdispersion
parameter η2 separately and use its predicted values to estimate equation (4.1). The
reason is that for a fixed η2, the log-likelihood of equation (4.1) can be shown to be in the
linear exponential family where the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is consistent
even if (4.1) and (4.2) are violated. In order to get conservative inference statistics, we
additionally adjust the covariance matrix to be robust against heteroskedasticity. We
will refer to this estimator as the ’Two-step QMLE’.
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4.3 Results
From the descriptive analysis of Figure 4.1, one might infer a difference in the relevance
of upward and downward unfairness for economic behavior. The gap in absenteeism
days associated with the belief that the rich are taxed too little is more than twice
as large as that related to the belief that the poor are overtaxed. However, these
mean differences in absenteeism rates are likely driven by unobservables which makes it
impossible to compare them in a meaningful way. It may well be that they are biased
to different extents, if not entirely spurious each. We therefore conduct an extensive
control analysis. Specifically, we run absenteeism regressions of the form (4.1) including
the variables mtax toolittle and wtax toomuch both separately and together carefully
conditioning on a huge set of potential confounders. We then compare the coefficients
of the two unfairness indicators to see whether the magnitudes of the fairness gaps are
different when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Finally, we will show
subsample regressions to analyze whether the coefficients differ between socio-economic
groups.
4.3.1 Full sample estimates
Upward unfairness
We start our full sample analysis by regressing the number of absent days on the variable
mtax toolittle, successively adding controls.7 Table 4.2 presents the regression outputs
using the Two-step QMLE. Since the mean function is exponential, coefficients are to
be interpreted in a log-linear fashion, i.e. as the percentage change in days absent from
work stemming from a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable (holding other
factors constant). The estimation results for the overdispersion parameter are in the
last row; fully robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Column (1) displays
the coefficient for mtax toolittle as obtained from a bivariate regression model. A value
of 0.43 means that workers perceiving upward unfairness the tax system have a about
40 percent higher level of absenteeism corresponding to the mean jump of 2.9 days
reported in Section (4.2.1).
7The descriptives for the control variables are found in the Appendix.
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This strong correlation could be due to failing to control for health. Specifically,
it can be argued that those who are often ill may want higher levels of redistribution
since they are net benefiters of the tax system, and therefore say that taxes on the
rich should be increased. At the same time, these individuals can be expected to have
higher rates of absenteeism. In fact, including a respondent’s self-reported health status
decreases the coefficient of mtax toolittle considerably, but the gap associated with the
belief that managers do not contribute adequately to the tax pool is still quite large
and remains significant at the one percentage level (see column 2).
In column (3), we add a number of ’soft’ variables capturing perceived income fair-
ness and general attitudes or preferences. This separates tax fairness perceptions from
other psychological factors that may affect absenteeism. To make sure that our coeffi-
cient of interest is driven by perceived tax justice and not by income justice, we include
an indicator whether or not one believes that own pay is unfair. We also control for an
individual’s degree of pessimism in order to disentangle perceived tax unfairness from
complainer attitudes or general negativism. E.g., it might be that pessimists tend to
have both unjust world beliefs and lower levels of intrinsic work motivation in which
case the coefficient of mtax toolittle would be upward biased (as it would arguably be
when not controlling for ’unfair pay’). We further condition on respondents’ willingness
to take risks: risk-averse individuals can be expected to have a higher preference for
social insurance, which in turn, may be positively correlated with having a ’soak-the-
rich’ attitude. If at the same time risk-averse individuals have a different inclination to
shirk at work (staying at home bears the risk of getting caught) our coefficient would
be (probably downward) biased. We net out political leniency, since, e.g., right wing
people might have a lower taste for state intervention and therefore are less likely to feel
that (manager) taxes are too low. To the extent that these people give higher priority
to work-related norms, the estimated tax unfairness coefficient would exceed its true
value. Finally, we directly control for a respondent’s self-reported degree of laziness.
Including these variables leaves our coefficient of interest stable (in fact, the coefficients
stays the same) giving us some confidence that our tax unfairness indicator explains
variation in worker’s absenteeism which is not driven by heterogeneity of general world
views or attitudes.
In column (4), we take account of socio-economic status which, as shown in the de-
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scriptive analysis, seems to affect the probability of perceiving upward unfairness. We
control for a respondent’s monthly (gross) income, occupational status group (measured
in terms of whether an individual is a blue-collar worker, white-collar worker or public
servant) and educational background (proxied by years of schooling). The inclusion
of these factors drops the mtax toolittle coefficient by roughly one third (the coeffi-
cient decreases from .30 to .21), but it remains highly significant. Note that the other
psychological variables loose their significance underpinning the explanatory power of
mtax toolittle.
Conditioning on further socio-economic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, having
children) leaves the coefficient virtually unchanged (see column (5)). The same applies
when controlling for variables at the firm and job level (column (6)). We include
dummies for firm size (it may be argued that the probability of being detected when
shirking is higher in smaller firms) as well as tenure, work experience and whether a
respondent is full-time (reference category), half-time or marginally employed. A set
of sectoral dummies is taken into the regression to allow for the possibility that people
with different work attitudes may self-select into different branches (e.g. employers in
the public sector may be less prone to competitive world views which may affect the
willingness to ’go the extra mile’ as well as the opinion of what constitutes just policy.)
Some of these variables turn out to be quite successful in predicting absenteeism but
they but do no harm to our coefficient of interest.
One might object that set of controls does not sufficiently take into account the
specific situation and conditions at the workplace (relationship to co-workers and su-
pervisors, workload etc). To the extent that these factors affect beliefs about tax fairness
(and only then), our results would be still biased. The GSOEP provides information
about respondent’s job satisfaction and fear of job loss which should capture a lot of
this kind of unobserved heterogeneity. When including these variables the coefficient of
mtax toolittle remains quite the same (see column (7)) suggesting that the control set
used so far is already effective in holding workplace characteristics constant.8
8We also include geographic dummies that may grasp regional variations in economic development
as well as differences in culture.
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4.3.2 Downward unfairness and interaction effects
While the mtax toolittle turned out to be a quite strong predictor of absenteeism
behavior, the same does not apply to the variable wtax toomuch. Table 4.3 shows
the results from analogous regressions to those of Table 4.2. Somewhat surprisingly,
the initial huge coefficient of the worker tax indicator is brought close to zero and
becomes insignificant even with a fairly small set of socio-economic characteristics (see
column 4). In fact, based on specification (3), controlling for income and schooling
alone would suffice to render the coefficient insignificant and to produce the large drop
from 0.16 to 0.06. Thus, over and above its correlation with socio-economic status,
the downward unfairness has no explanatory power in terms of predicting absenteeism
behavior.
Table 4.4 reports the results from different specifications including both tax unfair-
ness indicators in the absenteeism regression (we only report the coefficients of main
interest). As can be seen from column 1, the coefficient for wtax toomuch flips the sign,
but is still insignificant when included simultaneously with mtax toolittle.9 In speci-
fication 2, we allow for interaction effects. E.g., it might be that perceived downward
unfairness makes a behavioral difference when co-occurring with perceptions of upward
unfairness. This is not supported by our data as the interaction term is far from being
significant.
To sum up, there is no evidence that perceived downward unfairness is statistically
associated with our behavioral outcome variable after taking into account unobserved
heterogeneity. In contrast, the indicator representing the belief that the rich are taxed
too little is a strongly related to absenteeism behavior, and this throughout the entire
specifications. Given the quality of the control set, we are confident that the connec-
tion between mtax toolittle and sickness absence does not reflect a mere statistical
artefact. Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that behavioral responses
to perceived upward and downward tax fairness are not symmetric.10
9That mtax toolittle is only significant at a 10% level in this specification should give no concern.
The joint of effect of mtax toolittle and the interaction term is significant at a 1% level (as opposed
to the joint effect of wtax toomuch and the interaction term which is largely insignificant).
10To formally test for equality of the coefficients of mtax toolittle (β1)and wtax toomuch (β2), we
can use (based on specification (1) of Table 4.4) the t-statistics β1−β2√
V ar(β1−β2)
, which equals 2.4. Thus,
the H0 : β1 = β2 can be rejected at a 95% level of confidence.
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Tab. 4.4: Two-step QMLE results, interplay between the tax unfairness
beliefs.
(1) (2)
mtax toolittle 0.19∗∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.06) (0.09)
wtax toomuch −0.03 −0.09
(0.06) (0.10)
mtax toolittle*wtax toomuch 0.09
(0.12)
full set of controls
√ √
N 4718 4718
Note: All regressions include the same set of control variables as specification (7) of Table 4.2. Fully robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.3.3 Subsample regressions: results by social status
In the regressions so far perceived upward unfairness is significantly associated with
absenteeism behavior while no such relationship appears to exist for the belief that the
tax system is unfair to the poor. In this section, we analyze whether this tendency
prevails when splitting up the sample by social class categories.
Table 4.5 presents subgroup results obtained from regressing sickness absence on the
variable mtax toolittle using the same set of controls as in the full specification of Table
4.2. As the first part of Table 4.5 shows, the difference in absenteeism days associated
with the belief that those in charge do not pay their due tax is twice as large for blue
collar workers, compared to white collar workers. In both subgroups the coefficient of
mtax toolittle is highly significant. The middle part of Table 4.5 distinguishes between
individuals at lower, medium or higher levels of job hierarchy. The coefficients are always
positive, but the magnitude decreases with hierarchy level. When dividing the sample
by income quintiles (bottom panel of Table 4.5), we obtain a similar pattern. The
upward fairness gap is by far largest for the lowest-ranked group, where it is more than
three times the size of the gap in the other groups. The coefficient for the fifth income
quintile is still significant which is somewhat surprising since this quintile includes the
rich themselves.11 Thus, the positive link between perceived upward unfairness and
sickness leave is not a ’local’ phenomenon, but found across the social spectrum.
This is to be contrasted with the belief that unskilled labor is overtaxed. When
running the corresponding subgroup regressions for wtax toomuch, we find a significant
11The fifth income quintile goes from roughly 3.500 to more than 20.000 Euro gross income per
month.
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Tab. 4.5: Two-step QMLE estimations, subsamples.
by worker class (a)
(blue collar) (white collar)
mtax toolittle 0.36∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.08)
N 1410 2981
by job hierarchy level(b)
(low-tier) (middle-tier) (management level)
mtax toolittle 0.50∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗
(0.15) (0.08) (0.10)
N 708 2899 1350
by income quintile (c)
(1st Q) (2nd Q) (3rd Q) (4th Q) (5th Q)
mtax toolittle 0.49∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.09 0.20∗ 0.23∗∗
(0.22) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
N 583 955 1049 1202 1168
Note: The full sample is split by: (a) blue and white collar respondents, (b) position in the job hierarchy and
(c) income quintiles of the 2005 SOEP wave. All regressions include the same control variables as specification
(7) of Table 4.2. Fully robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
coefficient in only one subgroup: in the first income quintile. For all other subsamples
the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This is reported in Table 4.6,
where we show the results for the lowest ranked categories (see Appendix). Overall,
the subgroup results are in line with the findings for the total sample. For almost
every subsample, we find a sizable link from the belief that the rich are taxed too little
and worker’s absenteeism and a no effect of the view that the poor are overtaxed. In
the sample where we do find a statistical connection between downward unfairness and
intrinsic work motivation (in the first income quintile), the coefficient for wtax toomuch
is much smaller (0.23) than that for mtax toolittle (0.49), suggesting that there are
asymmetric responses even here.
4.4 Interpretation of the results
In this section we discuss our findings in light of existing theories of fairness or social
comparison. We follow the classical distinction in the literature on social psychology
between theories of distributional, procedural and retributive justice (see Tyler and
Smith, 1998). In particular, we will study the question to what extent these theories can
explain why individuals reduce work effort when perceiving the tax system as unfair and
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why these adjustments are asymmetric in the sense that expressed upward unfairness
is associated with changes in work effort but downward unfairness not.
4.4.1 Distributional justice/equity theory
Theories of distributional justice state that individuals evaluate the fairness of a sit-
uation by looking at outcomes rather than at how (i.e., by what process) these were
generated. A prominent approach of distributive justice is equity theory, going back to
Adams (1963, 1965). According to this approach, individuals think in terms of what
they contribute to a certain social situation and what they get out of it. They perceive
a situation as fair when their (or their in-group’s) ratio of ’inputs’ to ’outputs’ is in line
with that of comparable others. Equity theory also provides a behavioral prediction:
individuals who feel inequity will take actions that bring the input-output ratios back
into balance (see Walster et al., 1973).
One way to apply this approach to our framework is to interpret tax payments and
work effort as the relevant inputs. Individuals who say that the rich do not pay their
fair share of taxes may feel inequity in the sense that other’s contributions to the tax
system are too low in relation to what they receive in return (e.g., the amount of public
goods might be considered the same for all citizens but the inputs differ). According to
equity theory, this perceived imbalance would provide incentives to reduce one’s own
inputs. However, since possibilities to adjust ’inputs’ to the tax system are limited,
individuals withhold their contributions in areas where adjustments are possible, e.g.
by cutting back effort at work. Similarly, individuals would increase their absenteeism
when perceiving downward unfairness since they would see their own contributions to
the system as too high.
One objection against this interpretation is that tax payments and work effort are
inputs to different systems: work effort is a contribution to the goals of the company
but not an input to the tax system. However, equity theorists argue that the behavioral
reactions to perceived inequity can be indirect in the sense that people do not (only)
restore equity in the area from where the event of injustice originated but also try to
correct input-output ratios in seemingly unrelated domains – especially when a direct
response is not easy feasible or costly. As Austin and Walster (1975) put it, individuals
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not only maintain situation-specific equity but also ’equity with the world’. Adjusting
work effort when perceiving inequities in the realm of taxation might be such a ’fairness
spillover’ (see also Cornelissen et al., 2010). Alternatively, paying taxes and working
hard can be interpreted as inputs to one and the same system, e.g., as contributions
to the broader goals or functioning of society – a reading which is not uncommon in
the literature.12 Thus, equity theory may provide an explanation for why people adjust
work effort when perceiving inequities in the tax system.13
However, equity theory overpredicts the equity corrections. Individuals who feel
overprivileged in the sense that their input-output ratio is bent to their advantage
are expected to increase their inputs. Consequently, we should observe that non-poor
individuals should have a higher propensity to provide work effort when saying that the
poor are overtaxed.14 But this does not seem to be the case; in these subsamples we
do not find a significant relationship between downward unfairness and absenteeism.
Hence, the behavioral asymmetry we find cannot be not explained in terms of equity
theory.
4.4.2 Procedural justice
When individuals state that tax burdens are unevenly distributed in society, this might
also express concerns over the procedures underlying tax payments. Several studies
report that the feeling that the wealthy are taxed too little in relation to lower-income
groups can often be traced back to beliefs that there are unequal opportunities to
avoid taxes (tax loopholes for big corporations, preferential treatment of certain kinds
of income, etc.) or that tax authorities employ different enforcement strategies (see
e.g. Wallschutzky, 1984; Roberts et al., 1994; Kinsey and Grasmick, 1993 and Hobson,
12E.g., Feld and Frey (2007) argue that tax payments are often understood as contributions to the
’summum bonum’. Similarly, work effort is not only interpreted as a means to own life goals but also
as a contribution to higher-order goals such as society’s prosperity, wealth and economic growth (see,
e.g., Lipset, 1992).
13An alternative interpretation could be that individuals perceiving tax inequity try to get back
their fair share: reducing work effort or staying at home increases leisure, and thus, restores equity via
outputs.
14With the same kind of argument one might expect that the rich must have less absenteeism when
saying that the rich are undertaxed. However, we also find a positive coefficient for mtax toolittle in the
highest income quintile. This tension can be solved by assuming that that high-income earners think
of even richer individuals when expressing upward unfairness. Note that this does not automatically
mean to postulate irrationality since the GSOEP refers to CEOs as representing the rich, i.e. to the
extreme of the income distribution.
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2002). This would conflict with core principals of procedural fairness, e.g., impartiality,
consistency and representativeness (Wenzel, 2003).
That procedural unfairness may result in deviant behavior is a key finding in research
on social justice (see, e.g., Tyler and Blader, 2003). To allow grievances over tax
procedures to affect compliance-related behavior at the workplace, one would again need
either some kind of ’fairness spillover’ reasoning or the assumption that agents view the
tax system and their company as institutions of ’broader society’ from which they want
to withdraw when witnessing unfair procedures in one of its instances (absenteeism as,
say, a silent protest behavior against society’s rules.) In fact, social psychology research
shows that indirect adjustments may occur to perceived procedural injustice. E.g.,
Mullen and Nadler (2008) found that probands who were confronted with a newspaper
article reporting a flawed court decision were more likely to steal the pen that they
were given to fill in the experiment’s questionnaire. Likewise, Zajac (1995) reveals that
perceived fairness of their firms’ policies affect employees’ support for the regulation of
private industries which may be considered as a transgression from the firm’s to the
political sphere (and not vice versa as in our case).
However, if concerns about procedural justice were the driving force behind our
results, then we should observe that individuals show similar behavioral responses to
the statements that managers are taxed too little and that low-skilled workers are
taxed too much: from a perspective of procedural justice it should make no difference
whether the bias in the tax system is at the upper or at the lower end of the income
scale; both cases would conflict with the norm that ’equals should be treated equally’,
and hence, indicate unwarranted preferential treatment in taxation. Hence, procedural
justice alone cannot explain the asymmetry we found in the data.
4.4.3 Retributive justice
Our results could also be related to motives of retaliation. Injustice in the tax system is
often based on the view that aﬄuent taxpayers and corporations make overly use of tax
avoidance schemes or, even worse, engage in illegal behavior by evading taxes (see, e.g.,
Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Furnham, 1983). Thus, it might be argued that workers
use sickness leave (staying at home while getting paid) as a device to punish bosses or
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company owners who are as considered as norm violators or moral wrongdoers.
This provides a rationale for why abstract beliefs about tax fairness may become
manifest at workplace. It also can explain why the behavioral responses to perceived
injustice in taxation are asymmetric, since (by construction) one would have no reason
to expect that individuals show higher levels of absenteeism when saying that the poor
are overtaxed.
To directly check whether motives of punishment are at play, we can use further
information from the GSOEP. In the personality module respondents were asked to
what degree (on a scale from 1 to 7) the following statement applies to their character:
’If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the
cost”. We classify a respondent as a vengeful person when choosing values larger than
4 and interact this dummy with mtax toolittle in the absenteeism regression model.
Surprisingly, the interaction term is not significant and negative in sign. This does not
support (from the sign it would even contradict) the interpretation that retaliation is a
reason why sick leave is positively associated with perceived upward unfairness.
To sum up, traditional theories of justice can well explain why perceived injustice
in taxation may induce changes in workplace behavior. The asymmetry we find is not
incorporated in equity theory as well as in procedural justice. Though retributive justice
may provide an explanation, we find no evidence that motives of retaliation play a role
in our case.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we find evidence consistent with the view that abstract tax fairness
perceptions exhibit a strong influence on economic behavior, but only if they refer
to the top of the income distribution. Concerns about taxing the poor do not seem
to trigger any behavioral changes, except than for the poor. While this behavioral
asymmetry is hard to explain by existing fairness theories, our results suggest that
a distinction between upward and downward fairness might be informative in other
research areas analyzing the economic relevance of social justice beliefs, e.g., income
fairness, reciprocity, the allocation of rights or institutional fairness.
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4.6 Appendix
Fig. 4.2: Perceived tax burden on high-income earners
6 Appendix
Figure 2: Perceived tax burden on high-income earners
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Note: Data is taken from the 1992 wave of the Social Inequality data. The question
wording is: ”Generally, how would you describe taxes in your country today. (We mean
all taxes together, including social security, income tax, VAT and all the rest.) Please
tick one box. First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ... 1. much too high 2. too
high 3. about right 4. too low [or] 5. much too low?” The total number of repondents
varies between 749 (Sweden) and 2166 (Australia). Horizontal axis: percentage of
respondents answering with ’too low’ or ’much too low’.
Figure 3: Perceived tax burden on low-income earners
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Note: Data is taken from the 1992 wave of the Social Inequality data. The question
wording is: ”[...], for those with low incomes, are taxes ... 1. much too high 2. too
high 3. about right 4. too low [or] 5. much too low?” The total number of repondents
varies between 749 (Sweden) and 2166 (Australia). Horizontal axis: percentage of
respondents answering with ’too high’ or ’much too high’ (after deleting the don’t
know’s).
21
Note: Data is taken fro t e 1 f t i l I ality data. The question
wording is: ” enerally, how would you describe taxes in your country today. (We
mean all taxes together, including social security, income tax, VAT and all the rest.)
Please tick one box. First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ... 1. much too
high 2. too high 3. about right 4. too low [or] 5. much too low?” The total number
of repondents varies between 749 (Sweden) and 2166 (Australia). Horizontal axis:
percentage of respondents answering with ’too low’ or ’much too low’.
Source: Social Inequality II, 1992.
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Fig. 4.3: Perceived tax burden on low-income earners
6 Appendix
Figure 2: Perceived tax burden on high-income earners
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Note: Data is taken from the 1992 wave of the Social Inequality data. The question
wording is: ”Generally, how would you describe taxes in your country today. (We mean
all taxes together, including social security, income tax, VAT and all the rest.) Please
tick one box. First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ... 1. much too high 2. too
high 3. about right 4. too low [or] 5. much too low?” The total number of repondents
varies between 749 (Sweden) and 2166 (Australia). Horizontal axis: percentage of
respondents answering with ’too low’ or ’much too low’.
Figure 3: Perceived tax burden on low-income earners
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Note: Data is taken from the 1992 wave of the Social Inequality data. The question
wording is: ”[...], for those with low incomes, are taxes ... 1. much too high 2. too
high 3. about right 4. too low [or] 5. much too low?” The total number of repondents
varies between 749 (Sweden) and 2166 (Australia). Horizontal axis: percentage of
respondents answering with ’too high’ or ’much too high’ (after deleting the don’t
know’s).
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Note: Data is taken from the 1992 wave of the Social Inequality data. The question
wording is: ”[...], for those with low inco es, are taxes ... 1. uch too high 2. too
high 3. about right 4. too lo [or] 5. uch too lo ?” he total nu ber of repondents
varies between 749 (S ) ( str lia). rizontal axis: percentage of
respondents ans eri it ’to hig ’ or ’much too high’.
Source: Social Inequality II, 1992.
Tab. 4.6: Two-step QMLE estimations, subsamples.
blue collar low-tier 1st income quintile
wtax toolittle -0.05 0.19 0.26∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.15)
N 1478 777 719
Note: The full sample is split by: (a) blue and white collar respondents, (b) position in the job
hierarchy and (c) income quintiles of the 2005 SOEP wave. All regressions include the same control
variables as specification (7) of Table 4.2. Fully robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Tab. 4.7: Summary statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
dependent variable
absenteeism 7.612 17.26 0 245 5122
main explanatory variables
mtax toolittle 0.721 0.448 0 1 5122
wtax toomuch 0.535 0.499 0 1 5117
health status
health score 3.558 0.819 1 5 5122
health satisfaction 7.015 1.904 0 10 5122
other beliefs and attitudes
unfair pay 0.329 0.47 0 1 5122
pessimist view 0.257 0.437 0 1 5122
willingness to take risks 4.886 2.134 0 10 5122
leftist/right 4.71 1.745 0 10 5122
tend to be lazy 2.236 1.468 1 7 5122
socio-economic characteristics
income 2.728 1.85 0.25 35 5122
schooling 12.845 2.783 7 18 5122
blue collar 0.275 0.447 0 1 5122
white collar 0.582 0.493 0 1 5122
public servant 0.111 0.314 0 1 5122
age 42.41 10.598 17 74 5122
male 0.568 0.495 0 1 5122
children 0.371 0.483 0 1 5122
foreign 0.052 0.222 0 1 5122
firm and job related variables
micro-sized enterprise 0.208 0.406 0 1 5122
small enterprise 0.301 0.459 0 1 5122
medium enterprise 0.229 0.42 0 1 5122
large enterprise 0.263 0.44 0 1 5122
tenure 11.859 10.141 0 48.8 5122
full time experience 16.326 11.109 0 47 5122
part time experience 2.553 5.23 0 45 5122
part time 0.184 0.387 0 1 5122
marginally employed 0.03 0.17 0 1 5122
low-tier 0.143 0.35 0 1 4957
middle-tier 0.585 0.493 0 1 4957
management level 0.272 0.445 0 1 4957
agriculture 0.011 0.105 0 1 5122
mining/energy 0.014 0.118 0 1 5122
manufacturing 0.212 0.409 0 1 5122
processing 0.049 0.217 0 1 5122
traffic/media 0.061 0.239 0 1 5122
construction 0.047 0.212 0 1 5122
wholesale 0.114 0.317 0 1 5122
services 0.137 0.344 0 1 5122
banking/insurance 0.054 0.227 0 1 5122
public sector 0.301 0.459 0 1 5122
workplace perceptions and region
fear of job loss 0.602 0.49 0 1 5122
jobsatisfaction 7.04 1.928 0 10 5122
East Germany 0.202 0.402 0 1 5122
South Germany 0.285 0.452 0 1 5122
Note: Data is taken from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
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Chapter 5
Perceived Unfairness in CEO Compensation and Work Morale1
5.1 Introduction
’Nothing in business excites so much interest in the wider world as the pay of top
executives.’ the Economist wrote in a 2003 article titled ’Fat cats feeding - Executive
pay’. Indeed, it seems that the dizzying heights to which CEO compensation has
risen trigger stronger feelings than just plain interest. The Enron scandal inspired the
Forbes headline ’Pay Madness at Enron’, and in March 2009 the Economist published
an opinion poll in which 66% of respondents claimed to be ’very angry’ about AIG
bonuses, accompanied by an article entitled ’Will there be blood?’.
It is likely that public protests are only the tip of the iceberg, considering that
social psychologists and economists have shown that unfairness leads to a wide range
of behavioral consequences.2 One margin of adjustment that is likely to respond to
fairness perceptions related to labor market income is work morale. Observing a close
link between perceived pay inequities and work effort, Adams (1965) argued in his equity
theory that individuals compare their effort-to-pay-ratio to that of others and adjust it
whenever they differ. Along these lines, reduced work effort of individuals who perceive
manager incomes to be excessively high could be interpreted as a means of restoring
equity.
1This chapter is co-authored with Thomas Cornelissen and Oliver Himmler. The chapter is available
as Discussion Paper No. 435 of the discussion paper series of the Faculty of Economics and Business
Administration at Leibniz University of Hannover. The chapter was published as: ’Perceived Unfairness
in CEO Compensation and Work Morale’, Economics Letters, 110, 2011, 45-48. Publication within
this thesis with kind permission of the editor.
2See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and Tyler and Smith (1998) for literature surveys.
CHAPTER 5. CEO COMPENSATION AND WORK MORALE
We empirically investigate whether fairness perceptions of CEO compensation in-
deed affect work morale. We use absenteeism from work due to sickness as a measure
of work morale, based on data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The
results suggest that perceiving CEO compensation to be unfair is associated with up to
20% higher levels of absenteeism, even after conditioning on health and an exhaustive
set of individual characteristics. Our research complements the social comparison litera-
ture, which suggests that higher income of a reference group affects subjective well-being
negatively (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005). These
studies look into the direct effects on utility in terms of stated happiness or satisfaction,
while our outcome is an observable economic behavior. A further contribution of our
study is to show that the mere perception of unfairness of others’ incomes, rather than
the true relative income position, affects behavior.
5.2 Data and estimation strategy
The 2005 wave of the GSOEP asked respondents whether they believed that the income
of a manager on the board of directors of a large company had a ’just relation to the job
demands’. Roughly three out of four respondents thought that this was not the case.
If perceived unfairness triggers adjustment behavior, we expect to observe lower levels
of work effort for these individuals. A particularly appealing way of adjusting effort
is by increasing absenteeism. Unlike other measurable effort indicators such as hours
worked or overtime hours, absenteeism does not come with monetary repercussions in
the German system. There is no reduction of payments for the first six weeks of a
sickness spell, and for the first three days of each spell, employees are usually not even
obliged to produce a doctor’s note. At the same time the legal barriers to dismissing
employees are high. Such a setup provides incentives and leeway for behaving oppor-
tunistically by feigning sickness. While we do not intend to imply that everyone on sick
absence is a shirker, it is widely accepted in the labor economics literature (Barmby
et al., 2002; Johannsen and Palme, 2005) that absenteeism is not purely a response to
medical conditions. In accordance with perceived injustice increasing the propensity to
display such behavior, Table 5.1 shows that those who thought CEO pay to be unfair
displayed significantly higher levels of absenteeism from work due to illness.
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Tab. 5.1: Absenteeism by opinion on CEO pay.
CEO pay unfair
no yes Difference
Days absent 5.79 8.32 2.53∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.37) (0.68)
Observations 901 2682
Note: Mean days absent by opinion on whether CEO compensation
is perceived to be unfair. Standard errors in parentheses. T-test of
difference in means: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Obviously, there are many other factors that may determine absenteeism. In the
following regressions we include a large number of these possibly confounding variables.
The main driver of absenteeism should be an individual’s physical constitution. Our
dataset provides a variable ’health score’ that accounts for the level of individual health,
but as different individuals may judge the same health score differently, the respondent’s
rating of ’health satisfaction’ is also included. If there was no fraudulent use of sick
days, other factors should not have any significant impact on absenteeism once the effect
of health is netted out. However, because of the aforementioned institutional setup it
is clear that such a naive control approach may be insufficient. A standard predictor
of shirking is the probability of getting caught, as reflected in the firm size variables.
Higher stakes are represented by controlling for gross income. Job security is mirrored
in the personal fear of job loss as well as a control for being marginally employed. We
also add standard Mincer equation variables, ’occupational status’ dummies indicating
an individual’s rank in the firms’s employment hierarchy as well as sectoral and regional
dummies. The GSOEP also allows accounting for attitudes and personal traits that are
typically not collected in other surveys and may cause endogeneity if omitted from the
regression. We include the level of job satisfaction, general negativism, laziness, risk
aversion, and leftist political views because they may drive both beliefs on fairness of
CEO pay as well as work effort. Summary statistics and variable descriptions are given
in Table 5.3.
Since the dependent variable only takes on non-negative integer values, count data
methods are in order and our baseline estimations employ the two-step negative bino-
mial quasi maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) as described in Wooldridge (2002).
This estimator is consistent under the correct conditional mean, which we model as
an exponential function. It has an edge over Poisson and Negbin II approaches since
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it accounts for overdispersion and is robust against violations of the distributional as-
sumptions.
5.3 Results
Estimates of the association between perceived fairness of CEO compensation obtained
from various specifications are displayed in Table 5.4. Coefficients must be interpreted
as semi-elasticities and the bivariate specification in column (1) reflects the descriptive
finding from Table 5.1: those who think CEO pay is unfair show a larger number of days
absent. Somewhat surprising is that the inclusion of health and income variables doesn’t
even scale down the coefficient by half in column (2). While the controls are all highly
significant and the coefficients have the expected sign, the effect of perceived unfairness
remains strong. It still suggests that those who believe CEO pay to be excessive have
roughly one fifth more sick days. The naive estimator from column (2) already provides
a very good approximation of the coefficient magnitude when all controls are included
in column (6). Successively adding further controls does not decrease the coefficient.
Backed by the striking robustness of the coefficient to various specifications, these results
imply massive behavioral consequences of perceiving the income of top managers to be
unfairly high.
Robustness checks are applied in Table 5.2, where all control variables are as in
column (6) of Table 5.4. A linear probability model in column (1) shows the effect of
perceived unfairness on the probability of having at least 1 sick day. The coefficient is
rather small and only significant at the 11% level. This is not very surprising, as this
probability is pretty much out of the hands of the individual. Whether one gets sick
for a day or not should be largely random and we also believe that shirkers may often
simply add a day or two when they were truly sick in the first place. Columns (2)-(4)
further underscore the robustness of our results. OLS estimates in column (2) imply a
difference of 1.4 days, which nicely translates to the 20% effect obtained via the QMLE
estimations. Two alternative count data estimators are shown in columns (3) and (4).
Neither the Poisson nor the Negative Binomial model suggests effects different from
those obtained earlier. Taken together, the stability of our main coefficient of interest
across specifications and estimation methods makes us confident that the estimates
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Tab. 5.2: Robustness checks.
LPM OLS Poisson Negbin QMLE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO pay unfair .03 1.37∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗ .23∗∗
(0.02) (0.54) (0.02) (0.08) (0.09)
CEO pay unfair −.005
* Leftist > median (0.15)
Leftist > median .14
(0.13)
60 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3583 3583 3583 3583 3583
R2 0.10 0.12
log-l. -2384 -15200 -30351 -9340 -9407
Note: Column (1) is a linear probability model (LPM) with dependent variable taking on value 1 if absenteeism >0.
Column (2) is standard OLS, columns (3) and (4) are standard Poisson and Negbin II count data estimators. In column
(5), the two-step QMLE estimator described in Section 2 is used. The dependent variable in columns (2)-(5) is ’number
of days absent’. The regressor ’leftist > median’ is an indicator variable taking on the value 1 if the variable ’leftist’ is
greater than its median of 5, and taking on the value 0 otherwise. Standard errors in columns (1)-(2) allow for clustering
at the household level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
come close to the true causal effect.
It can be argued that the reaction to perceived unfairness depends on political views.
Therefore, we introduce an interaction term of ’CEO pay unfair’ with a dummy variable
taking on the value 1 if our 11-point indicator of leftist political views is above its median
of 5, and zero otherwise. As can be seen in column (5) of Table 5.2, the interaction
term is insignificant. It remains also insignificant when we interact ’CEO pay unfair’
with a full set of dummies for each value of ’leftist’ (results not reported here). This
suggests that the reaction to perceived unfairness of CEO compensation is not confined
to individuals with narrow political views, but that it holds throughout the political
spectrum.
5.4 Conclusion
That discontent with CEO compensation may have behavioral consequences could fre-
quently be observed when people took to the streets in protest during the recent finan-
cial crisis. In this paper we have shown that perceived unfairness of CEO pay may also
lead to ’hidden’ protest behavior that bears the potential of large economic costs, even
outside times of financial crisis.
That the income others supposedly earn has an effect on own economic behavior is
in stark contrast to standard neoclassical theory. The results are consistent with equity
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theory, yet they can also be reconciled with other adjustment triggering mechanisms
such as envy – which are typically hard to distinguish from fairness. An interesting
implication of our study is that the mere perception of what others earn may suffice to
trigger adjustment behavior. This adds a new angle to the recent social comparisons
literature.
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5.5 Appendix
Tab. 5.3: Description of variables and summary statistics.
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
absenteeism number of days absent in year of survey. 7.68 17.92
absenteeism dummy indicator variable, 1 if absenteeism >0. 0.56 0.50
CEO pay unfair indicator variable, 1 if respondent thinks CEOs pay is unfair. 0.75 0.43
health score self reported current health. ’Poor’ (1) to ’Very good’ (5). 3.58 0.83
health satisfaction satisfaction w/ health. Scale: ’totally unhappy’ (0) to ’totally happy’ (10). 7.07 1.88
gross income gross monthly household income in 1000s of Euros. 2.98 1.96
age age in years. 42.92 10.06
male indicator variable, 1 if male. 0.59 0.49
children the number of children <16 years in the household. 0.37 0.48
foreign indicator variable, 1 if non-German citizen. 0.05 0.22
schooling year of schooling (includes tertiary education and vocational training). 13.16 2.85
tenure tenure with current employer. 12.29 10.13
full time experience years of full time experience. 16.88 10.84
part time experience years of part time experience. 2.37 4.94
part time indicator variable, 1 if currently part time employed. 0.17 0.38
marginally employed indicator variable, 1 if currently marginally employed. 0.03 0.16
< 20 employees current employer firm size indicator variable. 0.19 0.39
20<=employees< 200 current employer firm size indicator variable. 0.29 0.45
200<=employees<2000 current employer firm size indicator variable. 0.24 0.43
employees>=2000 current employer firm size indicator variable. 0.29 0.45
afraid to lose job indicator variable, 1 if individual concerned about job security. 0.58 0.49
satisfied w/ job satisfaction w/ job. Scale: ’totally unhappy’ (0) to ’totally happy’ (10). 7.09 1.92
pessimist indicator, 1 if pessimistic about the future. 0.25 0.43
lazy Self reported laziness. Scale: ’not at all’ (1) to ’applies perfectly’ (7). 2.21 1.46
leftist political views. Scale: ’Far right’ (0) to ’Far left’ (10). 5.31 1.75
risk taker prepared to take risks. Scale (0) to (10). 4.88 2.13
sector dummies 9 indicator for the industry respondent is employed in.
region dummies 16 indicator variables for the German states.
occupation dummies 3 blue collar indicator variables: low, medium, high job level.
3 white collar indicator variables: low, medium, high job level.
3 public servant indicator variables: low, medium, high job level.
Note: The number of observations for all variables is N=3583.
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Tab. 5.4: Perceived fairness of CEO pay and absenteeism. Two-step QMLE
estimations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main explanatory variables
CEO pay unfair .3384∗∗∗ .1896∗∗∗ .1932∗∗∗ .1822∗∗ .1907∗∗∗ .2202∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
health score −.3609∗∗∗ −.3599∗∗∗ −.3582∗∗∗ −.36∗∗∗ −.3437∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
health satisfaction −.1254∗∗∗ −.1266∗∗∗ −.1252∗∗∗ −.1281∗∗∗ −.1352∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
gross income (1000s Euro) −.0833∗∗∗ −.0249 −.0529∗∗ −.0664∗∗∗ −.0594∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Personal characteristics
age −.011 −.0162 −.0403 −.0199
(0.020) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
agesq / 100 .0085 .0073 .0383 .0171
(0.025) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
male −.0888 −.173∗∗ −.1287∗ −.0849
(0.067) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078)
children −.2017∗∗∗ −.0946 −.0957 −.085
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.071)
foreign .0903 .0876 .1043 .0436
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.134)
schooling −.055∗∗∗ −.037∗∗ −.0319∗ −.0418∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Job related variables
tenure .0225∗∗ .019 .0191
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
tenure sq / 100 −.0435 −.0451 −.0412
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
full time experience −.0093 −.0103 −.019
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
full time experience sq / 100 .0358 .0321 .0472
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039)
part time experience −.0067 −.0056 −.0168
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
part time experience sq / 100 .0093 .0033 .0356
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072)
part timea −.1972∗ −.1885 −.1677
(0.118) (0.120) (0.121)
marginally employed −1.129∗∗∗ −.9265∗∗∗ −.7908∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.270) (0.298)
Firm level variables
20<=employees<200b .4001∗∗∗ .3979∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.102)
200<=employees<2000 .4816∗∗∗ .4517∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.104)
employees>2000 .4396∗∗∗ .4451∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.103)
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job .0129
(0.069)
satisfied w/ job −.0222
(0.017)
pessimist −.0863
(0.071)
lazy −.0166
(0.022)
leftist .0336∗
(0.017)
risk taker .0159
(0.016)
constant 1.759 4.127 5.088 5.241 5.31 5.291
(0.063) (0.144) (0.422) (0.665) (0.691) (0.714)
9 sectoral dummies No No No No Yes Yes
9 occupation dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
16 region dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
observations 5200 4223 4131 3970 3747 3583
log-pseudolikelihood -13468 -11092 -10846 -10351 -9851 -9398
Note: Reference categories are (a) full-time for ’job status’, (b) less than 20 employees for ’firm size’. All estimations are
two-step quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) implying fully robust standard errors. The dependent variable is ’number
of days absent’. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 6
(Post-)Materialist Attitudes and the Mix of Capital and Labor
Taxation1
6.1 Introduction
Among political and social scientists, it is widely held that a deep change in value orien-
tations has taken place throughout advanced industrial societies over the past decades.
In seminal contributions, Ronald Inglehart and others argue that people nowadays put
lesser emphasis on material goods such as consumption, wealth, and income but give
higher priority to immaterial goods, such as esteem, self-expression, freedom of choice
and other intangible aspects of the quality of life (Davis and Davenport, 1999; Hellevik,
1993; Inglehart, 1971, 1997, 1999; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Moors and Vermunt,
2007; Duch and Taylor, 1993).
This so-called “value change hypothesis” is largely supported by empirical evidence
derived from the World Values Surveys, the largest investigation on attitudes, values,
and beliefs around the world. In these surveys, a rising share of respondents say that
less emphasis on material possessions is a desirable change in our way of life; a growing
number of people consider “hard work” or “saving money” as less valuable qualities to
be taught to a child than tolerance and respect; people to a greater extent emphasize
the importance of leisure; respondents increasingly think that, when seeking a job,
1This chapter is co-authored with Andreas Wagener. The chapter was published as: ’(Post-)Mat-
erialist Attitudes and the Mix of Capital and Labor Taxation’, CESifo Working Paper, No. 2366.
The chapter was presented at conferences and seminars in Maastricht, Lille, Jena and San Antonio.
An earlier version of this chapter won the Best Paper Award at the 13th Spring Meeting of Young
Economists.
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good pay is less important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people
one likes; people are increasingly interested in arts, music, entertainment and culture;
and respondents are more inclined to view economic growth as a less important policy
objective than, say, the protection of the environment (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005).
The change in basic values, thus, involves that people shift priorities from materi-
alist issues to “postmaterialist” or quality-of-life goals, as Inglehart and others call the
objectives ranked higher in Maslow’s hierarchy. Occurring on a large scale, this trend
can be expected to impact on political decisions, processes, and policy choices. Indeed,
political scientists argue that postmaterialism helped to promote good governance (see,
e.g., Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and fostered the emergence of social movements with
concerns about civil rights, inequality, the environment, or globalization (Inglehart,
1997; della Porta and Diani, 1999). In this paper we argue that the rise of postma-
terialism may also affect tax policies. Inglehart (1971) defines postmaterialism as the
relative importance people ascribe to immaterial values relative to material goods. Put
simpler, it is the degree of how little people are impressed by money. As taxation is
foremost associated with a smaller purse, people’s attitude towards money may have an
effect on how strongly governments can tax them or how elastically they try to escape
from governments’ grabbing hands. Value-induced changes in the perception of the
burden imposed by taxes and in the responsiveness to taxation will then translate into
changes of the optimal tax mix in a society. Taxation will shift to those items that are
complementary with material values.
This is the vantage point of our paper. Specifically, we ask whether a society’s (non-)
materialistic attitude may affect its mix of capital and labor taxation. This exercise
seems especially worthwhile as the shift in the fiscal importance and in the tax burden
from taxes on capital to taxes on labor has been one of the most pronounced (and most
hotly debated) trends in the structure of taxation over the past decades. A standard
explanation for this trend is the pressures of“globalization”, i.e., a higher mobility – and,
thus, a higher tax sensitivity, of capital (see below). We complement this explanation by
arguing that the reduced relative tax burden on capital may also be driven by changes
in the values held in the populations.
In a first step, we propose a simple model of capital and labor taxation for open
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economies with mobile capital and immobile, but elastically supplied labor (Nash tax
competition). We incorporate the notion of postmaterialism via a preference parameter.
This parametric approach comes at the cost of some loss of generality, but allows for a
reduced-form solution for the equilibrium mix of capital and labor taxes.
As a testable hypothesis we derive that a higher degree of postmaterialism will lower
the ratio of capital to labor taxes. The intuition behind this result is the following. Both
capital and labor are elastic tax bases: capital can move abroad and labor, though
internationally immobile, avoids taxation by fleeing into leisure. If people place lower
relative emphasis on material aspects, they are less sensitive to their labor income being
taxed. The wage tax elasticity of their labor supply decreases with postmaterialism. In
turn, this implies that governments increase the relative tax burden on labor.
In a second step, we empirically test our theoretical results using a panel data set
comprising 17 OECD countries over the period covering 1981 to 2001. We employ a
modified version of the so-called Inglehart Four Items Index but also develop two other
proxies for postmaterialist attitudes from the World Values Surveys. Controlling for
country-specific and time fixed effects, these proxies, a measure of capital mobility, and
a set of control variables are used as regressors for explaining the ratio of the effective
marginal tax rate on capital (EMTR) to the tax wedge on labor. The estimates for the
postmaterialism parameter exhibit the predicted signs and are highly significant in all
regressions, indicating a substantial impact of non-material values on tax design.
Our research adds to a recent trend in the literature with focus on the complemen-
tarity between norms, values, and beliefs, and tax policies. E.g., Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) trace back differences in the volume of redistributive taxation between Western
Europe and the United States to different perceptions about how fair market outcomes
are. Hodler (2008) points out that different attitudes towards leisure (in our terminol-
ogy, varying degrees of postmaterialism) are responsible for the variation in the size
of welfare states and, by and large, in the overall tax burden. Franzen (2003) and
others report evidence that appreciation for eco-taxes is greater in postmaterialist than
in materialist countries. It remains unclear, however, whether this reflects “merely” an
increased concern for the environment or a generally reduced price sensitivity. Qari et
al. (2011) explicitly build on the assumption that individual attitudes shape tax sensi-
tivities. Specifically, they posit that patriotic values makes mobile rich more attached
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to their home country; governments in turn can exploit this when financing a redis-
tributive tax-transfer system. However, none of the studies we are aware of attempts to
relate values and norms to the composition of the tax burden or to the tax mix. This
is our focus.
Traditionally, the (relative) reliance on capital taxation is explained by the degree
of capital market integration. It is reckoned that more open economies face a greater
danger of capital flight. They, thus, have stronger incentives to shift the tax burden
to immobile factors – which is mainly labor, but also consumption (for a survey, see
Wilson, 1999). By and large, this argument seems well in line with the experience
from the last two decades, a period that was characterized by both deeper economic
integration and a decline in the ratio of capital to labor taxes (see Haufler et al., 2008).
Many of the empirical papers do, however, fail to find a robust negative link between
capital mobility and the relative tax burden on capital and labor.2 Thus, it appears
natural to search for further factors that drive the mix of capital and labor taxation.
This paper suggests that postmaterialist attitudes in the population are a potential
candidate – and substantiates this claim theoretically and empirically.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 sets out the model and derives predictions
on optimal tax structures. Section 6.3 tests these hypotheses empirically. Section 6.4
concludes.
6.2 The model
6.2.1 Framework
We incorporate postmaterialism into a standard tax model for open economies. We
borrow the main components of the modelling framework from Bucovetsky and Wilson
(1991), Persson and Tabellini (1992, 2002), and Haufler et al. (2008). These studies
explain the relative reliance on capital taxation by economic factors; we will put the
spotlight on the role values might play.
We consider an integrated economic area with two small open economies that are
identical in every respect. In particular, they face the same exogenously given gross
2Haufler et al. (2008) survey the empirical literature on the relationship between the openness of
an economy and its tax mix.
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return on capital. Capital is assumed to be imperfectly mobile and taxed at source.
The populations in both countries are identical in structure and tastes; individuals are
internationally immobile. For convenience, we refer to one of the two countries as the
“home” and to the other as the “foreign” country. If necessary, we shall correspondingly
index country variables with subscripts h and f , respectively. Without loss of generality
we introduce model features from the home country’s point of view.
Each country is inhabited by capitalists and workers. Within each class, individuals
are identical. Workers are assumed to outnumber capitalists. Governments, driven by
(re-)election concerns, choose policies (i.e., the capital-labor tax mix) as to maximize
the utility of workers.
Capitalists receive income from capital (which may include income from abroad).
Workers receive only wage income. Workers have convex and monotone preferences over
consumption c, leisure – negatively represented by working hours ` –, and a publicly
provided good g that is financed by domestic taxes on capital and labor.
We will interpret leisure as to reflect non-materialist goods and, thus, assume that
(post-) materialist attitudes are incorporated in the preferences over leisure. This as-
sumption is motivated by phenomena cited as evidence for the so-called “value change
hypothesis”. Inglehart and Welzel (2005), together with others, assert that people turn
their minds away from consumer goods towards arts, music and culture or, in short,
towards a “better quality of life”. As many of these quality activities are genuine leisure
time activities, it seems quite natural to suppose that postmaterialist societies tend to
have higher levels of leisure or, equivalently, lower volumes of work. Seen from that
angle, postmaterialism may be linked to the observation that Western European coun-
tries (which count as highly postmaterialist) experienced a sharp fall in average working
hours over the last decades (see Alesina et al., 2005).3
Specifically, the utility of workers is assumed to be quasi-linear and given by
U(c, `, g; γ, δ) = c− 1
1 + γ
· `1+γ + δ · g (6.1)
with δ > 1 and γ > 0. The marginal utilities from private and public consumption are
3This unrealistically rules out that non-materialist goals (such as self-expression or self-
actualization) can be achieved during work time. However, as mentioned above, leisure seems to
play a more important role for satisfying non-materialist needs.
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constant, with the latter being larger than the former (δ > 1). This assumption ensures
that workers wish to have some positive amount of the public good even if it has to be
financed by distortionary taxes.4
In (6.1), the parameter γ will be interpreted as the degree of postmaterialism. Two
arguments support this interpretation: First, the higher γ, the larger the willingness to
pay (measured in terms of material consumption) for an increase in leisure. The relative
weight that people give to non-material over materialist consumption is, however, the
genuine definition of postmaterialism according to Inglehart (1997). A higher γ, i.e.,
a higher marginal disutility from work, implies a shift away from consumption and
towards leisure . In this respect, postmaterialism is related to “laziness” in Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) or Hodler (2008).
Second, 1/γ equals the elasticity of labor supply with respect to net wages (also see
below). Higher values of γ then reflect a reduced sensitivity of individuals to material
incentives (or changes in their budgets). This is in line with Inglehart’s (1990, pp. 176f)
observation that postmaterialists are lesser motivated by income than materialists and
that they earn less for the same amount of labor and at comparable levels of education
(“economic underachievement”).5
To summarize, a higher γ translates, first and ceteris paribus, into an absolute
reduction in labor supply and, second, into a larger indolence of individuals with respect
to monetary rewards. The simple parametrization of the utility function (6.1) by γ, thus,
encompasses two important aspects of the sociological concept of postmaterialism.
We assume that γ and changes to it are exogenous. Empirically, postmaterialist
attitudes are highly and positively correlated with economic well-being. However, as
Inglehart (1990) shows, changes in postmaterialist attitudes occur at a much slower pace
than changes in economic conditions. Postmaterialism is a cultural value embedded in
society; since changes in γ should therefore reflect changes in attitudes over and above
those triggered by economic factors, we treat it as exogenous.
Workers’ consumption c equals their after-tax income (w − τ) · `, where w and τ
4While not innocent, the assumption of separable utility is the simplest way to generate the results
we are aiming at.
5Uhlaner and Thurik (2007) empirically show that the more postmaterialist a culture, the lower the
rate of entrepreneurial activities. As they argue that entrepreneurship is associated with (the hope of)
making a lot of money, this, too, corroborates the view that postmaterialists respond less elastically
to monetary incentives.
103
6.2. THE MODEL
denote the real gross wage and the wage tax, respectively. Using this when maximizing
(6.1) with respect to c and `, taking wages, taxes and the amount of the publicly
provided good as given, optimal labor supply L amounts to
L(w − τ ; γ) = (w − τ) 1γ . (6.2)
As mentioned earlier, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage tax equals
ηL,τ :=
∂L
∂τ
τ
L
= −1
γ
τ
w − τ < 0. (6.3)
Eqs. (6.2) and (6.3) formally justify why γ is a meaningful proxy for postmaterialism:
First, the higher γ, the higher the consumption of “non-materialist” leisure. Second, the
higher γ, the more difficult are people to motivate via monetary incentives. Equivalently,
less materialist people are less easily deterred by monetary disincentives like wage taxes
– an observation that will drive optimal tax policies.
Domestic and foreign capitalists each own a fixed stock K¯ of capital, which they can
allocate between their home and the foreign country. Given that both economies are
small, capitalists have to receive the real rate r of return on worldwide markets, gross
of taxes, independently of where they invest.
We denote by kij (with i = f, h) the amount of capital originating from country i
that is invested in country j. Investing abroad is associated with mobility costs (with
increasing marginal costs). These costs contain all extra costs that foreign investment
entails over domestic investment, e.g., when gathering information about legal issues,
tax planning, purely tax-driven misallocations of factors. We follow Haufler et al.
(2008) by assuming mobility costs M to be a quadratic function in the amount of
capital invested abroad. For an investor from h, they amount to Mh =
1
2β
· k2hf . The
cost parameter β is common to both countries; it serves as a proxy for the degree
of capital market integration between the two countries. After-tax income of capital
owners from h amounts to
(r − th)khh + (r − tf )khf − 1
2β
k2hf = (r − th)K¯ + khf (th − tf )−
1
2β
k2hf , (6.4)
where th and tf denote the rates of the source tax on capital in country h and f ,
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respectively.
We assume that capitalists are just interested in maximizing their after tax income.
They, thus, remain unaffected by postmaterialist tendencies. At first sight, this seems to
contradict Inglehart’s findings that rising postmaterialism can be observed throughout
all classes and strata of society. Yet, this assumption can be justified on several grounds:
In practise, the allocation of capital across countries is decided by professionals who,
by virtue of their job as bankers or managers, have to aim at maximizing after tax
profits, irrespective of what their personal attitudes towards material goods might be.
Moreover, one might also view capital owners as non-working rentiers who live on their
wealth. For such leisure-class people, increased tendencies towards postmaterialism
would not make a behavioral difference.6
Maximizing (6.4), the domestic capitalist’s optimal amount of foreign investment is
given by
khf = β · (th − tf ) =: Khf (th − tf ; β). (6.5)
Combined with labor input, capital produces economic output. In a general equi-
librium of a competitive economy, remunerations of factors will depend on the amounts
of factors employed. Assuming that factors of production are complements, a higher
capital stock would increase the marginal productivity of labor and, thus, lift gross
wages. Short-cutting that investment decisions impact on gross wages of workers, we
follow Haufler et al. (2008) and assume that gross wages vary proportionally with the
total amount of capital invested at home, i.e.,
wh = α · (K¯ −Khf (th − tf ; β) +Kfh(tf − th; β)) =: wh(th − tf ; β) (6.6)
with 0 < α < 1. Note that α being positive precludes that workers wish to expropriate
6There is a more fundamental objection against the assumption that capitalists be postmaterialist
in our model. In a dynamic framework, capital income would be derived from savings, i.e., from income
that is not consumed at the moment of its generation. However, we did not find any evidence that
postmaterialism is related to the postponement of consumption or the intertemporal (re-)allocation
of some given wealth. Rather, postmaterialism involves incentives to the generation of income in the
first place. Accordingly, even a more complete modelling of postmaterialist attitudes ought not to
include “inefficient” investment strategies (in the sense that maximizing (6.4) is questioned). Rather,
the generation of K¯ should be modelled. However, such intertemporal problems are beyond the scope
of this paper.
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capitalists entirely when it comes to generate positive tax revenues.
Now, let us turn to the government sector. The government uses tax revenues to
provide a public good. As only source-based taxes are available, the home government’s
budget constraint is given by
gh = τh · L(wh(th − tf ; β)− τh; γ) + th · (K¯ −Khf +Kfh) (6.7)
=: G(τh, th; tf , β, γ).
The foreign country is identical to the home country in every respect. By symmetry,
we get
Kfh(tf − th; β) = −Khf (th − tf ; β), (6.8)
∂Kfh
∂th
= −∂Khf
∂tf
= β. (6.9)
From (6.8) and (6.9), the elasticity of the home country’s capital tax base with respect
to the own capital tax rate th equals:
εKh,th =
∂(K¯ −Khf +Kfh)
∂th
· th
K¯ −Khf +Kfh = −
2βth
K¯ −Khf +Kfh . (6.10)
6.2.2 The tax mix in an equilibrium
Both governments are interested in getting majority support for their politics in the
domestic electorate. They are unwilling or unable to coordinate on policy decisions
with their neighbour. Since workers outnumber capitalists by assumption, governments
choose a mix of capital and labor taxes as to maximize utility of workers, thereby taking
the foreign tax policy as given. The indirect utility of the home workers is derived by
substituting (6.2), (6.6), and (6.7) into (6.1):
Vh = V (τh, th; tf , β, γ, δ) = (wh(th − tf ; β)− τh) · L(wh(th − tf ; β)− τh; γ) (6.11)
− 1
1 + γ
· L(wh(th − tf ; β)− τh)1+γ + δ ·Gh(τh, th; tf , β, γ).
The FOCs for the home government’s maximization problem are given by the fol-
lowing equations, where we use general functional forms, exploit the Envelope Theorem
106
CHAPTER 6. POSTMATERIALISM AND THE TAX MIX
and suppress parameters for reasons of simplicity:
∂Vh
∂th
=
∂w
∂th
L+ δ
[
K¯ −Khf +Kfh + th∂(Kfh −Khf )
∂th
+ τh
∂L
∂w
∂wh
∂th
]
= 0 (6.12)
∂Vh
∂τh
= −L+ δ
[
L+ τh
∂L
τh
]
= 0. (6.13)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the domestic and the foreign capital tax rates will
be equal (th = tf ). Consequently, no cross-border capital flows occur (Khf = Kfh = 0)
and equilibrium capital stocks equal initial endowments. Therefore, the equilibrium
gross wage in both countries is given by w = α · K¯. We shall henceforth abandon with
country indexes.
To arrive at an explicit solution for the government’s choice of τ , observe that (6.13)
yields the Atkinson-Stern rule that the willingness-to-pay for public consumption must
equal the marginal costs of public funds through labor taxes:
δ =
1
1 + ηL,τ
.
Substituting for ηL,τ and using w = αK¯, we obtain the equilibrium tax rate on labor as
τ ∗ =
cγ
1 + cγ
αK¯, (6.14)
where we set c := 1−1/δ. The wage tax is always positive since we assumed α > 0 and
δ > 1. If wages were independent of the amount of domestic capital (α = 0), workers
would wish to exclusively rely on capital taxes, leaving wage income untaxed. Thus, a
positive value of α (generally: a positive relation between capital and labor productivity)
opens the door for taxing both capital and labor. Similarly, the assumption δ > 1
triggers positive levels of taxation as it implies that the economy is willing to finance
the public good via distortionary taxes.
The impact of the postmaterialism parameter γ on labor taxation can be seen di-
rectly from (6.14): A stronger degree of postmaterialism will unambiguously lead to
a higher wage tax (∂τ ∗/∂γ > 0). Intuitively, as workers respond less sensitively to
their labor income being taxed away, the marginal opportunity costs of wage taxation
become lower, too.
Using (6.2) and substituting for w and τ by using (6.14) and w = αK¯, labor supply
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in the equilibrium turns out to be
L∗ =
[
αK¯
1 + cγ
]1/γ
. (6.15)
Note that the effect of a greater postmaterialism on equilibrium labor supply is unam-
biguously negative. For any given tax rate, a higher γ makes workers prone to consume
more of (non-material) leisure such that labor supply decreases. This effect is amplified
by the effects of postmaterialism on wage taxes. Due to the increasing sensitivity of
workers with respect to taxation, tax rates rise and net wages decrease. Thus, the di-
rect effect and the indirect effect of postmaterialism via taxing wages work in the same
direction.
For the equilibrium tax rate on capital, combine (6.12) and (6.13) to obtain
K
L
· [1 + K,t] = −∂w
∂t
.
Combining this equation with (6.6), (6.10) and (6.15) yields the reduced-form solution
for capital taxes:
t∗ =
K¯
2β
− α · L∗
=
K¯
2β
− α ·
[
αK¯
1 + cγ
]1/γ
. (6.16)
The optimal tax rate is, thus, driven by two concerns (see also Haufler et al., 2008):
First, capital taxes contribute to financing the public good, which ceteris paribus calls
for a strictly positive tax rate (see the first term on the RHS of (6.16)). By contrast, and
represented by the second term, capital taxation also has the negative effect of reducing
wages. Thus, workers have, for given levels of labor supply, an incentive to subsidize
capital. We henceforth assume that capital is taxed at a positive rate, presupposing
that the first effect outweighs the second.
Since capital mobility, represented by β, does not affect equilibrium wages (capital
flight is only perceived by governments), capital taxation unambiguously decreases the
more mobile is capital. This is a standard effect in open economies.
More interestingly, a higher degree of postmaterialism reduces also the tax burden
on capital. This can be explained as follows. With labor supply decreasing due to a rise
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in postmaterialism, the adverse effects of capital taxation on labor income are reduced.7
Thus, the incentives to subsidize capital (and, thus, to boost workers’ wages) declines
with stronger postmaterialist attitudes.
6.2.3 The effects of postmaterialism
Let us turn to the ratio of capital to labor taxes, t∗/τ ∗: First, deeper capital market
integration drives down this ratio (since τ ∗ does not depend on β and ∂t
∗
∂β
< 0). As
expected, higher capital mobility reduces the governments’ relative reliance on capital
taxation. Second, and more interestingly, the effect of a rise of postmaterialism on the
tax ratio is unclear since both capital and wage taxes increase with γ. Hence, the effect
of postmaterialism on the tax mix is ambiguous.
Fig. 6.1: Postmaterialism and the ratio of capital to labor taxes
positive tax rate (see the first term on the RHS of (16)). By contrast, and represented by the
second term, capital taxation also has the negative effect of reducing wages. Thus, workers have,
for given levels of labour supply, an incentive to subsidize capital. We henceforth assume that
capital is taxed at a positive rate, presupposing that the first effect outweighs the second.
Since capital mobility, represented by β, does not affect equilibrium wages (capital flight is only
perceived by governments), capital taxation unambiguously decreases the more mobile is capital.
This is a standard effect in open economies.
More interestingly, a higher degree of postmaterialism reduces also the tax burden on capital.
This can be explained as follows. With labour supply decreasing due to a rise in postmaterialism,
the adverse effects of capital taxation on labour income are reduced.6 Thus, the incentives to
subsidize capital (and, thus, to boost workers’ wages) declines with stronger postmaterialist
attitudes.
2.3 The effects of postmaterialism
Let us turn to the ratio of capital to labour taxes, t∗/τ∗: First, deeper capital market integration
drives down this ratio (since τ∗ does not depend on β and ∂t
∗
∂β < 0). As expected, higher
capital mobility reduces the governments’ relative reliance on capital taxation. Second, and
more interestingly, the effec of a rise of postmaterialis on the tax ratio is unclear since both
capital and wage taxes increase with γ. Hence, the effect of postmaterialism on the tax mix is
ambiguous.
2 4 6 8 10 Γ
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
tΤ
Figure 1: Postmaterialism and the ratio of capital to labour taxes
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the degree of postmaterialism γ and the tax ratio
t∗/τ∗. Parameters in this plot are chosen such that both the capital and the labour tax rate are
6The income loss from capital taxation, represented by ∂w
∂K
∂K
∂t
L in (15), decreases in L.
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the relationship between the degree of postmaterialism γ and
the tax ratio t∗/τ ∗. Parameters in this plot are chosen such that both th capital
and the labor tax rate are positive and, in line with reality, the tax rate on labor
exceeds that on capital (i.e., t∗/τ ∗ < 1).8 From Figure 6.1, the relationship between
7The income loss from capital taxation, represented by ∂w∂K
∂K
∂t L in (6.15), decreases in L.
8We choose K¯ = 100, α = 0.3, β = 2 and c = 0.2. According to Sørensen (2000), the average
effective tax rate on labor income was higher than the effective tax rate on capital income in Nordic
countries and in Continental Europe, while the effective tax rate on capital income was higher in
Anglo-Saxon countries. The time periods covered were 1981 to 1985 and 1991 to 1995. The European
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Fig. 6.2: Postmaterialism and the capital and labor tax rate
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Figure 2: Postmaterialism and the capital and labour tax rate
positive and, in line with reality, the tax rate on labour exceeds that on capital (i.e., t∗/τ∗ < 1).7
From Figure 1, the relationship between the tax ratio and postmaterialism is non-monotonic.
Starting at moderate levels of postmaterialism, the tax ratio increases with the degree of postma-
terialism; here, the potential of postmaterialism to reduce labour supply outweighs the positive
effect via reducing the tax sensitivity of labour supply. At higher levels of postmaterialism the
effects change and the tax-ratio starts to decline. This result is also apparent from Figure 1:
the slope of t(γ) is higher [lower] than the slope of τ(γ) for low [high] levels of postmaterialism.
The non-monotonic relationship between postmaterialism and the tax ratio can be explained by
the response of labour supply towards changes in postmaterialism. Figure 3 shows that labour
supply is converging to a fixed, positive level. Intuitively, even the most ardent postmaterialist
needs a certain amount of labour income to survive (formally, the constant marginal utility of
private consumption will eventually exceed the marginal utility from leisure). Close to this min-
imum level, further increases in the degree of postmaterialism have negligible effects on labour
supply and, consequently, on capital taxation. Thus, above a certain degree of postmaterialism,
the sensitivity effect of postmaterialism dominates and accordingly, the ratio of capital to labour
taxes is decreasing in postmaterialism.
Observe that – with our specification – postmaterialism does not exert much impact on govern-
7We choose K¯ = 100, α = 0.3, β = 2 and c = 0.2. According to Sørensen (2000), the average effective tax rate
on labour income was higher than the effective tax rate on capital income in Nordic countries and in Continental
Europe, while the effective tax rate on capital income was higher in Anglo-Saxon countries. The time periods
covered were 1981 to 1985 and 1991 to 1995. The European Commission (2006, pp. 46ff) reports an implicit
tax rate on labour income of 35.6 percent (unweighted EU average, 2003) while the implicit marginal tax rate on
capital is only 25.6 percent (the average tax rate on capital and business income is even lower at 17.7 percent).
Only in few countries (e.g., United Kingdom and Portugal) or for limited periods of time (e.g., Denmark in 2004)
has capital on the margin been taxed more heavily than labour.
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the tax ratio and postmaterialism is non-monotonic. Starting at moderate levels of
postmaterialism, the tax ratio increases with the degree of postmaterialism; here, the
potential of postmaterialism to reduce labor supply outweighs the positive effect via
reducing the tax sensitivity of labor supply. At higher levels of postmaterialism the
eff cts cha ge and the tax-ratio starts to decline. This result is also apparent from
Figure 6.2: the slope of t(γ) is higher [lower] than the slope of τ(γ) for low [high] levels
of postmaterialism.
The non-monotonic relationship between postmaterialism and the tax ratio can be
explained by the response of labor supply towards changes in postmaterialism. Fig-
ure 6.3 shows that labor supply is converging to a fixed, positive level. Intuitively,
even the most ardent postmaterialist needs a certain amount of labor income to survive
(formally, the constant marginal utility of priv t consumption will eventually exceed
the marginal u ility from leisure). Close to this minimum level, further increases in
the degree of postmaterialism have negligible effects on labor supply and, consequently,
on capital taxation. Thus, above a certain degree of postmaterialism, the sensitivity
effect of postmaterialism dominates and accordingly, the ratio of capital to labor taxes
Commission (2006, pp. 46ff) reports an implicit tax rate on labor income of 35.6 percent (unweighted
EU average, 2003) while the implicit marginal tax rate on capital is only 25.6 percent (the average
tax rate on capital and business income is even lower at 17.7 percent). Only in few countries (e.g.,
United Kingdom and Portugal) or for limited periods of time (e.g., Denmark in 2004) has capital on
the margin been taxed more heavily than labor.
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Fig. 6.3: Postmaterialism and labor supply
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Figure 3: Postmaterialism and labour supply
ment expenditures (i.e., on the level of the publicly provided good). Using (14), (15), and (16),
the size of the government budget in the equilibrium can be calculated as8
G∗ =
αK¯2
2β
−
(
αK¯
1 + c¯γ
)1+1/γ
. (17)
Only the second term in this expression varies (positively) with the postmaterialism parameter
γ. At low levels of postmaterialism, an increase in γ leads to a considerable increase in public
good supply. However, in the range where increased postmaterialism triggers a decline in the
capital-labour tax ratio, the variation of G∗ in γ is only very mild and convergence towards the
constant αK¯2/(2β) is fast. Figure 4 visualizes this.
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Figure 4: Postmaterialism and government expenditures
8For consistency, we also checked whether equilibrium tax rates are such that the economy is in the upward-
sloped part of its Laffer curve. This is the case.
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is decreasing in postmaterialism.
Observe tha – with our specificatio – postmaterialism does not exert much impact
on government expenditures (i.e., on the level of the publicly provided good). Using
(6.14), (6.15), and (6.16), the size of the government budget in the equilibrium can be
calculated as9
G∗ =
αK¯2
2β
−
(
αK¯
1 + c¯γ
)1+1/γ
. (6.17)
Only the second term in this expression varies (positively) with the postmaterialism
parameter γ. At low levels of postmaterialism, an increase in γ leads to a considerable
increase in public good supply. However, in the range where increased postmaterialism
triggers a decline in the capital-labor tax ratio, the variation of G∗ in γ is only very
mild and convergence towards the constant αK¯2/(2β) is fast. Figure 6.4 visualizes this.
A higher degree of postmaterialism does not translate into substantial changes in
the demand for government-provided goods.10 It only affects the tax mix that finances
9For consistency, we also checked whether equilibrium tax rates are such that the economy is in the
upward-sloped part of its Laffer curve. This is the case.
10As mentioned in the introduction, postmaterialism can manifest itself in a higher demand for
cultural activities. To the extent that cultural goods are provided by governments, this would imply a
larger government sector. In the model, this could be captured by a change in the preference for the
government-provided good, i.e., in δ (and, thus, c¯). However, this would require an interpretation of g
as a “non-materialist” good. We refrain from this, allowing that g may also be quite mundane.
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Fig. 6.4: Postmaterialism and government expenditures
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Figure 3: Postmaterialism and labour supply
ment expenditures (i.e., on the level of the publicly provided good). Using (14), (15), and (16),
the size of the government budget in the equilibrium can be calculated as8
G∗ =
αK¯2
2β
−
(
αK¯
1 + c¯γ
)1+1/γ
. (17)
Only the second term in this expression varies (positively) with the postmaterialism parameter
γ. At low levels of postmaterialism, an increase in γ leads to a considerable increase in public
good supply. However, in the range where increased postmaterialism triggers a decline in the
capital-labour tax ratio, the variation of G∗ in γ is only very mild and convergence towards the
constant αK¯2/(2β) is fast. Figure 4 visualizes this.
2 4 6 8 10 Γ
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
G
Figure 4: Postmaterialism and government expenditures
8For consistency, we also checked whether equilibrium tax rates are such that the economy is in the upward-
sloped part of its Laffer curve. This is the case.
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government expenditures.
6.3 Empirical analysis
In this section we test our model empirically. Our main hypothesis is that, for a suf-
ficiently high initial degree of postmaterialism, both a greater capital mobility and a
higher tendency towards postmaterialist values encourage governments to lower the tax
ratio of capital to labor taxes.
Our analysis focuses on OECD countries, i.e., on countries which are characterized
(according to Inglehart and his adherents) by high levels of postmaterialism. There-
fore, we are confident that the collected data come from countries positioned on the
downward-sloped part of the tax ratio curve in Figure 6.1. We consider the period from
1981 to 2000 which was characterized by a rise of postmaterialism (see Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005), a deepening in capital market integration and a decrease in the relative
reliance on capital taxation (see Haufler et al., 2008, and the references therein).
Our approach is in line with recent empirical work on the association between closer
capital market integration with lower (relative) tax burdens on capital (Bretschger and
Hettich, 2002; Haufler et al., 2008; Slemrod, 2004; Schwarz, 2007; Winner, 2005). We go
beyond these studies by adding several proxies for postmaterialism as explanatory vari-
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ables, i.e., by taking explicitly into account social values. Before presenting regression
results, we discuss the data; summary information is provided in Appendix 1.
6.3.1 Proxies for postmaterialism
To operationalize the concept of postmaterialism we use data from the World Values
Surveys (WVS), the largest worldwide investigation of attitudes, values, and beliefs.
The WVS studies were carried out in four waves of national surveys: 1981-1982, 1990-
1991, 1995-1997, and 1999-2001.11 In each wave, respondents were confronted with more
than 200 questions meant to detect their socio-cultural, moral, religious, and political
attitudes. Several of these questions shed light on the valuation of non-material over
material values. Using and aggregating items that were asked in each of the four waves
we construct a total of three proxies for a nation’s tendency towards postmaterialist
goals:
Adjusted Inglehart index. Our first proxy is based on the so-called Inglehart in-
dex, which is meanwhile included in the world values database as a ready-made variable
(Inglehart 1997, 1999). The Inglehart index rests on the relative importance respon-
dents ascribe to the following four items: (1) maintaining order in the nation; (2) give
people more to say; (3) fighting rising prices; and (4) protecting the freedom of speech.
Items (1) and (3) are considered to reflect materialist attitudes while items (2) and (4)
express postmaterialist values. Respondents were asked to indicate which two of these
items they consider to be most important. Then a score of “1” is assigned to the respon-
dent if both choices are materialist, a score of“2”if exactly one choices is postmaterialist,
and a score of “3” for two postmaterialist choices. A nation’s degree of postmaterialism
is then measured by the mean over all scores of the national respondents on this scale.
A major problem with the original Inglehart index is its potential downward bias in pe-
riods of high inflation (then respondents will probably put the fight against rising prices
higher on the political agenda more often and for reasons other than being materialist;
see Hansen and Tol, 2003). To correct for this bias, we use a procedure applied by
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) in a different context: We perform a pooled regression
11Our classification of waves follows the data file available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
However, sometimes (and also on the official webpage) waves are labelled in a different way.
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with the original Inglehart index as an endogenous variable and the inflation rate as an
exogenous variable at the country level and take the residuals from this regression as a
proxy for postmaterialism. We refer to this indicator as the adjusted Inglehart index.
Education qualities. Going beyond the political sphere, our second proxy for post-
materialism is developed from the following question about values in child education:
“Here’s a list of qualities that children can be encouraged at home. Which, if any, do
you consider to be especially important?” The items respondents can choose from in-
clude the qualities “thrift saving money and things”, “hard work”, “independence”, and
“tolerance and respect”. We code each quality with “1” if chosen and with “0” if not. For
each individual we subtract the codes of the first two qualities, which we think to be
preferred by materialists, from the other two qualities, which may be more attractive
for postmaterialists. This locates each individual on a scale from −2 to +2 with higher
values signifying a higher preference for immaterial goods. On the aggregate level, we
calculate a nation’s arithmetic mean on this scale and denote this variable by education
qualities.
Future changes. As a more direct indicator for postmaterialism, we consider the
following question from the WVS: “I’m going to read out a list of various changes in
our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one,
if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing or you
don’t mind.” Among the scenarios to be evaluated is “Less emphasis on money and
material possessions”. For each country, we calculate the percentage of respondents
who answered “good thing” and refer to this postmaterialism proxy as future changes.
These three indexes are hoped to capture important aspects of the multi-faceted
concept of postmaterialism. We expect each of them to be negatively correlated to the
relative reliance on capital taxation, the dependent variable to be discussed now.
6.3.2 Tax measures
To measure tax burdens on both capital and labor, many studies employ revenue-
based measures, derived from national account statistics. These measures can be easily
obtained for a large number of countries but have several important drawbacks (see
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Devereux et al., 2002; Griffith and Klemm, 2004). When tax ratios are calculated as
tax revenues over GDP, both numerator and denominator are driven by factors out
of government control (say, business cycles, the profitability of the corporate sector,
historical events etc.). This limits their reliability for reflecting government tax setting
behavior. A related problem occurs with the implicit tax rates due to Mendoza et al.
(1994) that divide tax revenues earned from one factor by its pre-tax income. These
tax rates are not linear in the “real” tax burden supposed to be approximated.12 As a
consequence, a country with high tax burden might be misleadingly identified as a low
tax country. In contrast to revenue-based ratios, measures based on tax laws give more
direct information on how governments react to changing environments. Thus, they
appear more useful in our context. For capital taxes, we use the effective marginal tax
rate (EMTR), provided by Devereux et al. (2002). The EMTR measures the impact of
tax policy on marginal investments via its impact on capital costs13 and allows inferences
on how tax policy affects the size of the capital stock. This comes close to the capital
tax rate of our theoretical model.14 A drawback of the EMTRs is their sensitivity
to underlying assumptions (financing sources etc.) and their disregard of enforcement
issues.15
To measure the tax burden on wages, we employ the tax wedge on labor income as
provided by OECD (2006). This tax wedge reflects the tax rate faced by a worker in the
manufacturing sector earning average income; it includes social security contributions
and payroll taxes. The tax wedge is based solely on tax laws; yet it is not a marginal
tax rate, which would better capture government-induced distortions of the labor-leisure
decisions.
In the regressions to follow, we use the ratio between the EMTR and the tax wedge
as the independent variable.
12Let t and y denote the “real” tax rate and the pre-tax income, respectively. Suppose y is decreasing
in t. When there are tax exemptions, denoted by E, the Mendoza-tax rate (M) is given by M =
t(1− Ey(t) ). M first increases, and then decreases in t for E > 0. Only without exemptions, i.e. E = 0,
we have M = t.
13We use the base case from Devereux et al. (2002) which applies to an (hypothetical) investment
in plant and machinery, financed by equity.
14We do not use the statutory corporate tax rate and the effective average tax rate (EATR). As
argued in Devereux et al. (2002), the former is relevant for profit shifting, the latter for locational
decisions of multinational enterprises. Both aspects are not in our focus. However, as shown in
Appendix 2, the statistical results are qualitatively the same when EATRs or statutory rates are used.
15See Stewart and Webb (2006) for further criticism of EMTRs.
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6.3.3 Capital mobility and other controls
We follow previous studies by assuming that capital mobility is positively related to the
overall openness of an economy. We employ a composite openness measure provided
by Dreher (2006) and referred to below as economicglob. This measure takes into ac-
count different aspects of economic integration, such as trade and FDI flows, portfolio
investments, but also restrictions on current and capital account. Dreher’s index for a
country’s openness is scaled such that higher values indicate higher levels of economic
integration. A potential drawback of the measure in our context is its broadness. E.g.,
it includes trade flows which might not be associated with cross-border capital move-
ments. A more direct proxy for capital mobility would be the so called Quinn 0-4 index.
However, this qualitative index does not show enough variation to be useful in fixed-
effects regressions (see, e.g., Haufler et al., 2008; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002). In
line with the model presented above, we expect to find a negative correlation between
economicglob and the ratio between the EMTR on capital and the tax wedge on labor.
Clearly, the variables identified as crucial for the tax structure in our simple model
(i.e., the degree of postmaterialism and capital market integration), are not the only
factors driving the tax setting behavior of real-world governments. Therefore, we control
for a variety of other factors. To capture an economy’s relative market size, we employ
a country’s GDP relative to the GDP of USA (size). Such a variable might be relevant
as Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) show that smaller countries face a lower (per
capita) capital elasticity, thus having incentives to tax capital at lower levels. We
therefore expect to find a positive relationship between size and the ratio of capital to
labor taxes.
To control for governments’ ideologies, we use a partisan index (referred to as ideol-
ogy) provided by Potrafke (2010). This index is scaled such that higher values indicate
a stronger position of left-wing over right-wing parties in government and parliament.
As left-wing parties are inclined to rely more heavily on capital taxation, we expect to
find a positive correlation between ideology and the ratio of EMTR to the tax wedge
on labor. To account for budgetary pressures, we include the budget saldo normalized
by GDP (budget saldo). To control for demographic effects on the government budget,
we include the percentage of the total population between 15 and 64 years (pop15to64).
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To capture fluctuations in the business cycle, a country’s unemployment rate (unemp)
and its growth rate of real GDP (growth), measured at PPP, are included. As argued
by Krogstrup (2004), governments might utilize the capital tax rate as an instrument
of employment policy. Against this background, it could be held that unemp negatively
impacts on the ratio of the EMTR to the tax wedge on labor.
6.3.4 Method and results
We construct a panel data set for 17 OECD countries, covering the period from 1981 to
2000.16 As the WVS studies were carried out in four waves only (1981-1982, 1990-1991,
1995-1998, and 2000-2002), we obtain at maximum four observations for the national
postmaterialism indexes during the period under study. To generate yearly values,
we linearly interpolate between two waves for each country. This imputation, though
rough, allows for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity between countries, that we
otherwise cannot control for. However, our data set is still “unbalanced” since not all
countries participated in every wave. If, say, a country did not participate in the first
wave but in each of the subsequent ones, then the time series for this country starts
with the date at which the second wave was conducted. For these reasons, we come up
with a maximum number of 265 observations for the postmaterialism measures derived
from the WVS.
The statistical model we estimate is:(
EMTR
tax wedge on labor
)
it
= Xitβ + ai + bt + uit.
Here, the Xit are the explanatory variables in country i at time t and uit is a possible
heteroskedastic and serially correlated error. Variables ai absorb all unobserved effects
that differ among countries but are constant over time, whereas variables bt represents
unobserved factors that are identical for all countries but change over time.17 To ensure
conservative statistical inferences, results are presented by using heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation robust standard errors following the approach developed by Newey and
16The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
USA.
17To control for fixed effects, we include year and time dummies in our regressions below.
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West (1987).18
Tab. 6.1: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
economicglob -0.31∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
size -0.60∗ -0.24 -0.02 -0.38
(0.32) (0.40) (0.38) (0.39)
ideology 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
budget saldo 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
pop15to64 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
growth 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
unemp -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
adj. Inglehart index -0.60∗∗
(0.24)
future changes -1.01∗
(0.64)
education qualities -0.45∗∗
(0.15)
observations 311 256 265 265
R2 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: HAC-robust standard errors with a lag-length of one in parentheses. All regressions include country-
fixed and time-fixed effects. Dummies are not reported. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The main regression results are shown in Table 6.1. The basic specification, pre-
sented in column (1), does not include postmaterialism indexes and regresses the ratio
between the EMTR and the tax wedge on labor on the openness measure, economic-
glob, controlling for various other factors described earlier. The relationship between
economicglob and the tax ratio is negative and highly statistically significant. While
this result is in full accordance with the theoretical prediction that deeper capital mar-
ket integration involves a lower relative tax burden on capital, many previous studies
fail to produce that observation. The reason why we obtain the expected sign may be
due to the circumstance that we use a tax ratio as a dependent variable and not the
18To obtain HAC-consistent standard errors, we use the Newey-West covariance matrix with lag one.
However, our inferences remain unchanged when using two or more lags.
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capital tax rate on its own.19 However, the coefficient of the market size variable, size,
is negative at a weak statistically significant level. This seemingly contradicts the theo-
retical prediction that larger countries more heavily rely on capital taxes. This “wrong”
sign will survive in (almost) all specifications, but will eventually become statistically
insignificant. Among the other explanatory variables, (only) the coefficients of budget
saldo, pop15to64, and unemp turn out to be statistically significant in the expected
directions.
Columns (2) to (4) in Table 6.1 extend the basic specification by separately adding
our various postmaterialism indexes. Recalling that these indexes are scaled such that
higher values denote a higher tendency towards postmaterialism, all coefficients show
the “correct” negative sign. Moreover, all coefficients are statistically significant ranging
from a ten percent to a five percent level. Thus, our cultural variables quite successfully
explain the ratio of EMTR to tax wedge on labor.
As mentioned above, the effect of size becomes statistically insignificant after includ-
ing postmaterialism measures. This might be due to fact that our market size variable is
strongly positively correlated with the postmateralism proxies:20 When omitting post-
materialism indexes from the regression, the effects of postmaterialism effect may be
hidden in the market power proxy. After all, size (= national GDP, relative to US-GDP)
also captures wealth effects, and the high correlation between size and the degree of
postmaterialism conforms with Inglehart (1990)’s prediction that richer countries ex-
hibit stronger tendencies towards postmaterialism.
6.3.5 Extensions and robustness
Appendix 2 reports some further robustness checks. Specifically, our results do not
change when we use the ratio between the EATR (rather than the EMTR) on capital
to the tax wedge on labor as the dependent variable. We still obtain a (statistically
significant) negative relationship between postmaterialism and tax structure (see col-
umn (1) in Table 6.2). However, when using the ratio between the nominal corporate
income tax rate and the tax wedge on labor, the (still negative) relationship becomes
insignificant in some regressions (see column (2) in Table 6.2).
19Schwarz (2007) arrives at a similar conclusion.
20E.g., the correlation between size and the adjusted Inglehart index is +0.35.
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Postmaterialism remains statistically significant for the tax mix after controlling for
per-capita GDP (see column (3) in Table 6.2). This indicates that cultural attitudes
indeed exert a genuine influence on the tax mix that is not driven by changes in economic
circumstances.
Recall that we control for country-fixed effects in all regressions. This makes vari-
ables that change only slightly over time – which is often said of attitudes and beliefs –
difficult to become significant. Moreover, standard errors are estimated in a HAC-robust
way which likewise depresses significance. When estimating without autocorrelation-
robust standard errors, parameter estimates for the postmaterialism proxies become
statistically significant at the one-percent level (see column (4) in Table 6.2). The ro-
bustness of our regression results is further supported by the fact that all coefficients
that are significant in our basic regressions maintain their signs and (in almost every
case) their significance when postmateralism proxies are added.
We also tested whether government expenditures are affected by the degree of post-
materialism.21 The results are inconclusive in sign and statistically insignificant. This
is in full accordance with our theoretical model which predicts that, above a certain
(and relatively low) level, postmaterialism only affects the structure of taxation but not
the overall budget size (see Section 6.2.3).
6.4 Conclusion and discussion
Cultural values shape policy outcomes. Starting from that premise, we investigated the
impact of a growing tendency towards postmaterialism on tax policies. Specifically, we
analyzed how the relative importance which society ascribes to non-consumptive values
affects its choice of tax structure, i.e., the mix of capital and labor taxation.
Postmaterialism means that individuals place higher priority on non-material goods
in their preferences. This includes both a reduced preference weight on goods other
than (materialist) consumption and a weaker responsiveness to (dis-)incentives to make
money. Understood in that way, a higher and substantial degree of postmaterialism
goes along with a lower [higher] relative tax burden on capital [labor]. People who are
21We use the same proxies for postmaterialism as in the estimations for the tax structure. Results
for these regressions are available from the authors upon request.
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less interested in material possessions are also less sensitive to higher labor taxation.
Since postmaterialists put relatively lower priority on consumption, their avoidance of
taxation by fleeing into leisure is low as well. Thus, a higher degree of postmaterialism
has a similar effect on the tax mix as a higher degree of capital mobility, though through
an entirely different channel. Changes in attitudes may, thus, complement the standard
“globalization argument” for the observed decline in the relative importance of capital
taxes.
Our model has clear predictive power: The rise of postmaterialist values in advanced
economies triggered, on its own, reductions in the relative reliance on capital taxation.
Testing the predicted negative link between postmaterialism and the relative reliance on
capital taxation proved fully successful: All estimates for postmaterialism parameters
show the predicted sign at high levels of statistical significance.
Several critical points – which then open avenues for future research – have to be
stressed, though. Foremost, our modelling of postmaterialism is open to dispute. We
limited the effects of postmaterialism to labor supply. Arguably, postmaterialism in
a more complete, intertemporal framework should be modelled as to also affect the
allocation of capital.
Furthermore, the simple link we assumed between postmaterialism and the elasticity
of labor supply has only superficially been established empirically so far. In spite of the
widespread discussion of postmaterialism (starting in the 1970s) empirical studies on the
behavioral consequences of changes in attitudes towards material values are remarkably
scarce. Still, we believe that our way of modelling captures, in a manageable way,
important features of the complex phenomenon of dampened materialism. Moreover,
our modelling of postmaterialist preferences gives rise to hypotheses that themselves
turn out to have empirical content and support. If our empirical findings are not mere
statistical artefacts but rest on some underlying causality, then our model might be one
candidate for an explanation.
Theoretically, the relationship between postmaterialism and the capital-labor tax
ratio is not monotonic, but hump-shaped. At low levels, lesser importance attached to
material goods leads to a higher, rather than to a smaller, reliance on capital taxes. For
the empirical part we excluded this feature, arguing that the countries in our sample
are, by common standards, highly postmaterialist. Non-availability of data at present
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forbids to extend our empirical analysis also to (still) more materialist countries. Closing
this gap is on our agenda for future research.
Finally, we represent the [increased] importance of postmaterialist values by [the
exogenous change of] an exogenous parameter. There is some evidence (also manifest
in the selection of countries for the empirical analysis) that postmaterialism is an atti-
tude dominantly found in richer economies – and, thus, is at least partly endogenous.
Allowing for endogenous value formation is a further challenge – both from a theoretical
and an empirical perspective.
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6.5 Appendix 1: Data sources and methods
Variable Source Definition
EMTR IFS data Effective marginal tax rate for a (hypothetical) invest-
ment. Base case (investment in plant and machinery, fi-
nanced by equity). For further details, see Devereux et al.
(2002).
EATR IFS data Effective average tax rate for an project with an expected
rate of economic profit of 10 percent. Base Case. For
further details, see Devereux et al. (2002).
nominal IFS data Statutory corporate income tax rate, including local taxes
and surcharges.
tax wedge OECD Taxing Wages Average tax wedge of a single, manufacturing worker with
average income, including social security contributions
and payroll taxes. Before 1993, it is reported biannually,
and we interpolate linearly.
economicglob KOF data Openness measure taking into account different aspects
of economic integration. For further details, see Dreher
(2006).
gdp AMECO Gross domestic product at current market prices (billion
US-$, PPP)
size AMECO, own calculation GDP of country divided by GDP of USA
budget saldo OECD Budget saldo, in percent of GDP
ideology Potrafke (2010) Partisan index, where higher values indicate a stronger
position of left wing over right wing parties. For further
details, see Potrafke (2010).
pop15to64 AMECO Percentage of the total population between 15 and 64 years
growth AMECO Growth rate of real GDP, measured at PPP
unemp OECD Unemployment rate
per capita GDP AMECO GDP divided by total population
inflation AMECO, OECD Inflation rate
adj. Inglehart index WVS, own calculation Proxy for a country’s tendency towards postmaterialism.
For a detailed description, see Section 6.3.1.
future changes WVS, own calculation Postmaterialism proxy. For a detailed description, see Sec-
tion 6.3.1.
education qualities WVS, own calculation Postmaterialism proxy. For a detailed description, see Sec-
tion 6.3.1.
Sources:
IFS data available from http://www.ifs.org.uk.
All OECD data are available from http://new.sourceoecd.org.
AMECO data are available from http://ec.europa.eu.
KOF data are available from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch.
WVS data are available from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
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6.6 Appendix 2: Additional regressions
Tab. 6.2: Additional regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable EATR/tax
wedge
Nominal/tax
wedge
EMTR/tax
wedge
EMTR/tax
wedge
economicglob -0.18∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08)
size 0.36 1.1∗∗∗ 0.28 -0.23
(0.27) (0.33) (0.52) (0.34)
ideology 0.005 0.002 0.01 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
budget saldo 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004)
pop15to64 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
growth 0.0004 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
unemp -0.01∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
adj. Inglehart -0.37∗∗ -0.25† -0.51∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17)
per capita GDP -4.18∗
(2.28)
observations 256 256 256 265
R2 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.92
Note: HAC-robust standard errors with a lag-length of one in parentheses. All regressions include country-
fixed and time-fixed effects. Dummies are not reported. † p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 7
Culture and Tax Structures 1
7.1 Introduction
Taxation varies widely internationally, not only in the details of tax codes and tariffs but
also in its overall structure. Particularly pervasive differences prevail in the taxation
of personal versus corporate incomes. For illustration, Figure 7.1 reports the ratios
between revenues from corporate and personal income taxes in OECD countries.
The ratio between corporate and personal income taxes differs by a factor of five
across OECD countries. As a tendency, the ratio is highest in Eastern European and
Asian countries, in the middle range in Southern European and Anglosaxon countries,
and lowest in Northern Europe and North America. This observation calls for an
explanation, in particular as the relative burden of taxation on individuals (“labor”)
and corporations (“capital”) is a highly sensitive and politically contested feature of the
tax systems.
In this paper we argue that cross-country differences in tax structures could be
caused by differences in values and norms. Specifically, we argue that different strengths
of postmaterialist attitudes play a key role in explaining Figure 7.1. Postmaterialism
roughly describes an attitude that places relatively low emphasis on material possessions
and monetary incentives (we will be more specific below). Its most prominent quanti-
tative measure is the so-called Inglehart postmaterialism index. Figure 7.2 reports the
value of this index (precisely: its difference with respect to the Danish value, which we
1This chapter is co-authored with Andreas Wagener. It was presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting
of the Public Choice Society in San Antonio.
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Fig. 7.1: Cross-country differences in tax ratios
1 Introduction
Taxation varies widely internationally, not only in the details of tax codes and tariffs but
also in its overall structure. Particularly pervasive differences prevail in the taxation of
personal versus corporate incomes. For illustration, Figure 1 reports the ratios between
revenues from corporate and personal income taxes in OECD countries.
Figure 1: Cross-country differences in tax ratios
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Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2009. Averages for 1980, 1990, and 2000 (for details see Section 2).
The ratio between corporate and personal income taxes differs by a factor of five across
OECD countries. As a tendency, the ratio is highest in Eastern European and Asian
countries, in the middle range in Southern European and Anglosaxon countries, and
lowest in Northern Europe and North America. This observation calls for an explanation,
in particular as the relative burden of taxation on individuals (“labour”) and corporations
(“capital”) is a highly sensitive and politically contested feature of the tax systems.
In this paper we argue that cross-country differences in tax structures could be caused
by differences in values and norms. Specifically, we argue that different strengths of
postmaterialist attitudes play a key role in explaining Figure 1. Postmaterialism roughly
describes an attitude that places relatively low emphasis on material possessions and
monetary incentives (we will be more specific below). Its most prominent quantitative
measure is the so-called Inglehart postmaterialism index. Figure 2 reports the value of
1
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2009. Averages for 1980, 1990, and 2000 (for details see Sec-
tion 7.3).
use for normalization), with higher values indicating stro ger d grees of ostmaterialism
in the population:
Postmaterialist attitudes appear weakest in Eastern European and Asian countries,
moderate in Southern Europe, and highest in North America and Northern Europe. A
quick comparison of Figures 7.1 and 7.2 already suggests an intriguing, yet not perfect
correlation (Spearman’s rho is at −0.63): tax policies in more postmaterialist countries
seem o impose a relativ ly higher tax burden on individuals than on corporations. This
paper argues that this finding is not coincidental but that a strong association and even
a causal link from postmaterialist attitudes to tax structures prevails. We test this
hypothesis empirically, controlling for reverse causality by applying an epidemiological
IV approach.
Standard theories of tax structures have difficulties in explaining Figure 7.1. E.g.,
theories of globalization and tax competition would argue that countries more deeply
integrated in international capital markets should tax mobile capital less heavily than
rather immobile labor (Wilson and Wildasin, 2004). Viewing corporate taxes roughly
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Fig. 7.2: Cross-country differences in postmaterialist culture: Ingle-
hart index
this index (precisely: its difference with respect to the Danish value, which we use for
normalization), with higher values indicating stronger degrees of postmaterialism in the
population:
Figure 2: Cross-country differences in postmaterialist culture: Inglehart index
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Note: Country’s score on the Inglehart’s postmaterialism scale. Mean deviations from Denmark.
For details see Section 2.
Source: WVS 1980, 1990, 2000.
Postmaterialist attitudes appear weakest in Eastern European and Asian countries, mod-
erate in Southern Europe, and highest in North America and Northern Europe. A quick
comparison of Figures 1 and 2 already suggests an intriguing, yet not perfect correla-
tion (Spearman’s rho is at −0.63): tax policies in more postmaterialist countries seem to
impose a relatively higher tax burden on individuals than on corporations. This paper ar-
gues that this finding is not coincidental but that a strong association and even a causal
link from postmaterialist attitudes to tax structures prevails. We test this hypothesis
empirically, controlling for reverse causality by applying an epidemiological IV approach.
Standard theories of tax structures have difficulties in explaining Figure 1. E.g., theories
of globalization and tax competition would argue that countries more deeply integrated
in international capital markets should tax mobile capital less heavily than rather immo-
bile labour (Wildasin and Wilson, 2004). Viewing corporate taxes roughly as taxes on
capital (income) and personal income taxes largely as taxes on labour,1 this would imply
1Arlen and Weiss (1995) call this the “rational populist”-view of the corporate tax.
2
Note: Country’s s r t I lehart’s postmaterialism scale. Mean deviations from Denmark.
For details see Section 7.2.
Source: S 1980, 1990, 2000.
as taxes on capital (income) and personal income taxes largely as taxes on labor,2 this
would imply a lower corporate/personal tax ratio in more open economies. However,
many of the economies of Figure 7.1 have similar degrees of openness; it appears im-
plausible that, e.g., Scandinavian countr es are subjected to globalization so much more
intensely than, say, the Netherlands as to warrant such a distinctly lower relative tax
burden on capital. Also political explanations appear problematic. If anything, one
would expect that traditionally social-democrat Scandinavian countries burden corpo-
rations relatively more heavily than individuals than liberal or conservative countries
such as the UK, the US, or Switzerland. Generally, countries with a low ratio between
corporate and personal taxes might be viewed as more business-friendly and less socially
equitable; in that sens , the ranking in Figure 7.1 does n t match with the co mon
reputation of the ranked countries. Different tax structures might also be linked to
different structures of factor markets. E.g., Hungerbu¨hler and van Ypersele (2009) ar-
2Arlen and Weiss (1995) call this the “rational populist”-view of the corporate tax.
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gue that countries with less distorted labor markets would have a higher ratio of profit
to personal income taxes than countries with severe market imperfections. However,
Figure 7.1 does not provide any support for this theory. To the contrary: countries with
flexible labor markets (the U.S. or Denmark, say) have a lower corporate to individual
tax ratio than countries with highly regulated labor markets (say, France, Japan, or
Greece).
This paper argues that differences in value orientations and, in particular, varying
degrees of postmaterialism may help to explain Figure 7.1 (though we do not endeavour
to test the correctness of this or any other theoretical approach). Postmaterialism
de-emphasises material goods (such as consumption, wealth, and income) but gives
higher priority to immaterial goods: belongingness, sense of community, social equity,
esteem, self-expression, freedom of choice, and intangible concerns of the quality of
life (Davis and Davenport, 1999; Hellevik, 1993; Inglehart, 1971, 1997, 1999; Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005; Moors and Vermunt, 2007; Duch and Taylor, 1993). Beginning in
the 1970s, there has been a strong tendency towards higher degrees of postmaterialism
across the globe, covering all socioeconomic classes and democratic as well as non-
democratic states (Inglehart, 1997).3 However, as Figure 7.2 evidences, large cross-
country differences prevail, even between the developed democracies in the OECD.
Economically, a higher degree of postmaterialism is associated with a reduced sensi-
tivity of individuals to monetary incentives (such as changes in prices, wages, and taxes).
This is in line with Inglehart’s (1990, pp. 176f; 1997) observations that, compared to
materialists, postmaterialists are generally less driven by achievement motivation, are
lesser responsive to economic rewards than materialists, and are willing to accept lower
pay for the same amount of labor and at comparable levels of education.4 In short, the
3In the World Values Surveys, the largest investigation on attitudes, values, and beliefs around the
world, a rising share of respondents say that less emphasis on material possessions is a desirable change
in our way of life; a growing number of people consider “hard work” or “saving money” as less valuable
qualities to be taught to a child than tolerance and respect; people to a greater extent stress the
importance of leisure and the “higher” goods in the standard Maslow order; respondents increasingly
think that, when seeking a job, good pay is less important than a feeling of accomplishment and working
with people one likes; people are increasingly interested in arts, music, entertainment and culture; and
respondents are more inclined to view economic growth as a less important policy objective than, say,
the protection of the environment (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
4Uhlaner and Thurik (2007) empirically show that stronger postmaterialism goes along with lower
rates of entrepreneurial activities. Arguing that entrepreneurship is motivated by the hope of making
lots of money, they corroborate that postmaterialists respond less elastically to monetary incentives.
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price (wage, rate-of-return, tax) sensitivity of income-generating household activities
(labor supply, saving etc.) decreases with the strength of postmaterialism. The theory
of optimal taxation demands that such goods or activities ought to be taxed more heav-
ily that respond relatively less sensitively (inverse elasticity rule). Presupposing that
OECD countries are all comparably open and that integrated capital markets equalize
the tax sensitivity of investment and capital internationally, stronger postmaterialist
attitudes would then call for a higher relative tax burden on personal incomes – as
suggested by the correlation between Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Under this proviso, stronger
postmaterialism would ceteris paribus also imply larger government budgets since the
lower excess burden of personal income taxes reduces the marginal costs of public funds.
While not our prime target, Section 7.3 will provide some tentative evidence for this
hypothesis too.
In positing a link between postmaterialism and the relative tax burden on individual
incomes, our research adds to a growing literature on the complementarity between
values and cultures and the design of economic policy (Guiso et al., 2006; Fernandez,
2010; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009). Trust as an indicator for social capital (La Porta
et al., 1997, Aghion et al., 2011), civic attitudes (Algan and Cahuc, 2009), and social
identities (Shayo, 2009) are the most widely used cultural indicators; labor market
institutions, mechanisms conducive to growth and development, and the design of the
welfare state, education and of intergenerational transfers are important explananda.
For our study, two strands in this literature are particularly relevant: approaches that
relate policy changes to postmaterialism and approaches that try to explain features of
the tax system in terms of culture.
Shifting priorities from materialist issues to postmaterialist, quality-of-life goals ar-
guably impacts on political institutions, processes, and policy choices. Political sci-
entists argue that postmaterialism helps to promote good governance and democratic
participation (see, e.g., Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), fosters the emergence of social
movements with concerns about civil rights, inequality, the environment, or the perils
of globalization (Inglehart, 1997; della Porta and Diani, 1999). Postmaterialism has so
far not been related to (changes in) tax policies. Rather, taxation has been linked to
other cultural predispositions. Alesina and Angeletos (2005), e.g., trace differences in
redistributive taxation between Western Europe and the United States back to different
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perceptions about how fair market outcomes are. Hodler (2008) points out that differ-
ent attitudes towards leisure (which one might loosely associate with postmaterialism)
shape the size of welfare states and, by and large, the overall tax burden (without any
implications for the tax structure). Franzen (2003) and others report evidence that
the appreciation for eco-taxes is greater in postmaterialist than in materialist coun-
tries, leaving it open, however, whether this merely reflects increased concerns for the
environment or a generally reduced price sensitivity. Qari et al. (2011) build on the
assumption that individual values impact on tax sensitivities. Specifically, they posit
that patriotic identification keeps mobile tax payers more attached to their home coun-
try; governments in turn can exploit this when financing a redistributive tax-transfer
system. However, none of the studies we are aware of relates values and norms to the
composition of the tax burden or to the tax mix. This is our focus.
We report cross-country evidence for a strong and statistically significant association
between postmaterialist attitudes and tax structure: countries displaying high degrees
of postmaterialist attitudes indeed tend to tax labor disproportionately more heavily
than capital. However, the impact of culture on policy outcomes is potentially conflated
with reverse effects: tax policy affects (post-)materialist attitudes (in an a priori unclear
direction).5 For instance, by heavily taxing personal incomes the government might
convey a perception that an individual’s material wealth, work effort or the income
generated through it are in low esteem socially. Also a negative impact cannot be
excluded: high taxation of personal incomes might leave less to consume for individuals
whose increased marginal utility from consumption then is expressed in terms of more
materialist values. To capture reverse causality, we adopt an epidemiological approach
a` la Ferna´ndez (2008, 2010) or Algan and Cahuc (2009): we measure postmaterialist
attitudes in a country by those of American-born citizens whose ancestors emigrated
from that country to the US two generations ago (see Section 7.4). These inherited
values are not shaped by the instantaneous economic and institutional environment
in the country where people are currently living. As the degree of postmaterialism of
people born and living in the U.S. is strongly positively associated with the attitudes of
5On a macro-level, Inglehart and Baker (2000) are among the first to study such a “reverse” impact
of economic and institutional factors on changes in values and culture. They show that economic
changes indeed have systematic and predictable cultural consequences.
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today’s populations in their ancestors’ country of origin we can use it as an instrument
for today’s postmaterialism in the home country. Doing so, we are still able to identify
that more postmaterialist countries tend to tax personal incomes relatively more heavily
than corporate incomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Based on data from the World Values
Surveys, Section 7.2 constructs estimates for the degree of postmaterialism in OECD
countries. Section 7.3 regresses national tax structures on postmaterialist values, con-
firming the correlation apparent from Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Section 7.4 statistically
identifies the validity of these correlations by use of an epidemiological IV approach.
Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 Measuring postmaterialist culture in OECD coun-
tries
To operationalize the concept of postmaterialism, we built on the so-called four-item
Inglehart index (due originally to Inglehart, 1971), one of the most widely used and
replicated measure of postmaterialism in political and social science literature. This
index is included in most large-scale survey data sets, thus enabling us to use the epi-
demiological approach in Section 7.4, which is demanding in terms of data availability.6
The Inglehart index as employed in the World Values Surveys (WVS) is constructed
from the following question:
“If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is
most important? And which would be the next most important?
1. Maintaining order in the nation;
2. Give people more to say;
3. Fighting rising prices;
4. Protecting the freedom of speech.”
6There is a large literature on the validity and appropriateness of the Inglehart index as a measure
of postmaterialism. See, e.g., the exchange between Davis and Davenport (1999) and Inglehart and
Abramson (1999). Despite some criticism, the Inglehart index continues to be widely accepted.
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Items (1) and (3) are considered to reflect materialist values (economic and physical
security) while items (2) and (4) express postmaterialist life goals (autonomy and self-
expression). If a respondent chooses the two materialist items, he/she is scored with “1”
as a degree of postmaterialism; if both postmaterialist items are given selected he/she is
assigned a value of “3”; individuals with mixed choices get a score of “2”. The position
on this scale reflects to which extent an individual gives priority to immaterial over
economic values.
Our analysis includes OECD countries for which the WVS question was asked in at
least one of the three main waves 1980-1984, 1990-1994, 1999-2003. These are: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States.7 We refer to the periods as the 1980, 1990 and 2000 wave.
Figure 7.2 in the introduction reports the countries’ mean responses on the Inglehart
index over the three main waves, diminished by the mean score for Denmark (which
is 2.07). Denmark is chosen as a reference country as it is included in all waves. To
look closer at cross-country differences in postmaterialist culture, we take into account
respondents’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics. We do so by running
individual level regressions on the whole three main waves. The statistical model is
Iit = βXit + ηj + it, (7.1)
where Iit represents the score on the Inglehart postmaterialism index of respondent
i at wave date t (t = 1980, 1990, 2000). The control vector Xit contains individual
characteristics such as gender, age, education, income, employment status, religiosity
and political orientation. The error term is denoted by it. The main variables of
interest are the dummies for country j; they are represented by the country fixed effects
ηj (Denmark is chosen as the reference country).
We estimate equation (7.1) by OLS. Table 7.1 presents the regression results with
clustered standard errors at the country level. The signs of the controls are largely
in line with arguments found in political science (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005): the
7The third wave is excluded since it only provides a smaller set of countries and questions.
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Tab. 7.1: OLS estimates of postmaterialism: individual level, WVS.
dependent variable Inglehart index of postmaterialism
Coeff. Std. error
male 0.052∗∗∗ (0.007)
age -0.002 (0.001)
age2 0.000 (0.000)
education 0.034∗∗∗ (0.003)
unemployed 0.027 (0.018)
medium income class 0.017∗ (0.009)
high income class 0.061∗∗∗ (0.016)
left 0.143∗∗∗ (0.019)
right -0.031∗ (0.016)
no religious affiliation 0.074∗∗∗ (0.021)
country fixed effects Yes∗∗∗
constant 1.789∗∗∗ (0.044)
N 57444
R2 0.123
Note: Data is taken from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 waves of the WVS. Reference
category is an individual from Denmark with low-class income and centered politi-
cal orientation. Wave dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
highest income category is associated with higher postmaterialist scores (it is argued
that postmaterialist attitudes primarily arise after basic material needs have been sat-
isfied), as is the case with being left, having no religious affiliation, and being highly
educated. Generally, the individual controls are strongly associated with postmaterial-
ist life goals: most are significant at least at a five-percent level. The country-specific
effects, which can be interpreted as a country’s mean deviation from Denmark’s po-
sition on the Inglehart scale after conditioning on individual heterogeneity, are highly
significant as well. We report them separately in Figure 7.3.
7.3 Tax structure and postmaterialist culture
In this subsection, we correlate postmaterialist culture with policy outcomes. To mea-
sure a country’s of tax burden on corporations, we use corporate tax revenues as a
percentage of GDP. The individual tax burden is measured as the share in GDP of tax
revenues from personal income.8 Government total expenditures relative to GDP are
used to capture public spending levels. The tax structure is measured by the ratio of
8There is an extensive literature on what sort of tax rates are appropriate to measure tax burdens
(see Sørensen, 2004). Ideally, we would like to use effective (forward-looking) marginal effective tax
rates; as a second choice, we would opt for (ex post) macro average effective tax rates. Unfortunately,
neither of these options is feasible since data is not available for a sufficiently large number of countries
and/or periods.
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Fig. 7.3: Cross-country differences in postmaterialist culture: Marginal
country-fixed effects
standard errors at the country level. The signs of the controls are largely in line with
arguments found in political science (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005): the highest income
category is associated with higher postmaterialist scores (it is argued that postmaterialist
attitudes primarily arise after basic material needs have been satisfied), as is the case
with being left, having no religious affiliation, and being highly educated. Generally,
the individual controls are strongly associated with postmaterialist life goals: most are
significant at least at a five-percent level. The country-specific effects, which can be
interpreted as a country’s mean deviation from Denmark’s position on the Inglehart scale
after conditioning on individual heterogeneity, are highly significant as well. We report
them separately in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Cross-country differences in postmaterialist culture: Marginal country-fixed effects
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Note: Country’s conditional score on the Inglehart’s postmaterialism scale. Mean deviations from Denmark.
Source: WVS 1980, 1990, 2000.
Though the ranking of the countries is not identical in every case (e.g., Finland’s score
is somewhat lower), the correlation between the raw data on postmaterialism and the
conditional deviations on the Inglehart scale is almost perfect (r = 0.934).
8
Note: Country’s co i lehart’s postmaterialism scale. Mean deviations from Denmark.
Source: S 1 .
corporate to individual taxes. All data are taken from OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2009.
We visualize the data and correl tions by scatterplots in Figure 7. . There, we map
the corporate and the personal tax burden, the tax ratio and government expenditure
(all averaged over the time span 1980-2003) against the marginal country-specific effects
of postmaterialism, as derived in Section 7.2.
Panel (a) in Figure 7.4 shows that the connection between the tax ratio and and
postmaterialist attitudes is clearly negative and, thus, well in line with our hypoth-
esis. In fact, the predictive power of the postmaterialist trait is surprisingly strong:
the bivariate linear regression exhibits R2 = 0.4130, such that the proxy for postma-
terialism explains more than 40 percent of the cross-country variation in relative tax
burdens. The more materialist Eastern European countries rely, to a great deal, on
taxes on corporate income. In contrast, the more postmaterialist Nordic countries tend
more towards personal income taxation. Panel (b) relates cross-country heterogeneity
in personal income taxes (as a percentage of GDP) to postmaterialist attitudes. The
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Fig. 7.4: Postmaterialist culture and policy outcomes
Figure 4: Postmaterialist culture and policy outcomes
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(d)
3 Tax structure and postmaterialist culture
In this subsection, we correlate postmaterialist culture with policy outcomes. To measure
a country’s of tax burden on corporations, we use corporate tax revenues as a percentage
of GDP. The individual tax burden is measured as the share in GDP of tax revenues
from personal income.7 Government total expenditures relative to GDP are used to
capture public spending levels. The tax structure is measured by the ratio of corporate
to individual taxes. All data are taken from OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2009.
We visualize the data and correlations by scatterplots in Figure 4. There, we map the
corporate and the personal tax burden, the tax ratio and government expenditure (all
averaged over the time span 1980-2003) against the marginal country-specific effects of
postmaterialism, as derived in Section 2.
Panel (a) in Figure 4 shows that the connection between the tax ratio and and post-
7There is an extensive literature on what sort of tax rates are appropriate to measure tax burdens (see
Sorensen, 2004). Ideally, we would like to use effective (forward-looking) marginal effective tax rates; as
a second choice, we would opt for (ex post) macro average effective tax rates. Unfortunately, neither
of these options is feasible since data is not available for a sufficiently large number of countries and/or
periods.
9
connection is strongly positive (R2 = 0.2360). The association between corporate taxa-
tion and postmaterialism appears to be negative; see panel (c). One conjecture (which
we have not verified) might be that the corporate sector itself is smaller in postmate-
rialist economies. Generally, however, the picture is less clear cut when compared to
th other panels; it also is more vulnerable to outlier pro lems.9 Panel (d) reveals a
positive, but quite weak correlation between postmaterialist attitudes and government
spending (R2 = 0.0561). This might reflect the postmaterialist predilection for social
equality, education or cultural activiti s or simply a generally lower marginal cost of
public funds in less tax-sensitive economies; owever, we d ot pursue this direction
any further.
To check whether the connections presented so far survive in a more rigorous regres-
9Excludi g the countries with the highest corporate taxes, the line of fitness wo l be almost
horizontal.
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Tab. 7.2: Postmaterialist Culture and Tax Policy (OLS)
tax personal corporate
structure taxes taxes
(1) (2) (3)
postmaterialist culture -0.639∗∗ 12.545∗∗ -2.630
(0.267) (5.148) (1.831)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
openness 0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
constant 0.092 12.522∗∗∗ 1.046
(0.139) (2.970) (0.707)
N 49 49 49
R2 0.238 0.250 0.174
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
sion framework, we estimate the following model:
Tjt = b0 + β1ηj,t + β2Xjt + jt. (7.2)
where Tjt denotes the respective tax variable in country j at wave date t. Postmaterialist
culture is represented by the country-fixed effects ηj,t. We extract them by estimating a
model similar to equation (7.1). In contrast to Section 7.2, we run individual regressions
separately for each wave. Thus, we get a cultural variable for each country at different
dates, endowing us with a maximum number of observations. Model (7.2) includes
controls at the national level, Xjt. To measure a country’s degree of openness, we use
the share of exports plus imports in GDP. We also control for per capita GDP. To get
consistency with our cultural data, the dependent variable and the controls are averaged
over the corresponding wave periods.
Table 7.2 reports the results where we cluster standard errors at the country level
and include time dummies. These results are in line with the correlations presented
in the scatterplots earlier: in particular, postmaterialism is negatively linked to the
tax ratio. The coefficient in the first column indicates that the effects are economically
sizeable. An increase in the degree of postmaterialism of 0.4 (which is, e.g., the difference
between Poland and Denmark) goes along with a decline in the corporate-to-personal
tax ratio of 25 percentage points.
Regression results for the raw data can be found in the Appendix (see Table 7.5);
they exhibit significance at even higher confidence levels.
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7.4 Epidemiological approach
So far we presented a stable link between postmaterialist culture and tax policy, sug-
gesting that societies with a lower emphasis on material values shift tax burden from
corporate to personal income. However, serious endogeneity issues arise in this context.
A first concern is that our estimates are biased by reverse causation. E.g., higher taxes
on personal incomes decreases private consumption which may go in hand with a value
shift towards material goods and possessions. Economically, this reflects decreasing
marginal utilities, in political science, this goes under the name of Inglehart’s Scarcity
Hypothesis (see Inglehart, 1997). Second, the regression analyses so far may suffer from
an omitted variable bias since the vector of controls in equation (7.2) might not include
all factors that are both correlated with policy outcomes and a country’s position on
the Inglehart scale (e.g., current economic and institutional conditions).
In this section, we tackle these problems by an epidemiological approach which
has been proved a powerful tool to obtain exogenous variation in cultural variables in
the recent literature on the role of culture in economics (for survey and critique, see
Ferna´ndez, 2010).
Our empirical strategy is as follows. To separate culture from its specific national
settings, we study individuals who share an identical political and economic environ-
ment but whose system of values and beliefs potentially differ, and this in a way that
systematically reflects the cross-national differences in culture we are interested in.
Specifically, we use information on the postmaterialist inclinations of second-generation
immigrants in the US. These immigrants were born in the US and are living there; they
were neither exposed to the current policy of their country of ancestry nor to potentially
omitted variables in equation (7.2), such as the prevailing ideology, current macroeco-
nomic situations or institutions.10 At the same time, these individuals are likely to
have inherited a significant part of their ancestor’s country’s degree of postmaterialism
through their parents’ cultural habits and practices. We exploit this source of variation
to instrument for the country-specific effects gained from the WVS.
10It cannot be ruled out that immigrants born in the US are still in touch with their home countries’
conditions, e.g., via contacts with family members and friends who have not emigrated. We miti-
gate this problem by focusing on second- and higher-generation immigrants, excluding first-generation
immigrants.
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We use data from the US General Social Surveys (GSS) which include a question
similar to that of the WVS quoted above. In the 1993, 1994 and 2000 waves, respondents
were asked:
“Looking at the list below, please check a box next to the one thing you think
should be America’s highest priority, the most important thing it should do.
America should . . .
1. Maintain order;
2. Give people more say;
3. Control prices;
4. Protect free speech.”
Respondents could then name which two of these items they considered to be America’s
first and second priorities. We classify an individual as a postmaterialist if items (2)
and (4) were both selected (score “3”). We assign scores for the mixed and materialist
categories (scores “2” and “1”, respectively). We restrict the GSS dataset to a sample
comprising second (or higher) generation immigrants only.11 On this subsample, we run
OLS regressions of the form:
Iij = βXi +Gj + i. (7.3)
Here, Iij stands for the individual score on the Inglehart scale of an American-born re-
spondent i whose ancestors come from country j. Gj represents the dummies associated
with the country of origin j. The fixed effects capture the inherited part of postmate-
rialism transmitted from the country of origin through the customs of respondents’ i
ancestors (we again use Denmark as reference category). We combine data from 1993
and 1994 to one wave, representing the early 1990’s. Thus, we can estimate the country
of origin fixed effect, Gj, for two dates that are comparable with the 1990 and the 2000
wave periods from the WVS. In both regressions we control for the same individual
characteristics, Xi, as in Section 7.2. The coefficients of the controls have in almost all
11A respondent is classified as an (at least) second-generation immigrant based on the GSS question
“From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come from?”
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cases the same signs as above and are statistically highly significant. In the Appendix,
we show the regression results for the 1990 wave (see Table 7.6).
We then estimate the following two-stage model
ηj,t = c0 + c1Gj,t + c2Xjt + vjt, (7.4)
Tjt = b0 + β1ηj,t + β2Xjt + jt. (7.5)
Equation (7.4) represents the first-stage regression of postmaterialist culture of home
country j on average postmaterialism of second-generation Americans with ancestors
from country j. Equation (7.5) represents the second stage, where the tax variable, Tjt,
is regressed on the inherited part of culture, ηj,t, i.e., on those parts of culture which
are separated from the current political and economic conditions of country j at wave
date t ∈ (1990, 2000). The control variables and the policy measures are the same as in
Section 7.3 and averaged over the corresponding time period.
The first-stage estimates are reported in Table 7.3.12 The coefficient of the marginal
country of origin fixed effects is 0.43 and significant at the five percent level, indicating
that strong cultural transmissions between generations take place.
Tab. 7.3: First-Stage Estimates of Postmaterialism in the Home Country
Dependent variable: Postmaterialism in the
home country
Coeff. Std. error
Inherited Postmaterialism of Americans from
their country of origin
0.430∗∗ (0.206)
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000)
openness 0.000 (0.000)
constant 0.073 (0.136)
N 20
R2 0.288
Note: WVS, 1990, 2000. GSS, 1990, 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The second-stage estimates for the different policy regressions are shown in Table 7.4.
The IV results are qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates of section 7.3. In spite of
a decrease in the number of observations13 we gain significant parameter estimates for
12Our analysis includes those OECD countries for which policy variables and cultural data from the
GSS are available from at least one of the two waves 1990 and 2000. These countries are: Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom.
13Due to limited data availability, such drops are not uncommon in studies using the epidemiological
approach; cf., e.g., Algan and Cahuc (2009) or Halla (2010).
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the instrumented marginal effects of postmaterialist culture in the regressions for the
tax structure (column 1) and personal taxes (column 2).
Tab. 7.4: Second-Stage Regression of Tax Policy
tax personal corporate
structure taxes taxes
(1) (2) (3)
postmaterialist culture -1.458∗∗ 42.843∗∗ -3.427
(0.564) (20.518) (2.584)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
openness 0.000 -0.011 -0.001
(0.000) (0.008) (0.001)
constant 0.388∗ 5.445 1.742∗∗
(0.217) (6.076) (0.746)
N 20 20 20
Note: WVS, 1990, 2000. GSS, 1990, 2000. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
These findings make us confident that the cross-country differences in tax struc-
tures observed in Figure 7.1 are indeed causally related to difference in material-
ist/postmaterialist attitudes, depicted in Figure 7.2.
7.5 Conclusion
Inglehart (1971) defines postmaterialism as the relative importance people ascribe to
immaterial values relative to material goods. Put simpler, it is the degree of how little
people are impressed by money. As taxation is foremost associated with a smaller purse,
people’s attitude towards money may have an effect on how strongly governments can
tax them or how elastically they try to escape from the government’s grabbing hands.
Differences in value-induced perceptions of the burden imposed by taxes and in the
responsiveness to taxation will then translate into different tax mixes in a society.
If people place lower relative emphasis on the material aspects of their work, they
might also be less sensitive to their incomes being taxed away, implying that govern-
ments can increase the relative tax burden on individuals without generating too much
political discomfort or too high an excess burden. In line with this idea, we demonstrate
that in the OECD countries with higher priority on postmaterialist life goals tend to
have low ratios of corporate to personal taxes.
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Our paper adds another piece of evidence to the hypothesis that culture indeed
impacts on economic policy. Yet, the interaction between culture and the economic
and institutional environment could also go the other way round. Studies of how tax
structures affect cultural values and their changes would, thus, be an important addition
to the literature.
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7.6 Appendix
Tab. 7.5: Postmaterialist Culture and Tax Policy (OLS)
tax personal corporate
structure taxes taxes
(1) (2) (3)
Inglehart index -0.708∗∗∗ 14.312∗∗∗ -2.463
(0.255) (4.999) (1.603)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
openness 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
constant 1.553∗∗∗ -17.058∗∗ 6.206∗∗
(0.445) (7.939) (2.985)
N 53 53 53
R2 0.3 0.316 0.187
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Tab. 7.6: OLS estimation of postmaterialism: individual level, GSS data.
dependent variable Inglehart index of postmaterialism
Coeff. Std. error
male 0.168∗∗∗ (0.042)
age -0.001 (0.008)
age2 0.000 (0.000)
education 0.019∗∗∗ (0.004)
income 0.002 (0.006)
unemployed 0.032 (0.136)
left 0.13∗∗∗ (0.023)
right -0.026 (0.048)
no denomination 0.138∗∗ (0.064)
country dummies Yes∗∗∗
constant 1.877∗∗∗ (0.168)
N 925
R2 0.068
Note: Daten is taken from the 1993 and 1994 waves of the GSS. Reference
category is an immigrant from Denmark with centered political orientation.
Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.
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